THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP

1. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP Topic #26

2. Presidential Power • In Presidential debates, candidates pretty much ask viewers and potential voters to choose between them on the grounds that “my plan” (on health care, immigration, energy, taxes, etc) is better than “my opponent’s plan.” • Such arguments might suggest a sensible basis for choosing between two candidates for dictator (and perhaps even two candidates for British Prime Minister), but do they provide a sensible basis for choosing between two candidates for U. S. President?

3. Presidential Power (cont.) • Such “plans” require legislation passed by Congress. • The President can • recommend legislation to Congress, • veto bills passed by Congress, • influence Congress with veto threats, • lobby members of Congress in various ways, and • and use his “bully pulpit” to try mobilize public opinion and thereby influence Congress. • But the President does not in any reliable way control Congress, • in anything like the way a Prime Minister or Cabinet controls a majority of votes in Parliament, • and this is true even if the President’s party controls Congress. • A Presidential candidate may say “if I’m elected,” I will carry out my “plan,” but Congress controls most of the instruments for carrying it out.

5. Presidential Power (cont.) • Moreover, because the President doesn’t control Congress, he doesn’t fully control “his” administration either. • A bureau is a unit of the executive branch that has been created by Congress and is charged with carrying out particular laws (see Enhanced Study Guide for Topic #27: The Bureaucracy). • The bureaus that make up the executive branch “report to” Cabinet secretaries and other Presidential appointees, who in turn “report to” the President, • but they depend on Congress for • their budgets ($$$), • legislative authorization of their programs, and indeed • their very existence, • so they have incentives to “report to” Congress as well.

6. Presidential Power (cont.) • The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 requires the President to draw up a federal budget with a proposed allocation for each bureau. • But the President’s budget is only a proposal to Congress • [unlike the government budget presented to the British Parliament by the Chancellor of the Exchequer], and • Congress can give any bureau either more or less than the President’s budget provides. • This encourages a bureau to try to develop close and friendly relationships with Congress, • which really means with the committee within whose specialized jurisdiction the bureau falls. • It also encourages a bureau to try to develop close and friendly relations with constituencies and interest groups that are affected by the bureau’s operations.

7. Presidential Power (cont.) • Bureaus that are especially successful in these respects particularly include those that play a major role in distributive or “pork barrel” politics, • because such issues are typically of greatest interest to • members of Congress, and • organized interest groups. • Such bureaus tend to be those least under Presidential control. • The parts of the Executive Branch most under Presidential control pertain to foreign policy and national security. • This is where the constitutional powers of the President are at a maximium strongest, and • distributive issues do not arise as much, so • Congress is more deferential to the President, and • interest groups are least controlling. • The “two presidencies” thesis (Aaron Wildavsky): • a “strong” foreign policy President, but • a “weak” domestic policy President.

8. Presidential Power (cont.) • Many (but certainly not all) political scientists and historians believe that the country is better off with a “powerful” President, for three reasons: • The President is the only government official who is a repre-sentative agent of (i.e., elected by and accountable to) the American people as a whole. • The President, having achieved his highest possible political ambition, is concerned how he will be viewed in history books and therefore is guided more by what (he thinks) is best for the country in the long-term (i.e., he is most likely to act as a trustee for the nation). • Powerful Presidents make Presidential elections more meaningful (by making it more likely that the winning candidate can carry his promised “plans”) and thereby promote democratic choice and accountability.

9. Neustadt and Machiavelli • The most famous political science advocate of this point of view was Richard Neustadt: • Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (1960) • Neustadt believed that “what is good for the country is good for the President and vice versa.” • Neustadt’s purpose was to instruct (potential) Presidents how to be strong, effective, and “powerful” leaders. • This was similarly the purpose of Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (1515).

11. Machiavelli (cont.) • Machiavelli is noted for his ruthless advice to political leaders. • A Prince, being thus obligated to know well how to act as a beast, must imitate both the lion and the fox, i.e., be able to use both • coercion and violence (or “hardball politics”), and • stealth and cunning. • James McGregor Burns: Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox • It is necessary for a Prince, if he wants to maintain himself, to learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge or not, according to the necessity of the case. • A Prince ought to be both feared and loved but, as it is difficult for the two to go together, it is much safer for him to be feared than loved, if one of the two must be wanting. • Nothing causes a Prince to be so much esteemed as great enterprises and giving proof of prowess. • And a prince ought, above all things, always to endeavor in every action to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man.

12. Presidential “Powers” vs. “Power” • Neustadt distinguishes between • “Presidential powers,” i.e., • the formal powers attached to the office of President (Topic #25): • constitutionally enumerated powers, • powers delegated to the President by Congress, and • (possibly) inherent executive powers, vs. • “Presidential power,” i.e., • the effective control of the particular office holder over his administration, Congress, and the country.

13. “Powers” vs. “Power” (cont.) • Neustadt notes that: • “presidential powers” are essentially constant, while • “presidential power” is highly variable • over the course of a President’s term, • “honeymoon effect” • “rally-round-the-flag effect” • “never let a good crisis go to waste” • from office holder to office holder (“strong” vs. “weak” Presidents), and • and from historical period to period. • The powers of the office of President guarantee only that the President will be the “chief clerk” of the U.S. government, not that the President is powerful leader of the country.

14. Cases of Command • Presidential powers are illustrated by cases of command, in which a President issues an order (based on his “powers”) that produce dramatic results. • Neustadt’s examples: • President Truman’s firing of General MacArthur (1951); • The steel seizure case (1952); • President Eisenhower sending U.S. Army troops to Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas (1957). • Other examples: • Nixon’s “Saturday Night Massacre” (1973); • any Presidential veto, or [the most extreme example] • using the “red phone” to put the Strategic Air Command in action. • Neustadt notes two points: • such commands are effective only in special circumstances, and • such dramatic uses of “Presidential powers” are often really examples of the failure of “Presidential power.”

15. Determinants of Presidential Power • Neustadt: Presidential power is essentially the power to persuade. • Presidential power to persuade depends two factors. • First, the President’s professional reputation in the minds of other Washington (and other) actors. • “Is this a President we can pretty much ignore without suffering bad consequences, or is this a President we should not cross?” • Thus the President’s day to day actions should in large part be devoted to developing the right kind of reputation, e.g., • for knowing what’s going on, for tenacity, determination, and decisiveness. • So day-to-day issues can’t be decided entirely on their “merits.”

16. Determinants of Presidential Power • Second, the President’s public prestige, as evaluated by other political actors: • Presidential “popularity” • but not necessarily as measured by polls, but rather • as perceived by other political actors, and • perceived as support for policies, not just likeability.

17. Presidential Resources for Power • A unitary office with some powers [the President] may be able to outmaneuver a plural institution with greater powers [Congress], which is moreover divided into rival houses and rival parties. • The “institutional presidency”: • Executive Office of the President • Office of Management and Budget • Budget and Accounting Act (1921) • central clearance (1939) • White House Office • “The bully pulpit” and the development of mass media: • Samuel Kernell, Going Public • evolution of • the State of the Union message, and • presidential press conferences.