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CLINICAL GOVERNANCE A PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW

CLINICAL GOVERNANCE A PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW. By DR BILL BERESFORD. “CLINICAL GOVERNANCE IS THE FRAMEWORK THROUGH WHICH ORGANISATIONS AND THEIR STAFF ARE ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE QUALITY OF PATIENT CARE”. NHS Commission of Health Improvement 1999

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CLINICAL GOVERNANCE A PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW

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  1. CLINICAL GOVERNANCE A PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW • By • DR BILL BERESFORD

  2. “CLINICAL GOVERNANCE IS THE FRAMEWORK THROUGH WHICH ORGANISATIONS AND THEIR STAFF ARE ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE QUALITY OF PATIENT CARE” • NHS Commission of Health Improvement 1999 • - “ a response to Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry”

  3. TODAYS PRESENTATION • Personal Profile • Understanding Inquiries • King Edward Memorial Hospital • Bundaberg Base Hospital • Lessons from Rebuilding • Special Problems for Rural Areas

  4. DR BILL BERESFORD PERSONAL PROFILE • Qualified medicine 1968 & initial specialty training paediatrics then tropical medicine • 1977-79 GP private practice Narrabri, NSW • 1979-84 SMO Derby & Medical Coordinator Kimberley RFDS • 1984-88 Medical Director all WA non-teaching hospitals • 1988-89 Assist. Commissioner of Health • 1989-2000 & 2002 -2005 initially Medical Superintendent then A/CEO Royal Perth Hospital • 2000-2002 A/CEO KEMH & PMH • 2005 – retired July. A/DMS Bundaberg Sept – July 2006 • 2006- Clinical CEO Rockhampton plus clinical leadership role for 9 Health Districts

  5. UNDERSTANDING THE REPORTS • Royal Commissions are run by Lawyers operating within strict boundaries set by Politicians • Inquiries are conducted in an environment of “Trial by Media” • Staff are subject to inquisitorial examination in a culture of blame • Governments in order to be seen to take action seek scapegoats prior to inquiry findings • Learned papers are written by those with second hand knowledge – based predominantly on the inquiry reports

  6. KEY FACTORS LEADING TO ROYAL COMMISSIONS Bristol KEMH Bundaberg Failure of credentialling - - + OT doctor + - + No performance review + + + No critical incident system + + + No response to Incidents + + + Executive distant from Staff + + + No management response + + + Fear of loss of service + - + Budget pressures + + + No review clinical indicator + - + Whistleblower + ? +

  7. KING EDWARD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL (KEMH) • WA’s only tertiary Women’s Hospital • Mid 90’s Board of Management amalgamated Princess Margaret Hospital for Children & KEMH – new CEO • 1998 – single Metropolitan Board of Management – new CEO • Jan 2000 – CEO sacks Executive • Clinical staff at both PMH & KEMH vote no confidence in CEO • Childs & Glover Report into KEMH • CEO whistleblower • Sept 2000 CEO replaced

  8. CHALLENGES ON ARRIVAL AT KEMH & PMH • Douglas Inquiry into KEMH – review of 105,000 O & G cases • Public Accounts Committee investigation into Trust Accounts at PMH • H.I.C. investigation into Medicare billing practices at PMH – outpatients privatised in early 90’s • A.C.C. investigation into alleged trust account frauds at PMH

  9. STATUS OF KEMH & PMH ON ARRIVAL • Executive under siege and isolated – no records available • Resignation / transfer of many key staff • Residual staff angry/ depressed/ under pressure but united against executive • Breakdown of all quality and governance systems • Budget in disarray – private consulting firm managing finance • Negative media daily • Loss of public confidence in organisation

  10. BUNDABERG BASE HOSPITAL • District Hospital providing service to Bundaberg Health District (pop. Approx. 100,000) • Administered from Brisbane as part of Central Area Health Service – centralised HR/ IT/ Finance/ Capital & laboratories • Years of fiscal restraint & unrealistic waitlist targets • Executive remote from staff • Disagreement DM with key clinical staff – resignations • IMGs recruited to provide surgery • No effective clinical governance systems • Whistleblower ICU nurse manager

  11. LEAD UP TO ARRIVAL IN BUNDABERG (5MONTHS POST-CRISIS) • Executive stood down • Review by DDG and other Dept of Health Officials • Premier intervenes & special deal for victims • Acting DM/ rotation of EDMS(6) and DONS (3) • Morris Inquiry commences, ceases because of bias & replaced by Davis Inquiry • Police & Coronial investigation into deaths commences • Min. Health/DDG/ CHO and other Headquarter staff dismissed • Continuous adverse publicity local, national and international media

  12. STATUS ON ARRIVAL IN BUNDABERG • Hospital recovery commenced thanks to A/DM • Breakdown of existing clinical governance and management systems • Management distracted from recovery by demands of Inquiry & investigations & management of 2000 + potential Patel cases • Loss of many Senior & Junior medical staff & difficult to recruit • Morale of remaining staff poor & staff divided • Continued bad media daily

  13. KEY ACTIONS IN REBUILDING FOLLOWING A DISASTER • Re-establish Governance systems • Improve internal communications • Manage external environment • Manage the Inquiry • Improve staff morale • Re-establish budgetary control • Re-commence recruitment • Strategic plan for future

  14. MINIMUM COMPONENTS OF CLINICAL GOVERNANCE • Credentialling, Privileging and Performance Review • Critical Incident Reporting and Investigation – backup systems • Complication monitoring (e.g. Y codes) • Recommendations from Audits/Case Reviews • Hospital Wide Clinical Indicators • Specialty Specific Clinical Indicators • Risk Analysis of Environmental and Support Systems • Customer Feedback • Commitment to Staff Development and Training • Control of New Services & Equipment

  15. MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT • Internal Communications – - open – door policy for executive - executive outreach to all areas - HOD & staff forums - monthly newsletter & frequent e-news - update of intra & internet sites • Management of External Environment – - media policy & regular good news + media briefings - regular meetings with politicians - utilise hospital volunteers & other support groups

  16. MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT (CONTINUED) • Manage the Inquiry - anticipate the inquiry recommendations - give regular media briefing on reform process to mitigate Inquiry Report - debrief & support staff giving evidence to Inquiry • Improve Staff morale - staff consulted at all stages - staff recognition awards - encourage staff education & development - support staff social events - publicly praise staff & services at all opportunities

  17. FURTHER ACTIONS TO REBUILD • Re-establish budgetary control - Establish budget planning cycle - Review workforce establishment - Negotiate budget deliverables - Negotiate funds required to rebuild –staff and capital • Recommence recruitment - aggressive recruiting campaign - utilise key clinical leaders networks - sell challenge of rebuilding

  18. FURTHER ACTIONS TO REBUILD (CONTINUED) • Strategic plan for future - Vision for next 5 years – owned by staff - Get political support to rebuild services - Aim high with vision so positive gain from disaster

  19. OUTCOMES FOR KEMH AT END OF 2 YEARS • Comprehensive governance system • Full staffing including 11 more full time specialist staff (previous only 3) including 5 professorial positions • Balanced budget • Both KEMH & PMH developed expanded State-wide role in line with new 5 year vision • $30 million redevelopment for KEMH & $35 million redevelopment at PMH proposed • Excellent staff morale • Returning community trust

  20. OUTCOMES FOR BUNDABERG AFTER 9 MONTHS • Clinical governance system operating • Improved staff morale • Positive media for last 4 months • Recruitment of staff proceeding to new establishment – should be complete by Jan 2007 • Inquiry recommendations nearly implemented • Patel affair nearing settlement of claims • Bid to politicians for major capital redevelopment Will take at least 2 years to recover!

  21. SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR RURAL DISTRICTS • Small number of specialists – credential, appraisals, audit • Shortage of nurses and allied health • Support for education/ up-skilling, relief • Competition between hospitals for recruitment • Linkage to tertiary/ larger centres for services and support – visiting, Telehealth, backfill for updates • Service continuity risks • Patient access to care

  22. LESSONS FROM DISASTERS • Be informed of Critical Events - have back up systems in place • Be available & communicate with staff – outreach regularly • Ensure credentialling, privileging & performance review is sufficiently broad based to be independent – both senior & junior staff • Ensure effective system for managing poorly performing clinician • Ensure delineation of surgical privileges in line with role of hospital • Ensure effective system to manage introduction new services/ technology • Ensure IT system responsive to clinical governance needs • Ensure effective customer services • Ensure effective governance reporting system

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