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LESSONS FROM PIKE RIVER. ROWAN ANDERSON Legal Officer, CFMEU Mining and Energy Division (QLD). Former in-house Solicitor, New Zealand Amalgamated Engineering, Printing and Manufacturing Union (EPMU). LESSONS FROM PIKE RIVER. Background Pike River Report of the Royal Commission
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LESSONS FROM PIKE RIVER ROWAN ANDERSON Legal Officer, CFMEU Mining and Energy Division (QLD). Former in-house Solicitor, New Zealand Amalgamated Engineering, Printing and Manufacturing Union (EPMU)
LESSONS FROM PIKE RIVER • Background • Pike River • Report of the Royal Commission • Legislative and regulatory reform
History of disaster • Kaitangata (1879) 34, methane explosion • Brunner (1896) 65, coal dust explosion • Ralph’s Mine (1914) 43, gas explosion • Strongman (1967) 19, explosion • Boatman #4 (1985) 4, carbon monoxide • Mt Davy (1998) 2, gas outburst • Pike River (2010) 29, methane explosion
Regulation • First industry specific regulation – Regulation of Mines Act 1874 • Lapsed 1897 • Rudimentary but provided for: • Two means of egress • Ventilation • Mines inspection
Regulation… • Coal Mines Act 1886 • Followed Kaitangata disaster • Certification of mine managers • Inspection of mines by representatives of coal miners • Right to refuse unsafe work • Rebuttable presumption that accidents result from negligence of owners and managers • Prosecution of owners and managers
Regulatory developments - 1925 • Coal Mines Act 1925 • Separate inspectorate • Appointment of Chief Inspectors • Minimum experience requirements • Provision of up to date mine plans
Coal Mines Act 1979 • Prescriptive regulation • Separate coal mines inspectorate • Worker inspections • Workman’s National Inspector • Represented the “high tide” of regulation in New Zealand • The result of at least 10 Royal Commissions or Commissions of Inquiry
Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 • Robens approach without mandatory worker participation • Lack of tripartite oversight • “all practicable steps” • Industry specific regulation – 1996 and 1998 • Codes of practice – not developed (ACOP) • 2002 amendments to facilitate employee participation
Other issues • Inspectorate • Inspectorate transferred to Department of Labour 1998 • Only one qualified inspector for underground coal mines. • Generalised approach, lack of resourcing and industry knowledge • Mine Safety Review (2006 – 2009) • Union push for reintroduction of check inspectors • Strengthening of regulations supported widely (COP’s) • Change of government November 2008
Coal Industry 2010 • Slightly over 5 million tonnes (compare Australia approximately 500 million tonnes) • 4 million tonnes from open-cut (16 mines) • Remainder from 5 underground operations • Approximately 1500 workers directly engaged in production
Significant issues • Location and access (licence to develop granted in 1997) • Inadequate geological information * Drift development delays and costs * Shaft collapse (2009) • Underfinancing for development * Grossly optimistic presentation * IPO – capital raising 4th occasion at November 2010 * several hundred $million, coal boom * Production pressure
Continued • Main fan placement • Ratio of ‘clean skins’ • Management turnaround • Prototype equipment • Inadequate ventilation • Methane
The Inspectorate • Lack of resource • Reporting structures problematic • No Chief Inspector • DOL policies on enforcement - negotiation • Regulation inadequate • No worker engagement • Company views unchallenged
Royal Commission • Announced in weeks following disaster • Appointments • Justice Graham Pankhurst (Chair), High Court Judge • Stewart Bell, Commissioner for Mine Safety and Health (QLD) • David Henry, Former Commissioner of Inland Revenue…
Royal Commission • Terms of reference – December 2010 • Cause • Practices used • Search, rescue and recovery • Regulatory requirements • Implementation of laws and resourcing
Royal Commission • 11 weeks of hearings between July 2011 and April 2012. • 4 ‘phases’ • Context • Search and rescue • What happened at Pike River? • Policy aspects
Royal Commission • Report back – 30 October 2012 • 16 primary recommendations • Regulatory framework • Statutory responsibilities • Approved code of practice • Worker participation • Emergency management • Mines Rescue Service
Regulatory Framework • Expert task force • QLD and NSW as best practice • Specific Issues: • Removal of “all practicable steps” from mandatory requirements in regulations • Statutory positions (including ventilation officer) • Requirements for gas monitoring and ventilation • Prohibiting placement of main fans underground
New Crown Agent • Sole focus on H&S • Responsibility for administering H&S • “High Hazards Unit” (late 2011) • Chief Inspector • Three Inspectors • Greater resourcing and inspectorate functions
Worker Participation • Requirement for operators to have systems in place • Trained worker H&S Representatives • Perform inspections • Stop activities if immediate harm • Union Check Inspectors • Inspectors to routinely consult workers • ACOP
Lost opportunity • Exclusion of tunnels and quarries • Work Safe Board – not tripartite • Over emphasis on ‘checks and balances’ on SSHR’s and ISHR’s • ISHR – Limited to underground coal