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NSS seminar spring 2017 In-monolith optical systems Remote handling for instruments - an update

Get the latest updates on remote handling for instruments at the NSS Seminar on In-Monolith Optical Systems. Learn about the status, recent decisions, and safety considerations. Discover why instruments should be aware of remote handling. Don't miss this informative session on 25th April 2017.

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NSS seminar spring 2017 In-monolith optical systems Remote handling for instruments - an update

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  1. NSS seminar spring 2017In-monolith optical systemsRemote handling for instruments - an update 25 April 2017 I.Sutton

  2. This mornings program … Part I • NBOA • Status • Recent decisions • Questions Part II • Remote handling • Status report • And why instruments should be aware of this • Questions

  3. 13-1-2017 INSTRUMENT INSTALLATION COMMENCING IN 2 8 0 WEEKS

  4. “NBOA” – all instruments R2 R5.5 R6.0 R11.5 (24.5) R15 (28) IN-MONOLITH (NBOA) Line of sight YES Length 3.5m Substrate Metallic Atmosphere Vac / He QC regime Nuclear IN-MONOLITH (BPSO) Line of sight YES Length 0.5m Substrate Metallic Atmosphere Vac / He QC regime Safety 4 NOT this window ‘Neutron beam window’

  5. Neutron beam optical assembly (NBOA) R2 R5.5 Neutron Beam Extraction (NBEX) Resp: Target Division • NBOA • Function • Beam transport • Streaming shielding • Features • Alignment of optics • Cooling Neutron Beam optical assembly (NBOA) Resp: NSS / Instrument Neutron Beam Port Insert (NBPI) Resp: Target division

  6. NBOA Generic One for all … all for one ! 16 inserts all the same … only different !

  7. Workshop on the Engineering of in-monolith optical systems Participants • Dr. Uwe Filges (PSI - Panel Member) (UF) • Dr. Alain Menelle (LLB - Panel Member) (AM) • Dr. Peter Link (FRM-II - Panel chair) (PL) • Dr. Christian Breunig (FRM-II - Panel Member) (CB) • Iain Sutton (ESS - Presenter) (IS) • Talal Osman (ESS - Participant) (TO) • Erik Nilsson (ESS - Participant) (EN) • Topics • Radiation heat management • Long term radiation damage • Operating atmospheres & windows • Alignment strategy • Risk mitigation • Waste management Cross facility working group Participation from LLB / PSI / TUM / ILL / ISIS

  8. Architecture Construction in 3 sections 1000 / 1000 / 1500 mm Each section is independently aligned and cooled Justification • Ease of manufacture • Ease in installation • Ease of alignment • Improved Cooling 8

  9. ArchitectureSchematic ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT ALIGNMENT COOLING COOLING COOLING

  10. Neutron beam optics windows R 2m NBO Entry window R5.5 NBO Exit window

  11. Atmosphere Proposition • The assembly will operate in an inert environment of helium at 2mBar • Install beam windows on NBPI Rational • Establish a controlled atmosphere around the beam optics by sealing the volume in which they are installed within the insert (NBEX). • helium at low pressure to protect the reflective surfaces and improve cooling.

  12. Substrates & Coating • Proposition • Employ copper as the substrates for all coated parts • Rational • Glass substrates excluded by waste handling • Radiation streaming through the device will be attenuated by the material employed for the substrates. • Metal substrates are robust and Al has been proven in use. • Copper is preferred over Al for its improved hi energy shielding properties • Question • Copper is an unproven solution are the risks involved unacceptably high ? • .

  13. Coatings M-value limitations Due to lack of experience in long term performance of high M coatings on this substrate in these conditions… • It is recommended that M-values on components should by restricted to M=4. • Teams currently using higher M values should • Consequences of reducing m to 4 • Risk – Benefit analysis to restricted use of High M • Waste management • NBEX design

  14. NBOA - Instrument milestones • 31-3-2017 final updated IM-OPTICS geometries & coatings. MS A2146884350 • 31-5-2017 Freeze of NBOA concept design & interfaces with NBPI (Freeze beam geometry) • June Instrument preliminary discussions with suppliers • July - September 2017 IM-OPTICS TG3’s • 30-11-2018Delivery of in-monolith optics (all instruments) COMPLETED ! CURRENT !

  15. Status overview

  16. WHY? remote handling on Instruments

  17. ESS unique source,with unique boundary conditions.

  18. Component activationa long term issue … Severely limited access duration Access Prohibited ? Bunker access regime Activation Limited access duration Unlimited access duration Beam power Integrated beam Beam days Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 .

  19. Activity during shutdown- rear of bunker Tungsten ROOF LEVEL ACCESS Dose >3 <25 microSv/h UNRESTRICTED CONTROLLED WORK AREA (BLUE) Gamma source distribution 72hrs after shutdown (@30cm)

  20. Activity during shutdown- front of bunker Tungsten ROOF LEVEL ACCESS Dose >25microSv/h RESTRICTED COUNTROLLED WORK AREA (YELLOW) Gamma source distribution 72hrs after shutdown (@contact)

  21. Access strategyControlled access Controlled restricted Yellow Access control fence Escape ‘hatch’ Zone 1 • Key points • All access through bunker roof • Access to floor is strictly limited • Access by sector • Conventional hazards Temporary roof entry point - with access control Uncontrolled restricted ‘Blue’

  22. Conclusions • Key points • In order to ensure safe working …. • No ‘regular’ personal access to floor level. • Floor level access restricted to installation activities during extended long (2-3 month) shutdowns. • All ‘regular’ activities shall be conducted from roof level. • All access to equipment shall be via the roof. • As a result … • All systems shall required to be ‘Remote handling’ compatible to an appropriate level .

  23. A strategy for maintaining systems within the shielded areas

  24. References and collaborations • References • S Rajendran. ITER Remote handling Code of Practice, 2E7BC5, 2011, 39-40 • John V. Draper and Reid L. Kress. Remote maintenance design guide for compact processing units. Oak Ridge, Tennessee, ORNL/TM-2000/124, 2000, 31 • Steven Craig. ESS RHH, TD-0000069, rev A. 2016 • Collaboration • Kevin Jones and Mark Woollett at ISIS/STFC • ElbioCalzada, FRMII • Van Graves, SNS

  25. Strategy • Maintenance strategy • Safe ways of working • Tooling • Design best practices - ‘build to be maintained’ • Modules • Interfaces • Classification • Activation • Handling

  26. Scope of application Applicability • All systems within the CS bunker. • Straight beamlines. • All • Curved beamlines • Some

  27. Scope of activities • RH operation • Inspection • Extraction (RH-I and RH-II) • Reinstallation (RH-I) • Alignment (partial) • Not RH operations • In-situ maintenance • Instrument installation

  28. Modules • Design instruments as modules. • Module is defined as • Common maintenance unit and/or • Common extraction unit. • All modules shall be classified during detailed design • RH-I • RH-II

  29. Interfaces • Avoid multiple modules interfaces. Mechanical interfaces • Bolted ! • Minimise number of bolts • Use few bolt sizes • Captive pop-up design Electrical and fluid interfaces • Bundle connectors • Place connections within reach from work platform • Self supporting snorkel solutions preferable for utilities.

  30. Classification RH-I RH-II

  31. Classification RH 1 Criteria RH2 > 25microSv/hrActivation < 25microSv/hr* Frequent Interventions Infrequent R6 > R9 Location > R 11.5 Low Reliability High High Criticality Low Typical components Choppers Base plates Monitors Supports Jaws Neutron guides

  32. RH IIWhich tasks need to be carried out in-situ using remote handling ? • Inspection • Visual • Removal • Unfastening • Extraction • (Re)Installation • (Re)insertion • Fixation • Precise-positioning

  33. RH IWhich tasks need to be carried out in-situ using remote handling ? • Inspection • Visual • Fault diagnostics • Re-alignment • Removal • Disconnection from beam-line • Disconnection from services • Unbolting from support • Extraction • (Re)Installation • (Re)insertion • Fixation to support • Positioning • Reconnection of services

  34. Activation Minimise activation ! • Materials selection • List of approved alloys • Materials black list • Air activation • B4C coated components • All major surfaces should be covered • Self shielding

  35. Standardisation Standardise Methods & Solutions where ever possible ! • Location devices • Fasteners • Lifting and handling features • Electrical connectors • Fluid couplings • Flanged joints • Mechanical drives • Lubricants • Seals and gaskets

  36. Tooling • Lifting equipment • Work platform • Bolt handling system • Positioning assistance • Grappling rods • Lighting system • Vision system

  37. RH Deployment • Baseline strategy • Technical standards • Roll-out • Tools development • Prototypes and testing • Compliance checks Development • Internal validation • External validation • Developed with collaborators. • External validation. • Released as packages. • Developed internally • Operations strategy Deployment • IKON • Newsletter • FtF meetings • During detailed design • During procurement phase • TG3 Implementation • Prototyping of critical systems, tools and components. • Development of foreseen tools Q1-19 Q1-18 Q3-18 Q3-17 Q1-17

  38. ENDYour questions please ? Special Thank you to ESS Safety group Neutron optics group (Activation studies) Bunker Project group (Bunker) Neutron Chopper group (Operational research)

  39. Summing up Good news Limited access to part of the bunker in long shutdowns is a realistic possibility. Bad news If obligations are not closely followed by all instruments we may all loose it. Obligations • Use features and materials to reduce activation (with QA checks) • Equipment design rad-hard and high reliability • Design and build all components for vertical insertion • Design and build for remote handling if …. • installed R6-R11.5 • or activate • or require maintenance Instrument conformity will be obligatory to pass CDR / TG3

  40. Remote handling classificationRH-II Equipment which fulfils all of the criteria below • Low level of activation < 25microSv/h* • In-frequent interventions. • Overhaul or inspect period > 5 years. • ‘Clash’ with neighbors (installed R6 > ~R9) • High reliability / Low criticality systems. • Reliability >99.9%. / low performance loss Typical components • Base plates • Supports & alignment mounts • Some guide components • Service infrastructure *On contact following 72hrs

  41. Remote handling (RH 2) Equipment which fulfils all of the criteria below • Low level of activation < 25microSv/hr* • In-frequent interventions. • Overhaul or inspect period > 5 years. • ‘Clash’ with neighbors (installed R6 > ~R9) • High reliability / Low criticality systems. • Reliability >99.9%. / low performance loss Typical components • Base plates • Supports & alignment mounts • Some guide components • Service infrastructure *On contact following 72hrs

  42. Remote handling (RH 1) Equipment which fulfils any of the criteria below • Represents a significant hazard to personnel during interventions (due to activation). Eg >0.5mSv after 48hrs • Requires frequent interventions. • Overhaul or inspect period < 5 years. • ‘Clash’ with neighbors (installed R6 > ~R9) • Low reliability critical instrument systems. • Reliability < 98% , and failure is critical to instrument Typical components • All components forward of R11.5 (unless proven otherwise) • PPS choppers • Shutters • Collimators • Choppers • Neutron guides forward of R11.5

  43. Viewing/Visibility • The visibility of RH operations is crucial. • If the task area cannot be seen, the RH operation is not possible. • Cameras and associated lighting systems will be used when needed. • Best practices: • High contrast or colour difference between mating modules. • Physical features that clearly align when correctly assembled. • Avoid highly reflective surfaces. • All module items, must be clearly marked and identified. • Have means to perform inspection in service, if required. • Incorporate suitable SAM attachment points.

  44. Remote handling classificationRH-I Equipment which fulfils any of the criteria below • Represents a significant hazard to personnel during interventions (due to activation). Eg >0.5mSv after 48h • Requires frequent interventions. • Overhaul or inspect period < 5 years. • ‘Clash’ with neighbors (installed R6 > ~R9) • Low reliability critical instrument systems. • Reliability < 98% , and failure is critical to instrument Typical components • All components forward of R11.5 (unless proven otherwise) • PPS choppers • Shutters • Collimators • Choppers • Neutron guides forward of R11.5

  45. Safe alignment of module • Self engaging and self aligning • Gradual alignment • No over-constraining • Generous tolerances • Prevent wedging and jamming • Provide visual cues where applicable • RH equipment is not ‘accurate’. • Capture range of bolts.

  46. Best practices • Design implementation of baseline strategy determines best practices. • Best practice areas: • Module handling and general design rules • Module interfaces • Safe alignment • Activation • Viewing and visibility • Failure considerations • Standardisation

  47. Operational commitment RH • ACCESS • No normal personal access to floor level • All interventions are preceded by partial removal of roof. • All normal activities from roof level platform. • Constraints (all components) • Designed for vertical insertion & extraction • Compatibility with ESS lifting tooling • Compatible with RH tooling • Designed for maintenance operations to be conducted with (soft)RH tooling • ‘long’ tools • cameras

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