280 likes | 291 Views
1000 Hackers in a Box. Problems with modern security scanners. What is a scanner?. Collects data and deduces possible problems on your hosts a “visibility” tool expensive product misunderstood product. What can scanning do?. Visibility Visibility Visibility
E N D
1000 Hackers in a Box Problems with modern security scanners
What is a scanner? • Collects data and deduces possible problems on your hosts • a “visibility” tool • expensive product • misunderstood product
What can scanning do? • Visibility • Visibility • Visibility • Software bugs & Installation bugs • Protocols & Topology • Public Services & Versions
History of scanners • SATAN in 1995, now SANTA • ISS • Ballista, now NAI cybercop (CSC) • Asmodeus, now commercial (Webtrends) • HackerShield • NetSonar (now cisco)
Virus scanner of the 90’s We have 3 million tests The “Best” reporting We “Enforce” your policy Scanner Propaganda
Signature Scanning • The attack domain is not confined Scanner’s Signature Coverage The Real World is infinite
Skilled UBER Underground Distro Network Script Kiddies Patch Level
False Sense of Security • I ran a scan, now I’m safe • I patched the program, now I’m safe • I have a firewall, I’m safe • I have an IDS, I’m safe • I had a consultant scan me, I’m safe • I use crypto, I’m safe
Just because you have a scannerdoesn’t make you a Hacker • 1000 Hackers in a Box (NOT) • Doesn’t synthesize attacks based on available data • (hackers don’t just go down a checklist) • Cannot find new problems based on programming flaws
You are buying a servicenot a product • Secretary reads bug newsgroups for you • Version and Patch checking w/ vendors • Is your scanner making you lazy? • Reactive, not Proactive • Mean time to notification • 10 steps behind the hacker
The Shiny Red Button • There is always a root compromise in your network • You cannot remove it • You can only place controls over it • Redundancy (backups, fast recovery) • Visibility (forensics & tripwires) • Deterrence (traps, prosecution, & retaliation)
Doesn’t ENFORCE Policy Doesn’t WRITE Policy Scanners “break” in - not “fix” A Scan is NOT an Audit
Ineffective • Relies on Inference & Deduction • Very little “Verification” • Banner Strings • Registry Settings & SNMP • “Black Box” • Lazy when deep detection is possible
External vs Internal scanning • Ineffective if scan filters are in place • force scanning takes longer • run both and compare
False Positives • Generalizations • lack of version coverage • this is a QA Hell • Assumptions about patch level
How to really screw up a Scanner • Ping and UDP scan tricks • (create extra work) • make everything listen on UDP port 1 • filter ICMP unreachable messages • don’t allow ping (must force scan) • Deception Toolkits (Honey-Pot tool) • touch all your files
Scanners suffer from security bugs too! • The imports for several common scanners have calls to (do you trust this code?): • strcpy • wsprintf • getenv • system • exec • Banner overflows • Service Requests (http, smtp …)
The Good Stuff is Free • The Port Scanner • nmap (www.insecure.org) • The Software Scanner • Grinder (rhino9.ml.org) • Banner Scanner (netcat & perl anyone?) • Nessus • Registry scanner • Chronicle • OS Detection • QueSO (www.apostols.org) • The Integrity Checker • tripwire (www.tripwiresecurity.com) • Deception Toolkit • http://all.net/dtk/dtk.html
A bit better scanner • Verify policy • A “configuration manager”
A bit better scanner • Model Authentication • Show authentication systems and domains • Show relationships between authentication system and services • Show what each entity can and cannot access
A bit better scanner • Process to Process • Show inter-process relationships • File & Registry access • IPC channels • Databases • Close the “window of trust”
A bit better scanner • Deep Detection • Get *as much* data as possible • drill down into exploited resources • more data is better • more data means better analysis
A bit better scanner • Replay Presentation • Replay an attack in slow motion, in realtime, in a format that is easy to understand • sniffer • tty snoop • scanner is educational
A bit better scanner • Use Host Based technology • Easier to verify versions and patches using file hashes • less work/less specialized programmers needed • more data easier = better analysis (and faster)
A bit better scanner • Focus on general security issues, not line item bugs • verify confidentiality of information • verify authentication systems • verify IDS working properly • verify trusted/untrusted relationships
A bit better scanner • Model protocol usage • since applications may depend on protocol security, show these relationships • show encapsulation
A bit better scanner • Auto-patching wizard • gets patches • verifies file hashes • Wizard helps build patch script • patches are automatically deployed • verifies installation is secure afterwards