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Dual-Use Education and Oversight of Science and Technology

Dual-Use Education and Oversight of Science and Technology. Tatyana Novossiolova Bradford Disarmament Research Centre University of Bradford, UK. European Union Joint Action in support of the Biological Weapons Convention Regional Workshop on National Implementation

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Dual-Use Education and Oversight of Science and Technology

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  1. Dual-Use Education and Oversight of Science and Technology Tatyana Novossiolova Bradford Disarmament Research Centre University of Bradford, UK European Union Joint Action in support of the Biological Weapons Convention Regional Workshop on National Implementation Chisinau, Republic of Moldova 22-24 June 2011

  2. Outline: • Dual-Use Science and Biosecurity Discourse • Lack of Awareness among Practising Life Scientists • Bridging the Education Gap: Train-the-Trainer Programme D. The Way Forward: 7th BTWC Review Conference

  3. A. Dual-use science and BiosecurityDiscourse

  4. A.1 New Security Threats: Dual Use • 9/11 terrorist attacks • ‘Anthrax Letters’ Attacks – October 2001 • US Department of Homeland Security • Securitisation of Public Health • Bioterrorism

  5. A.2 Paradigm Cases • Mousepox experiment • Recreation of 1918 Influenza Virus • Artificial synthesis of Polio Virus • Raise ethical consideration around the Responsible Conduct of research • Allowed under Laboratory Biosecurity and Biosafety Regulations • Can possibly be misused for malevolent purposes

  6. A.3 Dual Use: the Discourse • High-Level Review • Fink Report, Lemon-Relman Report, NASBB • Funders of Life Sciences • Wellcome Trust, BBSRC • Statement of Life Science Editors • Inter-Academy Panel 2005

  7. A.4 Dual-Use Research ‘Research that based on current understanding can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, or material.’ (NSABB 2007)

  8. A.5 Biosecurity • A very recent concept that appeared in parallel with discussions about the growing bioterrorist threat • ‘Beyond the laboratory door biosecurity’ • The objective of the whole range of policies, mechanisms, regulations, and initiatives including export controls and national implementation of the BTWC

  9. A.6 Biosecurity and Life Sciences • Biosecurity as a concept of a web of preventative policies centred on the prohibition of the misuse of the life sciences embodied in the General Purpose Criterion of the BTWC • A role for practising life scientists in being aware that the knowledge they generate may be misused, and for contributing their expertise to the development and maintenance of preventative policies

  10. B. Lack of awarenessamong practisinglife scientists

  11. B.7 Surveys of Biosecurity Awareness • Analysis of interactive seminars conclude that there is little evidence that life scientists: a. regarded bioterrorism or bioweapons as a substantial threat; b. considered that developments in life sciences research contributed to bio-threats; c. were aware of the current debates and concerns about dual-use research; or d. were familiar with the BTWC. • Lack of biosecurity awareness requires explanation: One possible explanation: it does not feature in their university education.

  12. B.8 University Education Surveys • Survey the extent of biosecurity education in life science degree courses in Europe using a sample of 142 courses from 57 universities in 29 countries speaking 25 different languages. • Results: only 3 out of 57 Universities identified in the survey offered some form of biosecurity module and in all cases this was optional. • Similar results were found in surveys in Israel and in the Asia-Pacific Region.

  13. C. Bridging the Education Gap:Train-the-trainerprogramme

  14. C.9 Basic Elements of EMR • 21 lectures freely available online • Video links • Sample essay questions • References • Available in English, Japanese, Russian, French and Romanian/Moldovan; soon to come in Spanish, Urdu, Polish, Arabic, Georgian and Chinese. http://www.brad.ac.uk/bioethics/EducationalModuleResource/

  15. C.10 Applied Dual-Use Biosecurity Education: Online Distance Learning Train-the-Trainer

  16. C.11 Learning Outcomes To build capacity of participants to develop: • 1. Knowledge & Understanding • Review and appraise ethical/biosecurity themes and methods relevant to dual-use • Ability to contribute to the practical development of biosecurity. • 2. Discipline Skills • Ideas and questions relevant to assessing ethics, Organise and synthesise dilemmas in specific dual-use issues affecting humans, animals and plants • Integrate dual-use biosecurity issues and concerns into their training • 3. Personal Transferable Skills • Communicate effectively in an online environment with their colleagues and students using a range of media

  17. C.12 Key Themes of the Course The Threat of Biological Warfare and Biological Terrorism International Prohibition Regime The Dual-Use Dilemma Responsibilities of Life Scientists National Implementation of the BTWC Building an Effective Web of Prevention

  18. C.13 Tools: Elluminate, NING and Blackboard • Elluminate • Live platform for lectures and seminars, • Virtual classroom enabling the interaction amongst participants backed up by (PPTs, Webcam, Audio equipment) • NING • Induction and social networking platform outside of lectures • Blackboard • Archives of the course: lecture PPTs, videos, hand books

  19. C.14 Course Structure and Assessment • Two types of courses • 1x 20 Credit Module (UK Higher Education Master’s level credits) • 12 Lectures in 12 weeks • 12 Real-Life Expert-Level Seminars (21 scenarios available) • 1x Certificated 6 Week Short Course • Assessment: 20 Credit Module • 1x Essay (Individual Action Plan) 70% • 1x Group Work 30% • 2,000 words report + online presentation

  20. C.15 Additional Questions for Action Plans 1. How is dual-use biosecurity distinct from biosafety and laboratory biosecurity? 2. What is your organisation? What advice do you receive regarding biosecurity? What is the wording of the advice? 3. Do you have a mechanism by which you could get help if you should encounter an issue or an experiment of dual-use concern? 4. Does your professional association require that you have an understanding of the international CBW prohibition regimes? 5. What is your professional association? Does your professional organisation require that you have an understanding of dual-use issues? And what mechanisms does your association have in place to consider such issues?

  21. C.16 Responsible Conduct of Research • Would you be able to spot an experiment of real dual-use concern? • Are dual-use and biosecurity policy developments being carefully followed and are you being kept informed so that you can contribute your expertise to finding solutions? • Are you well informed about the national laws and regulations that could affect your country’s obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention. • Are you aware of the key provisions of the Convention and of how efforts are being made to keep it up to date with ongoing scientific advances?

  22. D. The Way Forward:7th BTWC ReviewConference

  23. D.17 Seventh BTWC Review Conference 2011 ‘State parties are encouraged to inform the Seventh Review Conference of, inter alia, any actions, measures or other steps they may have taken on the basis of the discussions ... in order to facilitate...decisions on further action...’

  24. ‘State Parties should inform on their awareness-raising activities on dual-use education in a more explicit manner. [By doing so] those SP which are at a more advanced stage in the implementation of their dual-use awareness-raising and education activities would be able to identify, and offer appropriate cooperation to, SP at a less advanced stage in such activities.’ (Background Paper - ‘JACKSNNZ’ Prep Com Meeting 13-15 April 2011, Geneva)

  25. D.18 Conclusion (I) • Momentum behind the inclusion of dual-use biosecurity/bioethics training may translate into a legally-binding obligation at the BTWC in 2011 • Online Dual-Use Applied Biosecurity/Bioethics Train-the-Trainer programmes are proof of concept that life scientists can be trained online on dual-use and can be encouraged to assimilate dual-use into the training of others • Biosafety training needs to be complemented by training in biosecurity

  26. D.19 Conclusion (II) • Awareness raising and sustained engagement in both biosecurity and biosafety through the creation of international competency standards • Life scientists need to be involved in strengthening the BTWC as a bottom-up approach to responding to new threats is essential • Online education can assist in the process of awareness raising

  27. Thank you! Facebook: http://tinyurl.com/bioseced Twitter: http://twitter.com/#!/DualUseBioSec Skype: dual.use.biosecurity http://www.brad.ac.uk/bioethics/

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