Military and Economy

1. Military and Economy Lsn 13

2. Military Instrument of Power • The military instrument of power must have the capability to conduct sustained peacetime engagement activities as well as respond to two general types of crises (those with significant escalation potential and those without) • Peacetime engagement activities lay the groundwork necessary to ensure crisis operations are not conducted off-the-cuff

3. Carl von Clausewitz • Prussian officer born in 1780 • Resigned his commission in 1812 and joined the Russian Army to fight Napoleon • Ideas on war were heavily influenced by the mass popular warfare of the French Revolutionary period and Napoleon’s Prussian adversary Gerhard von Scharnhorst • Died in 1831 and his wife published his On War in 1832

4. Carl von Clausewitz • War is neither an art nor a science • It is a continuation of “policy” (or “politics”) by other means. • A form of social intercourse • War is like a wrestling match • It is “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” • But it is not unilateral. It is a contest between two independent wills.

5. Carl von Clausewitz • Used a trinitarian analysis consisting of (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and probability; and (3) war’s element of subordination to rational policy • Often loosely expressed as “the people, the military, and the government” • Analyzed “absolute war” or “war in theory,” but then noted that factors such as poor intelligence, chance, friction, etc make war in practice different than war in the abstract (the “fog of war”) • Argued one should focus his military efforts against the enemy’s “center of gravity” (“Schwerpunkt”) • Very important concept in modern American military doctrine

6. Albert Thayer Mahan • US naval officer who lived from 1840 to 1914 • Wrote The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 and The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812 • Considered “sea power” to include the overlapping concepts of command of the sea through naval superiority and that combination of maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets that produces national “wealth and greatness”

7. Albert Thayer Mahan • Advocated • “that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive” • “(1) Production; (2) Shipping: (3) Colonies and Markets– in a word, sea power” • Thought the Navy should be used offensively and that its principle object should be destruction of the enemy’s fleet • Destroying the enemy’s battle fleet would in turn cause his merchant fleet to find the sea untenable

8. Albert Thayer Mahan • Saw the Navy’s economic strangulation of France by blockade as the key to Britain’s defeat of Napoleon • “It was not by attempting great military operations on land, but by controlling the sea, and through the sea the world outside Europe,” that the British “ensured the triumph of their country.” • Critics argue that Mahan confused a necessary or important cause with the sufficient cause • The British Navy was important, but the Army and diplomacy also played key roles

9. Albert Thayer Mahan • Increasingly became an imperialist in order to gain control of the resources the US needed to best use its naval power • Considered the navy to be a better instrument of national policy than the army • This was especially true for the United States which had “neither the tradition nor the design to act aggressively beyond the seas,” but at the same time had “very important transmarine interests which need protection”

10. Giulio Douhet • Italian air power theorist who lived from 1869 to 1930 • Saw air power as a way for Italy to overcome its inherent weaknesses in manpower and natural resources • But to become the dominant weapon it could be, aircraft had to be freed from the control of ground commanders who did not understand the new capability • Advocated the creation of a separate air arm to be commanded by airmen

11. Giulio Douhet • Saw airpower as being able to crush the enemy’s will to fight by destroying or neutralizing a country’s “vital centers”– those elements of society, government, and industry essential to the functioning of the state • It could do so without the need for the bloody commitment of ground forces that had made World War I so costly

12. Giulio Douhet • Douhet recognized the importance of targeting • Aircraft could strike virtually anything but in order to be most forceful they should not attempt to strike everything • Instead, focus on the five basic target systems that Douhet considered the vital centers of a modern country • Industry, transportation infrastructure, communication nodes, and the will of the people • The will of the people was the most important target • Douhet did not advocate aircraft attacking or supporting ground forces; airpower was to be used strategically, not tactically

13. Navy • Safeguards maritime commerce • Shows the flag • Enables land power

14. Air Force • Maximizes technology • “Gratification without commitment” • Sends a message, but seldom can be decisive

15. Army • Can achieve decisive results • Provides “boots on the ground” • Represents maximum commitment • Very costly (casualties, time, logistics, etc)

16. Traditional Military Strategies • Attrition • The reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and materiel • Exhaustion • The gradual erosion of a nation’s will or means to resist • Annihilation • Seeks the immediate destruction of the combat power of the enemy’s armed forces

17. Case Study The Korean War

18. Divided Korea • After World War II, Japan’s former colony of Korea was divided into two occupation zones along the 38th parallel with the Soviet zone in the north and the US zone in the south • Before the occupation forces departed, an anticommunist regime was established in the south and a communist one in the north

19. US in Asia • The US was uncertain as to the extent of its commitment in Asia • It knew its umbrella definitely covered Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, but it was unclear about Taiwan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia • Believing the US did not intend to protect South Korea, the USSR allowed the North Koreans to invade the south in 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s speech to the National Press Club omitted South Korea from the US “defensive perimeter”

20. North Korea Attacks: June 25, 1950 • North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel with an invasion force totaling over 90,000 troops and 150 Soviet-built tanks • By the night of June 28, Seoul had fallen and the South Korean forces were in disarray • South Korea appealed to the United Nations for assistance • The UN passed a resolution recommending that “the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security to the area.”

21. United Nations • As a member of the UN Security Council, the Soviet Union could have vetoed UN involvement in the war, but instead Moscow was boycotting the Security Council at the time in protest of the UN’s failure to seat a representative of the newly established People’s Republic of China • In the absence of the USSR, the UN passed a resolution sending a military force to South Korea • The force was predominately American with Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander • There were also substantial contributions from the UK, Canada and other Commonwealth countries.

22. U.S. Armed Forces in 1950 10 Army divisions (4 in Japan) 48 USAF air groups 331 combatants (64 in Pacific) 2 Marine divisions (-) North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) 14 Divisions (9 in invasion force) Soviet trained, armed and advised 150 tanks, almost 100 modern aircraft Force Comparison

23. Task Force Smith • To stem the North Korea advance, the US deployed “Task Force Smith,” a delaying force of two reinforced rifle companies to Pusan • MacArthur thought this “arrogant display of strength” would cause the North Koreans to take pause and slow their aggression Elements of Task Force Smith arriving at Taejon

24. Task Force Smith • Task Force Smith began occupying defensive positions on July 5 at 3:00 am • At 7:00 they began seeing enemy movement • At 8:16 they began firing artillery • At 2:30 the commander decided to withdraw • When LTC Smith arrived at Ch’onan on July 6, he counted 185 men • He began with 540 • After all stragglers returned, the total loss to TF Smith was 35%

25. Implications of Task Force Smith • Task Force Smith has become the poster child for the cost of military unpreparedness • “No more Task Force Smiths” • GEN Gordon Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, 1991-1995 (administered the post Desert Storm Army downsizing)

26. “Hollow Army” World War II peak Army strength was 8,268,000 89 combat divisions in June 1945 June 1950 strength was about 591,000 (1/14 the peak World War II size) 10 active combat divisions But to keep them fielded, one battalion from each infantry regiment and one firing battery from each field artillery battalion had been eliminated This move effectively reduced combat power by 1/3

27. Far East Command (FEC) 108,500 troops under MacArthur 4 infantry divisions in Japan (7th, 24th, 25th and 1st Cavalry) Authorized peacetime divisions strength was 12,500 (13,500 for the 25th ) Authorized wartime strength was 18,900 3 of the 4 divisions in Japan had about 11,000 men In addition to the missing infantry and artillery battalions each Lacked three anti aircraft artillery batteries Lacked the regimental tank companies Had only a company of M24 Chaffee light tanks in place of the divisional tank battalion Estimated the divisions could field 62% of normal infantry firepower, 69% of normal anti-aircraft capability, and 14% of armored support

28. Equipment in FEC Mostly outdated World War II equipment and much of it was unserviceable Of 18,000 jeeps only 8,000 were serviceable Of 13,780 2 1/2 ton trucks, only 4,441 were serviceable Had none of the new 3.5 inch antitank rocker launchers Only the 2.36 inch Bazooka which had proved inadequate in 1944 – 1945 Hydraulic fluid for recoil mechanisms in the M24 tanks had been on backorder for two years, so most of their 75 mm guns had never been fired Some men were wearing tennis shoes because of a lack of boots ¼ of the small arms were defective

29. Training Problems Occupation duties took precedence over training No unit training above the company level had taken place in Eighth Army before April 1949 Limited maneuver area and an annual personnel turnover rate of 43% impeded training The four divisions were rated as 65% to 84% combat ready Some senior officers felt that 40% was more realistic US troops parade across the Yoshida Bridge

30. Pusan Perimeter:June 27 to Sept 15 • The American forces were unprepared for the North Korean attack • By the end of July, the North Koreans had pushed the UN forces to the southeast corner of the peninsula, where they dug in around the port of Pusan.

31. Korean War Case Study • What role did diplomatic communications play in the North Korean decision to attack? • How was “risk” not properly considered in the configuring of the post World War II US Army? • How did the American application of its military power in Korea fail in its peacetime engagement activity? • How did it fail in its response to a crisis?

32. Instruments of Power Economic

33. Economic Instrument of Power • Nations pursue the economic instrument of power to obtain broadly conceived welfare goals including security, prestige, autonomy, and access to markets and sources of supply all designed to enhance domestic economic growth • Economic power is influenced by a nation’s people, technology, financial resources, and raw materials

34. Economic Instrument of Power • People • Acquisition, preparation, production, management, and innovation all depend on human resources • A motivated and dedicated population can create many conditions of economic greatness despite the lack of raw materials • Japan is a good example

35. Post World War II Japan • Japan’s large and mostly compliant work force fueled an economy based on manufactured goods slated for export to markets with higher labor costs like the US • In the 1960s the Japanese used their profits to switch to more capital-intensive manufacturing but “Made in Japan” usually was associated with a cheap product

36. Economic Instrument of Power • Technology • People alone cannot manufacture products or provide services • Technology is required to enable an economy to alter, modify, build, or turn materials into products faster, better, and cheaper than before • Technology involves the application of science towards solving a particular objective or to produce selected products

37. Post World War II Japan • In the 1970s, Japan took advantage of a highly trained and educated work force to shift their economy toward technologically-intensive products and “Made in Japan” came to represent state of the art technology Sony turntable

38. Economic Instrument of Power • Financial Resources • Required for a nation to expand its economic power • Allow nations to invest in new plants and equipments, conduct research, purchase raw materials, hire and educate labor, and provide resources in an emergency • Financial resources can be acquired by savings and/or increased trade

39. Post World War II Japan • During the 1980s Japan used its strong economy to greatly expand its investments abroad, especially in the US • One survey reported that in 1970 there were only 12 US manufacturing companies in which Japanese firms held more than 50 % of the stock • By 1985, there were nearly 400 such companies, plus more than 500 Japanese-owned plants. Japanese direct investment flows 1980–90 ($ million)

40. Economic Instrument of Power • Raw Materials • Include minerals, metals, and energy sources • Growing economies often outstrip domestic supplies Petroleum refinery in Saudi Arabia

41. Post World War II Japan • Japan lacks abundant internal raw resources • In 2008 it held a trade fair aimed at boosting investment in Africa, in part to compete with China for a share of Africa’s oil resources

42. Economic Instrument of Power • Economic Tools • Improve domestic capability to out-compete potential foes • Large part of President Reagan’s strategy to defeat the USSR during the 1980s • Provide instant, direct assistance to a country in need • The Marshall Plan helped Europe recover after World War II • Debt forgiveness • In 1991 the US fully forgave Egypt’s military debt in recognition of Egypt’s role in forging the Desert Storm coalition • Sanctions • Throughout the 1980s the US imposed sanctions on Libya for being a state sponsor of terrorism

43. Case Study Marshall Plan

44. Marshall Plan • The economic devastation suffered by Europe in World War II made many European countries vulnerable to the spread of communism • On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall called on the Europeans themselves to draw up a plan for European recovery, which the US would then financially support. • In four years, the US would contribute $13 billion.

45. Dresden, 1944

46. Berlin, 1945

48. Results of the Marshall Plan Hamburg's Moenckebergstrasse in the business district at the end of the war (left) and in 1950 (right).

49. Results of the Marshall Plan

50. Results of the Marshall Plan • By 1951 Marshall Plan countries had raised their industrial output 40% over 1938. • Dramatic economic recovery both reduced the threat of the spread of communism to western Europe and set that region on the road to independence in world affairs. • Offer extended to eastern bloc countries but USSR ensured there are no takers. • Marshall awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 1953.