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Randy Stringer, Randy Boone, Richard Damania & Erwin Bulte

Paying for elephant conservation in Amboseli, Kenya. Randy Stringer, Randy Boone, Richard Damania & Erwin Bulte. An apology…. … this is not a paper, but a proposal… … and a series of very tentative results. Comments and suggestions very welcome.

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Randy Stringer, Randy Boone, Richard Damania & Erwin Bulte

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  1. Paying for elephant conservation in Amboseli, Kenya Randy Stringer, Randy Boone, Richard Damania & Erwin Bulte

  2. An apology…. • … this is not a paper, but a proposal… • … and a series of very tentative results. • Comments and suggestions very welcome.

  3. Southern Kajiado District, Kenya Eselenkei GR

  4. The problem in the Study Region • Ongoing land conversion and overstocking of livestock threaten the future of wildlife. • This has a negative impact on (i) tourism benefits and (ii) international nonuse values. • Inefficient landuse as a consequence of external effects: what scope for conservation finance (tailored payments) to maintain pastoral lifestyle and conserve wildlife?

  5. Two main questions of the project: • Is intervention through conservation finance worthwhile? Does it raise global welfare? • If so: how should we go about it? Unravel the problem in components…

  6. Q1: is intervention worthwhile? Intervention Costs (outbid onion growers, transaction costs, bureaucracy, …) Benefits (more wildlife). Express in $$ too Cost-benefit analysis, combination of ecological and economic modelling.

  7. Q2: how should we intervene? • Assume Benefits > Costs • Develop a household model to predict responses to various transfer mechanisms (allocation of time, purchases of livestock, etc). • Until now: simple ‘rules of thumb’ (PHEWS)

  8. Four building blocks… 1. Household model: how will the Maasai respond to payments; how should we “package” the transfer? 2. SAVANNA: Ecological model to simulate the impact of different (management) scenarios ( elephants?); 3. Valuation study: how much do we value extra elephants? 4. (How to fund the conservation finance scheme in the long run: transfers versus raising park fees?)  Today I will only talk about 1 and 2.

  9. Block 1: PHEWS and more… • Currently: correct HH-model is missing • Models do exist, but are characterized by • Malthusian population dynamics or migration • Fixed labor endowment / hh  you can never “win” • PHEWS: set of rules to descrive behavior (based on energy flows, target cash income + livestock, trading and savings) • The ultimate aim is developing a calibrated household model.

  10. The basic dietary energy flow in PHEWS … If household energy needs are met, stop If not, can the household purchase the balance and maize? If yes, purchase the balance and stop If not, buy what the household can afford The balance is made up of ‘relief’ Milk energy Own maize available Dead, edible animals Probabilistic slaughter Sugar and tea energy Household herds Household cash box …

  11. Block 2: SAVANNA • “A complex computer program to link local conditions to future ecosystem status.” • Spatially explicit model, developed in East Africa and now used around the world.

  12. Savanna Application to Southern Kajiado • 7 plant types – 4 grasses, 2 bushes, 1 tree • 9 animal types – 6 wildlife (15%), 3 livestock (85%) • Initial stocking density and distributions (DRSRS surveys) • Joined with the PHEWS model • 2.5 x 2.5 km resolution • Monthly output from 1977 to 2000  spatial mapping over time • Temporal changes plotted • Force maps to manipulate scenarios

  13. Run 5 simulations… A: Pristine conditions (no people) B: Returning to pastoralism (no agriculture) C: The current situation (control model) D: Worst case: convert all usable land E: Introducing payments and simulate response with PHEWS.

  14. Modeled Elephant DistributionScenario C, 1992

  15. Modeled Cattle Distribution Scenario C, 1992

  16. Some preliminary results • Comparing B to C: how many extra elephants do we get when we implement CF scheme? • In many years the changes are small. But the system appears more resilient in response to droughts… • However, without compensation: the Maasai are much worse off… (according to PHEWS)

  17. Elephant Populations

  18. Introducing CF? Some CBA guess work • On average, elephant stock increases by 500 animals • The total transfer amounts to about $450.000 (assuming an average fee of $40 / acre / harvest) • Assuming these numbers are correct: would a value of $1000 / elephant / year be acceptable? If so: CF… • This amounts to a required WTP of $3.5 / hh / yr, assuming MWTP = constant; 150106 hh in “West”; & 500,000 elephants in Africa. Note: WTP for elephant conservation in Sri Lanka = $12/yr

  19. When looking at park fees instead? Google: 200.000 visitors/yr… Foreigners vs Kenyans? $500.000/yr may be brought in by raising the entrance fee by $2.5/visitor (even less per visitor/day) Acceptable?

  20. More preliminary results • Comparing C to D: what will happen when all usuable land is converted to agriculture? • Ag lands increase from 2330 ha to 90,150 ha (90 km2 from total of 10.746 km2). Great deal of extrapolation. (Transaction costs etc ignored) • In the model without population growth, the Maasai gain (in PHEWS: cash boxes loaded)

  21. Areas in cultivation used in Scenarios C and D

  22. The elephant population increases!? Due to a livestock crash? Likely an artifact of the model. More work needs to be done… on both the ecological linkages and Maasai behavioral responses.

  23. But… • Of course transfer payments go way up, and may exceed the value from extra conservation… • Focus on priority areas instead? • More realistic (economic) modeling to predict the real ‘threat.’ Include transaction costs, allow for soil/precipitation differences, etc. • Strategic issues? Can payments induce extra conversion (to qualify for payments)?

  24. Final preliminary results • Comparing C,B to E: what happens to the elephant population if we compensate Maasai for not leasing their land? • PHEWS model: similar to scenario B but the Maasai now accumulate their livestock herd (cattle, not goats). Wildlife response through competition for food.

  25. Maasai can support their preferred cattle stock…

  26. … and therefore have smaller stocks of goats…. And because goats and elephants have some overlap in diet….

  27. … the elephant population gains more than before. We emphasize again: these are preliminary results.

  28. Next steps • Add economics: • beyond PHEWS and ‘Malthusian’ models. Maybe add leisure and ‘imported’ goods: U(c1,c2,l)? Survey work has been done. • Implication for contract design; formulate hypotheses etc. • Corners versus interior: focus on priority areas (corridors), explore how much land can credibly be converted, etc. Implications for contract design. • Estimate the monetary value of elephant conservation

  29. Furthermore • We need to “tailor” the Savanna model for this sort of research • Are there general equilibrium effects (prices/wages)? Welfare and distribution. Displaced labor? • We need to think about long-term funding strategies… • How sustainable are “hand out schemes” like this one?

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