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COMPARATIVE DATA (CHINA VS BRAZIL) 2012

U nion Internationale des Avocats International Association of Lawyers MACAO – 2013 BRAZILIAN INVESTMENTS IN CHINA AND CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN BRAZIL. COMPARATIVE DATA (CHINA VS BRAZIL) 2012. ORIGIN OF CHINESE IMPORTS (MAIN COUNTRIES) - BRAZIL: 2,73%.

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COMPARATIVE DATA (CHINA VS BRAZIL) 2012

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  1. Union InternationaledesAvocatsInternationalAssociationofLawyersMACAO – 2013BRAZILIAN INVESTMENTS IN CHINA AND CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN BRAZIL

  2. COMPARATIVE DATA (CHINA VS BRAZIL) 2012

  3. ORIGIN OF CHINESE IMPORTS (MAIN COUNTRIES) - BRAZIL: 2,73%

  4. DESTINY OF CHINESE EXPORTS (MAIN COUNTRIES)

  5. ORIGIN OF BRAZILIAN IMPORTS (MAIN COUNTRIES) USD BILLIONS – CHINA: USD 34,2 BILLIONS

  6. DESTINY OF BRAZILIAN EXPORTS (MAIN COUNTRIES) USD BILLIONS – CHINA: USD 41,2 BILLIONS

  7. CURRENT TRADE – BRAZIL VS CHINA

  8. MAIN PRODUCTS EXPORTED BY BRAZIL TO CHINA AND IMPORTED BY BRAZIL FROM CHINA

  9. DIRECT INVESTMENTS – BRAZIL VS CHINA (USD BILLIONS) – 2012

  10. DOING BUSINESS IN BRAZIL AND IN CHINA - 2014

  11. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF BRAZILIAN INVESTMENT IN CHINA

  12. BRAZILIAN PRESENCE IN CHINA (i) in 2012, therewereabout 60 Brazilianenterprises in China (e.g. Inbev, Banco do Brasil, Banco Itaú BBA, Bovespa, Embraer, Odebrecht, Petrobrás, Vale, Votorantim, etc.); (ii) In the last 10 years Brazil invested in China about about560 million dollars (0,04% of the total amount of foreign direct investments in China); (iii) the service sector is what most attracted the interest of Brazilian companies, representing 51% of the group; (iv) Brazilisconsidered a latecomerto China. When it arrived in the country, American andEuropeancompnaieshadalready a consolidated position.

  13. THE MAIN DIFFICULTIES FOUND BY BRAZILIANS TO OPERATE IN CHINA (i) Red tape: difficulties on obtaining permits and approvals from the Chinese government for projects in regulated sectors; (ii) Local partner: mismatch between the strategic objectives of Brazilian companies and the strategic objectives of the Chinese partners; (iii) Over regulation: the detailed regulation of various sectors by the Chinese government; (iv) Intellectual property: non-recognition by China of international practices relating to intellectual property; (v) Government interference with the market: limitsimposedbytheChinesegovernmenttothefreemarket;

  14. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF CHINESE INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL

  15. CHINESE PRESENCE IN BRAZIL (i)Chinesecompanies are dividedintodifferentsectorsofproduction in Brazil; (ii) the amount China invested directly in Brazil until 2012 corresponds about 20 billion dollars; and (iii) in 2011, there were lots of Chinese enterprises in Brazil (e.g. Chery, Foxconn, JAC, Wuhan Iron An Steel Group Co., etc.).

  16. THE MAIN DIFFICULTIES FOUND BY CHINESE TO OPERATE IN BRAZIL (i) Red tape: bureaucratic processes; (ii) Taxes: high taxation and complex system; (iii) lack of infrastructure; (iv) floating exchange rate; (v) Visas: difficulties on obtaining working permits

  17. SPECIFIC ISSUES OF THE CHINESE PRESENCE IN BRASIL – TRADE (ANTI-DUMPING AND SAFEGUARD MEASURES) (i) The trade defensemeasuresconsist in theapplicationof antidumping andcountervailingduties, provisional ordefinitive; (ii) The safeguardmeasuresconsist in theapplicationoftariffmeasuresorquantitativerestrictionsagainst a surge in importsfromvarioussources; (iii) Brazilpromulgatedlaw n. 9.019/1995 thatprovides for theenforcementofrightsunderthe Antidumping AgreementandtheAgreementon Subsidies andCountervailingMeasuresofthe WTO; (iv) Currently, eventhough China isconsideredanemergingeconomy, it istreated as non-marketuntil 2016; (v) In 2004, China andBrazilsigned a MemorandumofUnderstandingwherebyBrazilgranted China marketeconomy status. Thisrule, however, hasnotbeenapplied in practice; and (vi) Halfofanti-dumpingmeasuresimposedbyBrazil are againstChineseproducts;

  18. SPECIFIC ISSUES OF THE CHINESE PRESENCE IN BRASIL – RURAL LAND ACQUISITION (AGRICULTURE) (i) Accordingtothelastreportofthe Central Bank ofBrazil, foreignershavebought USD 60 billion in land in Brazil. China isthefirstforeinginvestor in landacqusition; (iii) TryingtocontrolBrazilianlandacquisition for foreigners’ enterprises, mainlyChineseones, theBraziliangovernmentannounced a change in theopinionofthe General AdvocacyofUnion regardingleglistation; (iv) for purchasing a rural property in Brazil a foreignentity must beauthorizedtooperate in Braziland must obtainapprovalofanagriculturalprojectofexplorationtiedto its contractualorstatutoryobjectives; (v) thelimit for acquisitionof rural propertyby a foreign legal entityis 100 rural modules. For theacquisitionof a superior amounttheforeign legal entity must obtainanspecialapprovaloftheBrazilianNationalCongress; and (vii) The amountof 1 rural module varies accordingtoeachBrazilian region.

  19. EDUARDO LORENZETTI MARQUES CAMPEDELLI, MARQUES E ZARIF SÃO PAULO – BRASIL emarques@cmzadv.com.br www.cmzadv.com.br

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