PUBLIC OPINION AND THE POLITICS OF PEACE RESEARCH

1. PUBLIC OPINION AND THE POLITICS OF PEACE RESEARCH NORTHERN IRELAND, BALKANS, ISRAEL, PALESTINE, CYPRUS, MUSLIM WORLD AND THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’

2. Colin Irwin Institute of Governance Queen’s University Belfast and Institute of Irish Studies University of Liverpool www.peacepolls.org

3. Campbell’s Galvanometer • Both US and UK got WMDs wrong • Interests and applied social science • Political, ideological, economic, religious • Data collection, instrument choice and design, data interpretation and theory choice • Break the glass and move the needle for desired meter reading • Matters of State, war and peace, life and death

4. Campbell’s adversarial stakeholder “There should be adversarial stakeholder participation in the design of each pilot experiment or program evaluation, and again in the interpretation of results. We should be consulting with the legislative and administrative opponents of the program as well as the advocates, generating measures of feared undesirable outcomes as well as promised benefits”

5. POLLING AND INTER-TRACK DIPLOMACY • Track One - Political leadership • Track Two - Civil society • Track Three - The people

6. Track One - Political leadership • Each party to the negotiations nominated a member of their team to work with the facilitator on the polls • Questions were designed to facilitate the testing of party policies as a series of options or preferences from across the social and political spectrum • All questions, options and preferences had to be agreed by all parties as not being partisan or misleading

7. Track Two - Civil society • The research was undertaken by independent academics from Queen’s University Belfast • The work was funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust • Detailed reports were given to the parties, two governments and Independent Chair • Analysis were published in the local press and more recently on the inter-net • It was a joint University, NGO, Newspaper enterprise

8. Track Three - The people • A representative sample of the population in terms of age, gender, social class, religious denomination and geographical area • Questions ‘pitched’ at what most people could understand most of the time NOT lowest common denominator • All relevant issues covered and NO irrelevant issues • Results made available to the public without ‘cherry-picking’ • Public ‘given a seat at the negotiating table’

9. POLLING ANDCONSENSUS BUILDING • Top down • Bottom up • Centre out • Polarities in

10. Top down • Questionnaire design and vicarious discourse between parties who may not even be talking to each other • Understanding of the real concerns of the other parties’ electorate • Un-real concerns exposed • Information on public policy and ‘deals’ disseminated to general public

11. Bottom up • Views of public brought to negotiations on key issues • The moderating voice of ‘the silent majority’ given expression • Public prepared for new policies, ‘a deal’ and/or a referendum

12. Centre out • Small centre parties not excluded and given a part to play in the political process • Small centre parties given a stronger public voice as parties of moderation • Common ground mapped out and defined • Compromises mapped out and defined

13. Polarities in • Major community based parties are included as they must ‘make the deal’ • Major concerns of largest communities defined and explained • Extreme parties not excluded and given a part to play in the political process • Extreme positions demonstrated to be marginal with little cross community support

14. US/UK practice? • Most negotiating practice focuses on the major parties in each community • Small centre parties are often ignored • Extreme parties are frequently not brought into the political process • Public not part of or prepared for ‘deals done behind closed doors’ • ‘Real Politic’ power plays not consensus building • Deals lack stability of broad consensus

15. US polling in Northern Ireland • Since 1998 the State Department has run two polls a year in Northern Ireland but no systematic input from local parties or civil society • The National Democratic Institute (NDI) work with willing parties but do not run regular polls in Northern Ireland. However they do include some questions in the State Department polls • Fairly simple questions are used with an emphasis on local political profiling as part of a wide ranging poll • Results selectively released to press by the State Department/Consulate

16. QUESTION DESIGN

17. Table 1. NI Peace Polls Constitutional Question

18. Power sharing with North-South institutions • ‘Power sharing with North-South institutions but no joint authority - Government by a Northern Ireland Assembly, power sharing Executive and a number of joint institutions established with the Republic of Ireland to deal with matters of mutual interest. (But these arrangements will not include joint authority between the British and Irish governments).’

19. Table 2. 1st and 8th Constitutional Choice

20. Preferences 1, 2, 3 and 4

21. Qualitative 5 point scale • ‘Essential’ - You believe this option is a necessary part of a lasting settlement and should be implemented under any circumstances. • ‘Desirable’ - This option is not what you would consider to be ‘Essential’, but you think this option, or something very similar to it, is a good idea and should be put into practice. • ‘Acceptable’ - This option is not what you would consider to be ‘Desirable’, if you were given a choice, but you could certainly ‘live with it’. • ‘Tolerable’ - This option is not what you want. But, as part of a lasting settlement for Northern Ireland, you would be willing to put up with it. • ‘Unacceptable’ - This option is completely unacceptable under any circumstances. You would not accept it, even as part of a lasting settlement.

22. Table 3. Per cent ‘Essential’ and ‘Unacceptable’

23. Table 4. US/NI 1995 Constitutional Question

24. Local assembly - power sharing • ‘A local assembly for Northern Ireland within the UK with power-sharing between local parties’ • This option does not include ‘North-South institutions’ and therefore probably exaggerates Protestant support for the ‘Belfast Agreement’

25. Table 5. US/NI 1998 Constitutional Question

26. Table 6. US/NI 2003 Constitutional Question

27. 9 NORTHERN IRELANDPEACE POLLS • 1 - Peace building and public policy • 2 and 3 - Procedural • 4 - Comprehensive Settlement • 5 - Test of Belfast Agreement • 6, 7, 8 and 9 - Implementation

28. POLLING ANDPUBLIC DIPLOMACY • Parties • Electorate • Governments • International Community

29. The Ulster Unionists • Police reform and equality issues are essential to Nationalists and Republicans • ‘Steps we need to take to win peace’, Belfast Telegraph, Saturday, January 10th, (1998)

30. The Democratic Unionists • Few alternatives to the Belfast Agreement • ‘Alternatives to a comprehensive settlement’, Belfast Telegraph, Tuesday, March 31st, (1998)

31. The Social Democratic and Labour Party • Time to take seat on Policing Board • BBC Northern Ireland, Hearts and Minds, Thursday, September 20th, 2001

32. Sinn Féin • Northern Ireland Assembly is a good thing • ‘Why Ulster now wants to have new assembly’, Belfast Telegraph, Monday, January 12th, (1998)

33. The Progressive Unionist Party and Sinn Féin • Paramilitary activity must end • ‘Ceasefires, paramilitary Activity and Decommissioning’, Belfast Telegraph, Wednesday, March 3rd, (1999)

34. Women’s Coalition and Alliance Party of Northern Ireland • Not very sceptical

35. The pro-Agreement parties in general • Referendum can be won • ‘Majority say yes to the search for settlement’, Belfast Telegraph, Tuesday, March 31st, (1998)

36. The Ulster Unionist Council • Ulster Unionist electorate more moderate than their Council and party executive • ‘Unionism at the Crossroads: What the people say’, Belfast Telegraph, Thursday, May 25th, (2000)

37. Anti-Agreement Unionists • Alternatives to the Belfast Agreement have little cross community support • What now for the Agreement?, Belfast Telegraph, Wednesday, February 19th, (2003)

38. Rejectionist Irish Republicans • United Ireland has little cross community support • ‘Little support for SF agenda’, Belfast Telegraph, Wednesday, April 1st, (1998)

39. Rejectionist Loyalists • Violence loses votes • 'The PEOPLE'S peace process', Belfast Telegraph, Wednesday, February 21st, (2001)

40. UK Government • Council of the Isles is a good thing • ‘What hope for Council of the Isles?’, Belfast Telegraph, Wednesday, January 14th, (1998)

41. Irish Government • Independent cross boarder bodies with executive powers – united Ireland by the ‘back door’ - is unacceptable to Unionists • ‘Feasibility and reality of north-south bodies’, Belfast Telegraph, Tuesday, January 13th, (1998)

42. US State Department and President • People of Northern Ireland want negotiations for a settlement • C. J. Irwin, ‘YES vote for talks’, Belfast Telegraph, Thursday, September 11th, (1997)

43. Irish Americans • The Belfast Agreement is acceptable to Sinn Féin • C. J. Irwin, 'It's the Agreement - stupid', Irish Times, Friday, February 23rd, (2001).

44. European Community • People of Northern Ireland want the Agreement to work • ‘93% SAY: MAKE THE AGREEMENT WORK’, Belfast Telegraph, Wednesday, March 3rd, (1999)

45. Macedonia • CDRSEE concerned about Albanian insurgency in Macedonia (fYROM) in 2002 • Poll to explore problems and solutions • Similar results to Northern Ireland • Protestants & Macedonians concerned about paramilitaries & decommissioning • Catholics & Albanians concerned about discrimination & policing • All concerned about elections • All agree solutions

46. Table 7. Causes of Conflict

47. Table 8. Priorities for peace

48. Table 9. Fair and free elections

49. Table 9 continued.Fair and free elections

50. No insurgency and successful elections • Media publication generated public discourse • International community followed up on all policy recommendations • First President, Kiro Gligorov, compared questions with those of US contractor • EU diplomat critiqued US methods • ‘Ethnopoltics’ published ‘Forum’ article • Campbell’s ‘adversarial… interpretation of results’