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Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM. Briefing to Secretary of Defense. Who am I?. My experience in the wild. Case Study. Meeting Agenda. Introduction. Advanced Persistent Threat. How did they do that?.
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Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM
Who am I? My experience in the wild... Case Study Meeting Agenda Introduction Advanced Persistent Threat How did they do that? Effective Counter Measures What has 30 years taught me…
Now lets look at a few problems… How’s your Calculus?
Know the Enemy… He who knows the enemy and himself will never in a hundred battles be at risk; He who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes win and sometimes lose; He who knows neither the enemy nor himself will be at risk in every battle. -Sun-Tzu
MI5 says the Chinese government “represents one of the most significant espionage threats”
What is it? Mandiant defines the APT as a group of sophisticated, determined and coordinated attackers that have been systematically compromising U.S. Government and Commercial networks for years. The vast majority of APT activity observed by Mandiant has been linked to China. APT is a term coined by the U.S. Air Force in 2006
Advanced Persistent Threat • Advanced means the adversary can operate in the full spectrum of computer intrusion. They can use the most pedestrian publicly available exploit against a well-known vulnerability, or they can elevate their game to research new vulnerabilities and develop custom exploits, depending on the target’s posture. • Persistent means the adversary is formally tasked to accomplish a mission. They are not opportunistic intruders. Like an intelligence unit they receive directives and work to satisfy their masters. Persistent does not necessarily mean they need to constantly execute malicious code on victim computers. Rather, they maintain the level of interaction needed to execute their objectives. • Threat means the adversary is not a piece of mindless code. This point is crucial. Some people throw around the term “threat” with reference to malware. If malware had no human attached to it (someone to control the victim, read the stolen data, etc.), then most malware would be of little worry (as long as it didn’t degrade or deny data). Rather, the adversary here is a threat because it is organized and funded and motivated. Some people speak of multiple “groups” consisting of dedicated “crews” with various missions. Richard Bejtlich’s Blog
APT’s Objectives • Political • Includes suppression of their own population for stability • Economic • Theft of IP, to gain competitive advantage • Technical • Obtain source code for further exploit development • Military • Identifying weaknesses that allow inferior military forces to defeat superior military forces
Recon / Intelligence • Systems, resources, connections • (Easier to attack a trusted partner?) • (E.g., target’s ISP, legal firm, contractor?) • Individuals of interest • (Good targets for spear phishing?) • Possible access methods • (Attacks on systems, partners, people)
Initial Intrusion • Spear phishing is pretty common • (Because it seems to work well enough because we are so weak. ) • Email to one or more targeted individuals • Spoofed follow-up to conference, meeting, etc. • Or email “follow-up” to customer complaint … • Malware payload • Zip file typical (harder to scan for malware) • Different people may get different attacks • If even one attack works – they’re in
Consolidation • Install additional malware • Multiple copies (various locations) • Different kinds & configurations • Crack & exfiltrate credentials • For re-login from outside (unusual) • Provide for malware updates
Credentials • (To look like a local user/admin) • Identify local usernames • Active Directory • Local machine user database • Attack local authentication data • Password guessing (Nvidia CUDA GPU) • Brute force decryption
Tools • Backdoor install • Password dump • Get email • List processes • (Normal, useful stuff ) • (Doesn’t trip AV alarms)
Exfiltration • Disguise via RAR, CAB, encryption • (Make it difficult to see what’s leaving) • Multiple hops to final destination • (Harder to ID where data is going) • Outgoing connections only, IP tunnel, etc. • Expect discovery of more tricks • Piggyback on other traffic? Slow torrent?
Command / Control • Outgoing connections preferred • Firewall less of an issue (mistake) • Imitates “normal” traffic • Looks like (but isn’t) Windows Update • Looks like chat, actually C/C rendevous • C/C in web comments & image headers • Scan-signatures more difficult to find • Random content, multiple encryption
APT Maintenance • Tries to keep your system infected • Multiple copies • “Seeds” to re-infect • Multiple small custom programs • Leverage existing system components • Updates, to change AV signatures • (Only 20% trip AV alarms – so change ‘em)
APT Case Study • Major Defense Contractor – Electronic Systems • Attacks consistent with US-CERT CIIN-07-332-01 • Attackers been in almost a year before noticed • Attacks came from Shandong Providence • Exfiltrated 20 GB/360 GB staged and encrypted • 8 known variants of malware • Corporate PII from HR taken as well
APT Case Study - Methodology • Poison Ivy • Remote Admin • Keystroke logger • Mine Trojan • Full Remote Admin • Capture user credentials • Exfiltrates Data • MS Gina • Password sniffer • Remote RDP
Case Study – Process of Attack • This Information is on a Master Target List • Search unclassified information using Google operands • Use Maltego To target individual – Facebook /Linkedin • Get HR Records – Target HR Boss • Send SE email to VP he had access to everything • Harvest user credentials – Move latterly… Harvest • Access Servers – establish test connection Port 53/443 • Access Data – Compress/Encrypt • Pass out port 53 or 443 • done
SE - Email • Use Maltego/Facebook/Linkedin– find the weak-link someone who is possibly underappreciated /underpaid. Find the person who has porn issue (eastern block owns this), gambling (mostly US organized crime), or is searching for a new job (someone who is frustrated). • Email target and appeal to their pride! “We have conducted an exhaustive nationwide search for someone with these skills and you are in the top 3 of your peers”“We are willing to fly you and your spouse to our Corporate Headquarters for an interview”
What should we do? • End “Default Permit”mentality – sandbox everything coming in • Enable “White Lists”for corporate user groups – kill all default permit! • Don’t allow “corporate users (n00bs)” to install their favorite software – take them out of local Admin Group on local box • Learn how to operate Back-Track 4 – become proficient in Linux • Don’t trust anyone…everyone on the inside of the network is a hacker • Know what “normal” looks like – data coming in, data going out. • Don’t allow port 443 to pass-through firewall without looking at it. Dave and Muts (Mati Aharoni)
What has 30 years taught me? • You want a good job – Then look like you want a good job. • Polish your social skills for interviews • Customers and Employers like certifications – Get over it. • Don’t be afraid in an interview “What educational opportunities do you give your employees?” • Always keep in mind your continuing education – you don’t want to be working for a young snot-nose boss when your 55