EOA 15 : KOREAN WAR, OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1950

1. EOA 15: KOREAN WAR, OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1950 End state: Initial-Immediate cessation of hostilities and a restoration of the 38th parallel boundary.27SEP50- destruction of the NK Armed Forces, both north and south of the 38th Parallel Condition: The North Korean (NK) forces invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK) 24 June 1950; UN Security Council adopted a resolution, demanding immediate cessation of hostilities and a restoration of the 38th Parallel boundary; Russia perceived as being the real aggressor; President Truman vows to contain the spread of communism. COG: Enemy- NK Armed Forces (O); Friendly- U.S. Armed Forces (O) OP Approach: Direct approach. Defeat Mechanism: 1st disintegrate through simultaneous operations (amphibious landing in the rear). 2nd destroy through pursuit across 38th Parallel. Stability mechanism: control until United Nations have completed the unification of the country; support after ROK takes over. Decisive Points:Crossing of 38th Parallel. Seizure of positions along the YALU river. Basing: Japan, Pusan, Incheon LOO: Two lines of operation EUSA left, and X Corps right (landing at WONSAN, IWON). OP Reach: 200-250 km. Enabling EUSA to seize positions at 38th Parallel without tactical pause, launch and sustain operations up to the YALU river from positions around SEOUL Tempo: NK force break contact and withdraw as a result of EUSA’s X Corps threatens NK LOCs. Maintain pressure (pursuit/exploitation) to destroy NK forces and seize key terrain is essential for an encirclement of NK forces south of the 38th Parallel. Simultaneity and Depth: X Corps landings at INCHON simultaneous to defense against NK forces at the PUSAN perimeter. X Corps rapid advance to the east simultaneous to EUSA advance to SEOUL. Operations across 38th Parallel after reconstituting forces at SEOUL. Phasing/Transitions: PH- I Breakout and seizure of positions east of SEOUL; PH- II Pursuit by EUSA; PH III Reconstitution of forces at SEOUL; PH IV Attack across 38thParallel Culmination. SEOUL reconstitution and seizing positions at the YALU Risk (S/O/T):U.S. operations across the 38th parallel and Chinese entering the war (S). MacArthur did not designate an operational reserve to commit in case of a local emergency (T and O). Theorist Synthesis: Deep operations (Isserson), Discourse vs. reality (Lynn), Concept of strategy (Mintzberg), Heroes vs. Managers (Linn), the attack and war plans (Clausewitz book 7/8), and a plan for continuing the war or peace (Dolman). Timeline: Korean War Timeline June –December 1950 25 June 1950: North Korean (NK) forces launched an attack across the 38th Parallel into Seoul 25 July 1950: KPA (North Korean People’s Army) seizes Suwon 04 August 1950: Battle of Pusan Perimeter 15 September 1950: Incheon Landing 29 September 1950: Syngman Rhee’s government is restored 09 October1950: US forces cross 38th Parallel near Kaesong. 19 October 1950: US forces occupy Pyongyang 01 November 1950: US forces first engagement against Communist Chinese forces at Unsan 03 November 1950: UN resolution passed, censuring North Korea for "breach of peace” 27 November 1950: US Marines/Infantry surrounded by Chinese Communist forces at Chosin Reservoir. 23 December 1950: General Walker killed in vehicle accident 26 December 1950: LTG Ridgeway assumes command of Eight Army (EUSA) 31 December 1950: Chinese and NK forces launched offensive attacks into South Korea

2. EOA 15: KOREAN WAR, OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1950, CHINESE ENTER THE WAR End state: Initial- NK Armed forces destroyed and conditions for reconciliation achieved. Endstate was changed by the JCS on 30DEC50 and now stated as to defend in successive positions not necessarily north of the 38th parallel. Condition (P/M): After crossing the 38th Parallel, GHQ and higher command received conflicting and contradictory intelligence about the likelihood of a Chinese intervention (P/M). JFC and President Truman followed MacArthur's assessment that a Chinese commitment to North Korea was unlikely, because (1) the unfavorable weather conditions for a major offensive, (2) the Chinese could not afford war with the United States, (3) the Air force would be capable of sealing the battlefield by bombing LOC bridges over the YALU river. COG: Enemy- Chinese Armed Forces (O); Friendly- U.S. Armed Forces (O) OP Approach: Direct. Limitations in engaging Chinese staging areas on China's territory. Defeat mechanism: continue destruction of NK Army; dislocate Chinese forces from favorable positions south of 38th Parallel. Stability mechanism: control territory south of 38th Parallel. Decisive Points: Break off contact with Eight Army and X. Corps from Chinese forces. Defend favorable positions north of 38th Parallel to gain time for reinforcements. Defense of SEOUL. Basing: Japan, Pusan, Incheon LOO: Two, Eight Army left, ROK A right. OP Reach: 200-250km provided extreme difficultly and was partly very successful (Operation Pink - shipment of equipment). Tempo: Evacuation of Forces north of 38thParallel required speed (evacuation over sea). Simultaneity and Depth: Simultaneous to the retreat, reinforcements must be brought from U.S. territory Phasing/Transitions: Phase I: defending in successive positions north and south of 38th Parallel. Phase II: Seize the initiative. Phase III: Attack and Seize objectives north of SEOUL vic. 38th Parallel. Culmination. MacArthur's forces had already culminated (in parts), before the Chinese launched their operation on 26 November 1950. Risk (S/O/T): Intelligence estimates identified possible risk of a Chinese attack and more than 200,000 Chinese forces on NK territory (S/O). Theorist Synthesis: Deep operations (Isserson), Discourse vs. reality (Lynn), Concept of strategy (Mintzberg), Heroes vs. Managers (Linn), the attack and war plans (Clausewitz book 7/8), and a plan for continuing the war or peace (Dolman).