Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DMHA)

1. Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance(CFE-DMHA) Pamela K. Milligan Director 12 March 2014

2. PACOM Disaster Response Lessons Trends1991-2013 • Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance • www.cfe-dmha.org

3. 01 02 03 table of contents Trends Table Aim: to indicate major categories of PACOM Disaster Management Lessons Identified and Good Practices Supporting Data

4. Introduction • CFE analyzed representative PACOM Disaster Management response activities between 1991 and 2013 for which military focused Lessons Identified and After Action Reports are available. The aim is to illuminate Disaster Management related trends in 11 categories. • As more data becomes available additional operations will be added to the Lessons repository. Many After Action Reports (AARs) and Observations and Lessons Identified have been captured. Yet a large percentage of the issues identified in HADR activities are re-identified in subsequent operations. The re-identification may result from the following persistent challenges: • Personnel turnover. People who learn the lessons and develop HADR expertise transfer to new duties. New personnel, without the expertise and benefit of previous learning, are called upon to execute the next HADR mission. • Implementation challenges. The Lessons Identified are in some cases not fully implemented to become Lessons Learned. Changes to each of the DOTMPLPF elements are required to generate effective change. Absent this implementation, the learning process is repeated. Doctrine Organization Training Materiel Leadership Personnel Facilities Interoperability section 01

5. Disaster Management Trends Table

6. 2006 OPERATION AFTERSHOCK: Yogyakarta, Indonesia 2004 Tsunami OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE 1991 Bangladesh Cyclone SEA ANGEL 2006 Pakistan Earthquake 2006 Typhoon/Mudslides Philippines • 2011 Operation Tomoedashi Japan • 2008 Cyclone Nagris Burma • 2013 OPERATION DAMAYAN, Philippines • 2008 Typhoon Fengshen • Philippines • 2010 Wildfires, Russia • 2011 Typhoon Megi • 2010 Pakistan Floods • 2008 Snowstorms, China • 2011 Thailand Floods • 2009 Padang Earthquake X Issue identified X Significant Deficiency XGood practice No specific data section 02 • Source: Placeholder example

7. This section containsselectedquotescapturing key insights uponwhich the evaluationswerebased. • Supporting Data

8. Supporting Data • Liaison officers played an important role in facilitating communications and coordination between military and humanitarian organizations and between both of these sets of actors and local and national government actors. Locally recruited liaisons that worked with the Canadian forces served in each barangay to provide key information to local communities about the response effort and relay any problems with aid delivery back to responders. • Liaison officers were pivotal in the response for both effective coordination between military and humanitarian agencies and between government ministries and the humanitarian organizations. (Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 33) Liaison Officers (LNOs) • U.S. should position LNOs within OCHA, WFP, and within the Inter-agency Coordination cluster, Emergency Telecommunications cluster, Logistics cluster. OCHA should position its own LNOs within relevant military coordination center (JHOC, CMOC, etc.). • Responding agencies should seek to recruit LNOs from the local community whenever possible, especially where those individuals possess strong language skills and are trusted members of their local communities. (Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 35) Operation Damayan U) IOT provide 24 hour coverage, use either a DLA LNO rep in Okinawa or bring a second DLA Rep from mainland Japan to provide 24 ;hour coverage so that there are no gaps in capturing logistical information that would help DLA support operations and plans on time/early should we stand up for such Operations in the future. Having two heads together would produce better results in support of this type or any other significant disaster relief operations, and this type could apply to any other region in the Pacific. Back to Table section 03

9. Since commercial e-mail systems are the primary means of communication among civilian organizations, a reliable capability communicate with these organizations is critical. Cell phones and SMS text messaging are also the most common and reliable forms of communication in disaster response settings where the infrastructure is available. There was a shortage of Indonesian cell phones issued. AAR participants felt this was an oversight that could have been easily resolved if it had been brought to the attention of the leadership. (OPERATION AFTERSHOCK: A Review of the III MEFDisaster Relief Operationin Yogyakarta, IndonesiaApril-May 2006, pg. 12) Communications • Three features of information sharing and communication underpinned successful civil-military coordination in Roxas. First, all communications were open and unclassified. There were no proprietary data sets or secret information. Second, because the UN, local government, international NGOs and Canadian military were all physically collocated in one room, responders could literally walk over to one another and have a conversation. Cluster meeting attendance in Roxas was facilitated by the fact that the different agency representatives were already working in the room where meetings were being 33 held; it was not necessary to travel across town to attend a cluster meeting. This encouraged the development of interpersonal bonds across agencies. Finally, the quality of information made available by the Philippines government was reliable, timely, and provided a good common baseline set of information from which to work. All of these features enhanced communications and information sharing with the Roxas Operations Center. (Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 32-33) Below the section signifier is a small discreet text field where you can put reference or source material. You can have it be a live web link to the source or simply give attribution to the source you’ve cited. section 03

10. As noted above, the prior experience of the leadership of Operation Aftershock was key to successful interagency coordination and partnering. The military leadership clearly understood the supported/supporting relationship with the lead federal agency – USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA). Within two hours of arrival, the 3d MEB DRAT’s Senior Medical Officer met with representatives of USAID-OFDA who facilitated meetings with key NGO partners working in the Bantul region. Initial contact with local heath officials, including the provincial Minister of Health, was made at UN-led health cluster meeting the following day. Of note was the 3d MEB leadership’s guidance that junior medical department officers also attend the UN cluster meetings in order to gain invaluable experience in working with the humanitarian relief community. Such mentoring is critical to sharing knowledge and experience, with a view toward developing institutional and individual capacity. (OPERATION AFTERSHOCK: A Review of the III MEFDisaster Relief Operationin Yogyakarta, IndonesiaApril-May 2006, pg. 7) Recommendation 1-5: While the experience level of deployed personnel in future disasters can not be guaranteed due to staff rotation, III MEF should continue efforts to institutionalize effective policies, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that draw on lessons observed from recent responses and provide increased education and training opportunities related to disaster relief for individuals and units • Recommendation 1-6: Develop pre-disaster working relationships or agreements with key partners in the III MEF area of interest, such as NAMRU and the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences (AFRIMS) in Bangkok, and with USAID/OFDA, the Department of State medical attachés at U.S. Embassies, and others as appropriate. (OPERATION AFTERSHOCK: • A Review of the III MEFDisaster Relief Operationin Yogyakarta, IndonesiaApril-May 2006, pg. 7 ) Experience • Military commands should promote HA/DR training and further enable JTFs by providing experienced HA/ DR personnel knowledgeable of SOPs and CONOPS. (Yolanda 36) • Military commands should promote HA/DR training and further enable JTFs by providing experienced HA/ DR personnel knowledgeable of SOPs and CONOPS. (Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 36) Operation Sea Angel: A Case Study Paul A. McCarthy, RAND, pg 12 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR374.pdf section 03

11. Mapping • (U) The operational requirement for updated maps and charts of the Panay Island region drove the need to extract electronic NGA charts from the ship's digital holdings and then print them via the LFP in the Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC). Electronic chart printing of this nature was, however, designed for briefing graphics vice the types of tactical maneuver type charts used for ground operations. Charts produced by the LFP did not have the required resolution to create quality 1:100,000 scale graphics of the entire island of Panay on one sheet of paper for ease of use by HAST. Collection of detailed information on landing zones (LZs) in the relief area, detailed existing maps of existing infrastructure, critical facilities (e.g., hospitals, airfields, etc.), and utility systems, street level maps and imagery was precluded by the inability of intelligence personnel to access high quality electronic printing capabilities. Small, 8 x 10 images were available, but not realistic for planner purposes. Carrier Air Wing FOURTEEN (CVW-14) personnel contacted Commander, United States Seventh Fleet (C7F) NGA representatives for special products, crafted using ARCview or other technologically superior software running on NGA-designed computer systems, to facilitate single-page printing of a high quality, high fidelity chart of Panay Island via the LFP. NGA C7F was able to generate the product quickly, and CVW-14 was able to print and distribute to the HAST ashore, 40 hours after the mission commenced. (Typhoon Fengshen, Phillipines) section 03

12. Linguistic Expertise • Liaison officers who had native fluency of the language in affected areas proved to be a key enabler in the coordination and information sharing of the relief efforts. ((Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 34) As was the case in the provision of the NEHK, the assistance of USAID-OFDA in providing interpreters and liaising with the IOM for vehicles was critical to a successful operation. Despite having 24 fulltime translators, more were required to fulfill the critical task of providing clinical translation, as well as assisting with administrative functions in support of the command element. More dedicated clinical translators would have greatly assisted medical operations. ((OPERATION AFTERSHOCK: A Review of the III MEFDisaster Relief Operationin Yogyakarta, IndonesiaApril-May 2006, pg. 12) section 03

13. - The media should be provided open and regular access to information. Ideally a central cell should be made for disseminating information and to avoid inconsistencies. - Media management is very important: this entails feeding them correct information, facilitating field visits, educating them on the latest developments, participating in interviews and talk shows. Equally important is monitoring of the public mood and taking proactive steps. - The media should retain its independence and objectivity, but at the same time should be sensitive to the feelings of disaster survivors and should not undermine the national effort through overtly negative coverage. Criticism of disaster management by the authorities and others should be constructive. Pakistan Earthquake AAR, pg. 6 Crisis Communication • • Attention to the positive impact of U.S. relief efforts may have sent the wrong message to certain segments of the local population. • • Too little media coverage on the positive AFP relief efforts. • • the first few days of the relief efforts, international and local media largely influenced government response. Isolated areas were left to fend for themselves as international relief poured into areas where the cameras were rolling. (Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 24) • The unfair and inaccurate reporting on the Philippine government response could conceivably be traced to Anderson Cooper’s controversial reporting during the initial days of Haiyan, and its one-sided reporting, focusing exclusively on town line roads instead of going to the hinterlands where Filipino efforts were clearly visible. • The media’s overall thin knowledge on disaster management further caused unfair criticisms to the affected state. (Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 25) section 03

14. NGO Interaction • An example of good civil-military coordination was the International Medical Corps (IMC) who used military transport to set up mobile clinics in some of the hardest hit areas. A Canadian air force officer joined the team and local police accompanied the teams and provided translation services. The IMC team was able to provide primary care when mayors of the LGUs requested two-day notice before providing services. The IMC team also bought pharmaceuticals from the local pharmacies providing evidence that the transition from response to recovery was already underway. (Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 35) Operation Sea Angel: A Case Study Paul A. McCarthy, RAND, pg16 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR374.pdf section 03

15. Access to shared information among all partners is critical in responding to a complex disaster. For U.S. Forces, there were two major requirements around which information sharing was needed: the provision of support to the Government of Japan, and the safety of the U.S. military personnel and dependents living in Japan…Amid the particular uncertainty of radiological contamination, the challenge as time moved on was collecting and presenting the right information in a way that was useful to all parties, considering that each had different goals and priorities. Among the measures that worked effectively was the establishment of direct lines of information sharing between U.S. forces and JSDF. Operation Tomodachi: Lessons learned in the U.S. Military’s support to Japan, Liaison, Vol V, 2012, pg 57. Information Sharing • The NGO perspective in Roxas was that data coming from national authorities submitted to the UN cluster were good, reliable, and timely. Information sharing within the clusters was good. ACF had six people on the ground by 11 November, and had a team of 20 on the ground by 29 November. ACF is involved primarily in WASH, food distribution and supplemental feeding. ACF suggested that it was important that UNDAC was on the ground and felt that the national authorities were impressive. Rapid turnover of cluster leads and a disparity in levels of previous experience and ability to manage and lead meetings were limiting factors. • (Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 24) Bilateral information and intelligence sharing are essential to relief efforts. Sharing information is essential to effective bilateral or multilateral operations. This applies not just to information needed for situational awareness, but also for the protection of personnel. Operation Tomodachi: Lessons learned in the U.S. Military’s support to Japan, Liaison, Vol V, 2012, pg 57. http://www.coe-dmha.org/publications/liaison/2012/Liaison2012_Web.pdf section 03

16. Pol-Mil Coordination • DART team members emphasized just how important prior training exercises were to successful response to Haiyan. Strong relationships between the DART team lead and the commanding U.S. generals greatly enhanced a smooth relationship between civilian and military actors. (Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 24) Operation Sea Angel: A Case Study Paul A. McCarthy, RAND, pg16 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR374.pdf There were several innovative Command and Control aspects within 3d MEB that are of note in this operation – most significant was the conversion of 3d MEB’s Command Operations Center (COC) into a Medical Operations Center (MOC). This clearly identified medical/health services as the main supported command function rather than a supporting function. The command relationships established were particularly effective for a mission of this scope and contributed greatly to the mission’s success. In this command structure, the Brigade Surgeon (Group Surgeon, 3rd MLG) was effectively both the Director of the MOC and Deputy Commander for Medical Operations (DCMO). As the DCMO, the Surgeon was given Direct Liaison Authority (DIRLAUTH) with civilian agencies. He was also given the lead for medical planning and execution, as well as tasking authority – an authority not typically given to a Special Staff Officer.(OPERATION AFTERSHOCK: A Review of the III MEFDisaster Relief Operationin Yogyakarta, IndonesiaApril-May 2006, pg. 8) section 03

17. Use of Existing SOPs • Joint Staff and USPACOM should ensure task order and execution order for HA/DR response operation directs familiarity and adherence to standing SOP and CONOPS for HA/DR operations. • Review and update the MNF SOP and “GRP-U.S. Military HA/DR CONOPS” as required to ensure they are consistent with current approved command and control, communications, and coordination concepts for international HA/DR operations. • Consider MPAT deployment to assist USPACOM JTFs deploying to support multinational operations. • Ensure key staff likely to deploy to international HA/ DR operations are familiar with the MNF SOP and other key USPACOM CONOPS prior to deployment(Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 41) • Many deployed U.S. military personnel were unfamiliar with longstanding command, control, and coordination tactics, techniques, procedures, and processes established in the Multinational Forces Standard Operating Procedure (MNF SOP) and the RP-U.S. Military Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Concept of Operations (2009) and exercised in USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation exercises with Allies and partner nations. (Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 24) https://community.apan.org/mpat/p/sop.aspx section 03

18. Hydrographic Survey • (U) In the aftermath of the South Asia tsunami new underwater hazards were created and navigation aids were destroyed or moved. Soundings and features on charts were of questionable reliability. Grounding of a relief vessel could risk life, damage vessels, and create additional environmental damage and burden on host nations and US forces. A rapid hydrographic survey capability was needed to support the safe flow of relief supplies. • (U) One US Survey Ship (USNS JOHN MCDONNELL) and two elements of Naval Oceanographic Office Fleet Survey Team deployed to the Relief Operating Area to survey flow of supplies. MCDONNELL deployed from SASEBO. The Fleet Survey Team was airlifted from CONUS and embarked USS BENFOLD of the LINCOLN CSG. Rapidly deployable Survey Teams from the Naval Oceanographic Office proved invaluable. Their mobility allowed a rapid arrival into the Relief Operating Area. The small footprint and transportable equipment supported the embed with the Strike Group where they could directly support the needs of the Naval Force Commander on LINCOLN. section 03