Global Conference on the Prevention of Genocide McGill University October 13, 2007

1. Global Conference on the Prevention of GenocideMcGill UniversityOctober 13, 2007 Making Prevention Feasible: A United NationsEmergency Peace Service? “A proposal & recent global initiative to address our five big challenges in preventing and managing armed conflict”

2. 1. Preventing genocide & crimes against humanity Challenges Leading to Crisis

3. Challenges leading to crisis: 2. Preventing armed conflict

4. Challenges leading to crisis: 3. Protecting civilians at risk

5. Challenges leading to crisis: 4. Prompt start-up of peace operations

6. Challenges leading to crisis: 5. Addressing human needs in emergencies

7. What is available to: • Prevent genocide and armed conflict • Protect civilians at high risk • Prompt start-up of peace operations • Address human needs in emergencies We do have a universal organization already committed to these challenges…

8. UNITED NATIONS Not reliable, prompt or optimally effective! No dedicated capacity of its own to: • Stop large scale atrocities • Enforce treaties, convention or laws • Conduct peace operations • Preventive deployments • Protect civilians In order to act: • Security Council must authorise a response • Request assistance from its Member States • National governments must agree to lease their personnel and resources

9. Existing Arrangements UN Standby Arrangements System SHIRBRIG African Union Standby Forces NATO European Union ‘Battlegroups’

10. The current arrangements only provide ‘conditional’ access to national standby resources. “Many Member States have argued against the establishment of a standing United Nations army or police force, resisted into entering into reliable standby arrangements, cautioned against the incursion of financial expenses for building a reserve of equipment or discouraged the Secretariat from undertaking planning for potential operations prior to the Secretary-General having been granted specific, crisis-driven legislative authority to do so. Under these circumstances, the United Nations cannot deploy operations ‘rapidly and effectively’ within the timelines suggested.” Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations Para 90 (2000) …Under these circumstances, the United Nations cannot deploy operations ‘rapidly and effectively’ within the timelines suggested.”

11. National Governments Tend to Wait, Watch & Often Defer…

12. The Implications • Later, larger efforts are often needed to stem wider escalation and spread of armed conflict • Millions continue to die and millions suffer • Millions of refugees and internally displaced people • Hundreds of $ billions required for post-conflict re-construction and recovery

13. So what now? The UN must have a capacity to respond: • Reliably • Rapidly • Robustly • Coherently (integrated) • Cost-effectively

14. A United Nations Emergency Peace Service

15. Requirements (everywhere) Safety and security Law and order Useful services for human needs

16. Why the Concept of a ‘UN Emergency Peace Service’ ? • Former proposals remain contentious and opposed • Array of useful services attracts deeper and wider support • Expands on legitimate, reliable emergency services needed, yet still unavailable world-wide • A UN Emergency Service has broad appeal • May shift global social and national political responses • A ‘UN Emergency Service’ is a tougher concept to oppose

17. What is Proposed as a UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS)? • A permanent UN formation • A ‘first responder’ available immediately • Requires authorization by the UN Security Council • Multidimensional and multifunctional service • Military, police and civilian elements • Prepared for rapid deployment to diverse crisis • Pre-trained, well-equipped 18,000 personnel

18. What is Proposed as a UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS)? • Co-located at a new UN base • Static operational headquarters • Two mobile field headquarters • Integrated, modular formation • Robust security • Civilian police • Skills and services to address human needs

19. Office of SRSG Pers 3 MIL, 2 POL, 10 CIV. -Senior MILAD, POLAD & CIVAD -Policy & Legal EMC Liaison Cell: DPA, DPKO, OCHA,UNHCR, Field Log & National Support DEPLOYABLE ELEMENTS SRSG Annex A Operational Level UN Emergency Peace Service Permanent Operational Level Headquarters and Base Personnel: 270 MIL 40 POL 1540 CIV OPERATIONS Pers 100 MIL Pers 25 POL Pers 25 CIV -Contingency -Contingency -Contingency Planning Planning Planning -Operations -Operations -Operations -Training -Training -Training -Logistics -Personnel -Personnel -Personnel -Legal Advisors -Advisors [Joint 24/7 OPS Cell] SUPPORT Pers 50 MIL, 10 POL&CIV Pers 100 MIL, 1500CIV -Contingency Move -Administration Planning -Personnel -Staging -Housing -Mission Support -Finance -Rotation/Augmentation -Host Nation Support Planning -Airlift/Sealift Contracting -Deployable Movement Support Teams Military Staff CIVPOL Staff Civilian Staff Deployment Cell Base Support & Infrastructure TRAINING Pers 5 MIL, 2 POL., 2 CIV Pers 10 MIL, 2 POL, 2 CIV Pers 4 MIL, 2 POL, 4 CIV -Ongoing Development of -Set & Assess Standards -Long-Term Planning Doctrine -Course & Curricula -Lessons Learned -SOPS Development -Multidisciplinary -ROE Options -Training & Exercises Think Tank -Interoperability Doctrine Training Standards Research & Analysis Military Police Civilian

20. Annex B. Composition of Deployable Elements for a UN Emergency Peace Service(assume 2 MHQ with 2 complete formations)(assigned to UN Base under a Static Operational HQ and 2 Missions HQs)Total Personnel in Each: MIL 5000, CIV 304, POL 400 Deputy/SRSG Military&Police Commander MIL-1 x 250 Pers CIV-1 x 20 Pers POL- 1 x 20 Pers MSN HQ Includes:Military, Police and Civilian StaffPolitical and Legal AdviceTranslation/Comms/Signals/Intell.Defense & Security PlatoonNGO Liaison Team Mission HQ (Tactical) Mission HQ (Tactical) Technical Recce Unit Technical Recce Unit Civilian Police Companies Technical Recce Unit Civilian Police Companies Technical Recce Unit MIL- 4 x 50 Pers Augmented by CIV Civilian Police Companies POL- 3 x 125 Per Light ArmouredRecceUnit Disaster Relief & Humanitarian Assistance Team Light ArmouredRecceUnit Disaster Relief & Humanitarian Assistance Team MIL- 2 x 150 Pers CIV- 2 x 30 Per Motorized Light Infantry Battalion Human Rights Monitors & Educators Motorized Light Infantry Battalion Human Rights Monitors & Educators MIL- 2 x 600 Pers CIV- 2 x 10 Per Amoured (Wheeled) Infantry Battalion Amoured (Wheeled) Infantry Battalion Conflict Resolution Teams MIL- 2 x 600 Pers Conflict Resolution Teams CIV – 2 x 10 Pers MIL-450 Pers 2 flights of 8 utility Helis 1 flight of 3 Heavy Lift Helis 1 flight of Armed Scout Helis Peacebuilding Advisory Teams Helicopter Squardron CIV- 2 x 10 Pers CIV- 10 Pers DDDRRR team Engineer Battalion MIL-500 Pers -3 Field Squadrons -3 Support Troops Environmental Crisis Response Team CIV- 10 Pers Logistics Battalion MIL- 1 x 500 Pers CIV- 100 Pers Medical Teams MIL-400 Pers -Forward Surgical Teams Public Affairs Medical Unit CIV- 2 x 10 Pers Public Affairs

21. UNEPS Key Components A ‘UN 911’ designed to be: • A complement to existing arrangements (UN, national, and regional) • A ‘lead service’ or ‘first-responder’ • Deployable within 48 hrs, sustainable for 6 months • Competent in diverse emergencies • A cost-effective investment for ‘we the people’ and the international community

22. Why this Model for UNEPS? • Alleviates pressure on national governments • Builds on and beyond the existing UN foundation • Universal composition to ensure universal legitimacy • Advanced training, equipment and standards to ensure cohesive sophisticated service

23. Why this Model for UNEPS? • Corresponds to requirements of UN missions • Provides useful incentives to address human needs • Assures services to restore law and order • Maintains robust disincentives to dissuade or deter and repel further violence • Ensures a more rapid, reliable, effective response when the need is imminent

24. UNEPS would Help Reduce: • Number of armed conflicts and war crimes • Massive suffering and violent deaths • Size, duration and number of peacekeeping operations • Pressure on national governments and national armed forces to contribute in the high-risk, critical start-up phase of operations • High costs associated with violent conflict and post conflict reconstruction

25. Any Progress in Global Initiative? • International working group of senior scholars, with executive and secretariat in New York • 40 CSOs actively supporting, over 350 endorsing • U.S. H. RES ‘213’ United Nations Emergency Peace Service Act of 2007 • Increasing Representation World-Wide

26. Representatives of Diverse Sectors Agreed that: • Concept is far more appealing • Case is more compelling • Model is more appropriate • UNEPS has more potential

27. UNEPS Potential Attract and mobilize • people • organizations • eventually governments Support • partnerships • global network

28. Objectives for 2007 • Educational outreach • Ongoing research to detail requirements • Generate constituency world-wide at all levels • Be prepared for the next favorable moment (2008?)

29. Your Thoughts & Questions?A United Nations Emergency Peace Service? Dr. H. Peter Langille hpl@globalcommonsecurity.org In cooperation with ‘Global Action to Prevent War’

30. Credits Special thanks for permission to use photos is extended to: The United Nations Human Rights Watch Genocide Watch Presentation created by: Dr. H. Peter Langille, Global Common Security.org Robbyn Evans, rae Communications.com

31. Is This Really Credible or Any Improvement? As noted in the 1995 Canadian report, Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability For The United Nations: “As professional volunteers develop into a cohesive UN force, they can assume responsibility for some of the riskier operations mandated by the Council, but for which troop contributors have been hesitant to contribute. UN volunteers offer the best prospect of a completely reliable, well-trained rapid reaction capability. Without the need to consult national authorities, the UN could cut response time significantly, and volunteers could be deployed within hours of a Security Council decision… No matter how difficult this goal now seems, it deserves continued study, with a clear process for assessing its feasibility over the long term.” ... “No matter how difficult this goal now seems, it deserves continued study, with a clear process for assessing its feasibility over the long term.”

32. Personnel Selection • Merit and professionalism • Universal representation • Not national/political affiliation • Contracted and assigned • Extensive preparation/training • Reliability, readiness, dedication • Flexibility in managing diverse assignments • Paid, full-time (UN Civil Servant)

33. Removes 1 & 2 and should Improve 3rd Decision-Making Level • National government approval (may be needed urgently) • National defence approval (personnel and resources) • UN Security Council approval (waits for 1. and 2.) All have developed unique excuses for inaction!

34. Why this Model for UNEPS? • Provides a dedicated, ‘lead service’; a ‘first responder’ for the critical, initial 4-6 months of complex peace operations. • Functions until replacement/rotation needed and secured from multinational contingents • Provides a modular formation that can be tailored • Cost-effective and a sound investment for saving lives and money