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Higher School of Economics Moscow October 27 2008. The Outlook for Russian Oil Supply. Thane Gustafson CERA. Outline of Presentation. A Brief Look Back: The “Russian Oil Miracle” 1999-2004 The Slow-Down 2005-2007 The Stagnation 2008--? What is the Industry Suffering From?
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Higher School of Economics Moscow October 27 2008 The Outlook for Russian Oil Supply Thane Gustafson CERA CERA_London RT_November 2008
Outline of Presentation • A Brief Look Back: • The “Russian Oil Miracle” 1999-2004 • The Slow-Down 2005-2007 • The Stagnation 2008--? • What is the Industry Suffering From? • Capital Starvation • A Shortage of Profitable Opportunities • Excess Taxation • Will Tax Relief Be Enough? • No: Too Small • No: Wrong Problem • The Real Problem: the Era of High Rents is Over (Gas Too) • The next generation of oil and gas will be higher-cost • Too many claimants and too little rent • The state will have to cut back its share—but can it do so? CERA_London RT_November 2008
During the Period 1999–2005, Russian Oil Output Grew Strongly (Led by a Resurgence in West Siberia), Coming as a Major (but Welcome) Surprise for Global Oil Markets *Projected; Eurasian Oil Export Outlook (November 2007 update). Source: Cambridge Energy Research Associates. CERA_London RT_November 2008
After Rising at Double-Digit Rates in 2000–2004, Russia’s Monthly Growth Rate Falls to Only ~2% in 2005–2007 … and Declines Slightly in 2008 • After growing 8.9% in 2004, Russian output rose only 2.4% in 2005 to 470.0 mt (9.5 mbd) and 2.2% in 2006, to 480.5 mt (9.71 mbd) • Up by 2.3% in 2007 to 491.5 mt (9.83 mbd) • Main boost came from Sakhalin-1 project in Jan-Feb • Onshore production up only ~0.6% • Little growth in second half of 2007 • In 2008, production in first 9 months down 0.5%, to 365.5 mt (9.74 mbd) • Output in April slid to 9.68 mbd, but back up slightly to ~9.8 mbd in August and September • Companies been warning for some time that decline imminent due to squeeze on investment from high taxes and rising costs Source: Cambridge Energy Research Associates. CERA_London RT_November 2008
A Look Back at the “Oil Miracle” 1999-2004 • “A Handful of New Fields Producing More, Hundreds of Old Fields Losing Less” • The Secret to Slowing Decline Rates: “Pumps, Fracs, and Floods” • A One-Time Harvesting of the “Soviet Dividend” CERA_London RT_November 2008
1 8 0 1 6 0 1 4 0 1 s t H a l f 2 0 0 7 1 s t H a l f 2 0 0 8 1 2 0 M i l l i o n 1 0 0 M e t r i c 8 0 T o n s 6 0 4 0 2 0 0 W e s t V o l g a - T i m a n - E a s t S i b e r i a O t h e r S i b e r i a U r a l s P e c h o r a a n d S a k h a l i n … and Regions: Russian Crude Oil Production by Major Region, First Half 2008 Versus 2007 Source: Cambridge Energy Research Associates. 81003-22 CERA_London RT_November 2008
Russian Tax Code’s Petroleum Taxation Regime: “One Size Fits All” • Oil Taxation Remains Highly Regressive: Focused on Revenues/Production Volumes, Not Profits • Such systems invariably unstable due to need to adjust for changing prices and costs • Original Plan for New Tax Code: Profits-Based, Self-Regulating Mechanism and Predictable Environment for Investors • Relatively low royalty • Normal corporate profit tax • Plus excess-profit tax • Plans for special regime for low-flow wells • But New Tax Code of January 2002 Opted for Simple and Enforceable (but Regressive) Taxes • Replacement of royalty, mineral restoration tax, and excise tax with single “mineral resource extraction tax” (MRET) • MRET set at 340 R/ton for crude oil, but linked to international export prices for Urals Blend with sliding-scale formula • Export taxes on crude oil and refined products • For crude oil and products, sliding-scale formulae linked to international export prices for Urals Blend (with subsequent revisions in effect in 2005) • Profit tax = 35% of profits (according to Russian accounting standards) CERA_London RT_November 2008
Russia’s Marginal Tax Take Over 90% At Prices Above $25/barrel Since 2005 CERA_London RT_November 2008
L u k o i l G a z p r o m N e f t E x x o n M o b i l R o s n e f t B P 4 5 B i g F i v e I O C s ( a v e r a g e ) T o t a l S h e l l 4 0 I n t e r n a t i o n a l C h e v r o n 3 5 O i l T N K - B P C o m p a n i e s 3 0 N e t I n c o m e 2 5 p e r B a r r e l o f 2 0 P r o d u c t i o n R u s s i a n O i l 1 5 C o m p a n i e s 1 0 5 0 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 Comparison of Oil Company Profitability Source: Cambridge Energy Research Associates. 81003-11 CERA_London RT_November 2008
2007-2008: Government Offers Limited Tax Relief • January 2007: As Oil Production Growth Slowed in 2005-2006, Government Granted Two Forms of Modest Tax Relief: • Holiday from MRET for upstream projects in Sakha, Irkutsk, and Krasnoyarsk • Really done to provide oil for ESPO • Modest differentiation: 70% MRET reduction for “hard-to-recover” oil in selected fields (more than 80% depleted) • But impact largely symbolic: less than $250 million in 2007 • Because of technical quirk, companies unable to take advantage of “hard-to-recover” measure • January 2009: Additional Measures Go into Effect: • Threshold of MRET raised from $9/bbl to $15/bbl • Number of regions eligible for MRET holidays expanded • Finance Minister Kudrin estimates new package worth 100 billion rubles/year (~$3.7 billion) in tax savings to industry • “Not enough,” says Oil Industry: • By April 2008, companies calling for higher MRET threshold and cuts in export duty • Kudrin still opposed to further cuts—for now CERA_London RT_November 2008
What’s Wrong with Government’s Tax-Relief Program to Date? • Too Modest in Scale: • $4 billion in tax cuts small compared to the industry’s total upstream capital spending of nearly $23 billion in 2007 • Government reluctant to cut export taxes, by far larger issue • Aimed at Wrong Problem: • Aimed at stimulating new development in frontier provinces • No incentive to add and produce reserves-in-place from existing fields • Does Not Correct Basic Flaw: • System taxes production (gross revenues) instead of profits • Too blunt an instrument: “one size fits all” • Fails to encourage efficient production of higher-cost oil CERA_London RT_November 2008
Collapse of Prices Since July 2008 Has Cut Russia’s Oil Export Earnings Essentially in Half:From ~$1 billion per day to ~$500 million per day CERA_London RT_November 2008
What Will Be The Impact of Falling Prices On The Oil Industry? • Government Will Be Hurt More than Industry • “Regressive on the way up, progressive on the way down”: State took 90% of price increase; it will now absorb 90% of price decline • Decline of Ruble Providing Mild “Devaluation Dividend” • Offsets some of current ~14% inflation • Declining Commodity Prices and Economic Slowdown May Help to Contain Cost Pressures • Particularly cost of steel • But “Stickiness” in Tax Scale Becomes Big Problem if Prices Fall Fast • Because export taxes adjusted only every two months • BOTTOM LINE: Oil companies’ Net Income and Cash Flow Will Suffer, But Not as Much as Might Seem at First Glance • Still, companies likely to cut their dividends and their capex budgets for 2008 • While rerouting their investment resources to “brownfields” CERA_London RT_November 2008
The Russian Oil Industry—and the State--Are at a Fundamental Divide • Era of Rapid, Low-Cost Growth in Production is Over: • Low-cost “post-Soviet” legacy opportunities running out • From now on, new oil will be much more costly • Next Generation of Russian Oil Will Generate Less Rent • Rents historically divided among three main claimants: the state, the industry (for reinvestment), and its shareholders • If reinvestment needs go up, then share remaining for shareholders and the state will have to go down • Yet returns to shareholders are already much lower than international norms • Lower oil prices only aggravate the basic problem • Two Bottom-line Implications: • As profits and dividends decline (while capex goes up), company market values (and therefore share prices) will remain low • State revenues from oil will decline sharply; a new tax reform, to re-broaden the tax base, will be essential • This Will Be Politically Very Painful: Will The State Actually Leave the Oil Industry the Investment Capital It Will Need? CERA_London RT_November 2008
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