Motives, Evolution, and Institutions of European Integration

EU STRUCTURE, EVOLUTION AND INSTITUTIONS Department of European Public Law

MOTIVES FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION • Peace and stability and desire to keep Germany under control by its integration within Europe • Creation of a single market • Economic prosperity • Independence in relation to new world powers (USA/USSR) • New European democratic identity as opposed to totalitarism and nationalism - Which motives stayed the same, which have changes and which have been achieved?

CHURCHILL’S SPEECH - ZÜRICH, 1946 • “The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. In this way only can France recover the moral and cultural leadership of Europe. There can be no revival of Europe without a spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany. The structure of the United States of Europe will be such as to make the material strength of a single State less important. Small nations will count as much as large ones and gain their honour by a contribution to the common cause.

SCHUMAN DECLARATION 9 MAY 1950 • French foreign minister • “The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims.”

FOUNDING TREATIES 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (expired in 2002) 1957 European Economic Community 1957 European Community for Atomic Energy (Euratom) 1992 European Union(Treaty of Maastricht)

AMENDING THE FOUNDING TREATIES • Intergovernmental Conference – Heads of States and Governments of EU Member States decide on and sign amendments • Amendments enter into force only if ratified by all Member States • Ratification Procedure – according to Constitutions of respective Member States

AMENDING THE FOUNDING TREATIES • Single European Act, 1986 • in force 1 July 1987 • Maastricht, 1992 • in force 1. November 1993 • Amsterdam, 1997 • in force 1 May 1999 • Nice, 2001 - in force 1 February 2003 • Lisbon, 13 December 2007 - in force 1 December 2009

EU ENLARGEMENT WAVES • 1951 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,(ECSC) (1957 EEC and EURATOM) • 1973 Denmark, Ireland and the UK • 1981 Greece • 1986 Portugal and Spain • 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden • 2004 Cyprus , the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia • 2007 Bulgaria and Romania • ?

PERIODS OF PROGRESS AND CRISES • 1950S – mid 1960s – beginning (ECSC → abandonment of EDC&EPC → EEC and Euratom) • Mid 1960s – 1986 – crisis (“Empty chair crisis” 1965 → Luxembourg compromise 1966 → Single European Act 1987) • 1986 – 1993 – success (Treaty of Maastrichta – creation of the EU) • 1993 – 2005 – enlargement, consolidation • 2005 – 2009 – consitutional/identity crisis (failure of Constiutional Treaty after the French and Dutch referenda → Treaty of Lisabn 12 June 2008 Irish “no” ) • 2009 - … - Treaty of Lisbon

TREATY ON THE CONSITUTION FOR EUROPE SIGNED ON 29 OCTOBER 2004

Treaty on the Constitution for Europe rejected by French citizens on 29 May 2005 and by Dutch citizens on 1 June 2005

After the Failure of the Constitutional Treaty • 31 December 2007 – Lisbon Treaty signed: • Elimination from the text of state-like rhetoric: flag, hymn, certain terms, such as Minister of European Law • Content, although differently organized, mostly unchanged • Old technique for amending Treaties, by amendments on amendments, used

Still, this enabled Member States to ratify the LisbonTreaty without referenda All, but Ireland … Result: same content in A less understendable package

IRELAND: 12 JUNE 2008

IRISH “NO” • It is not linked to unpopularity of the EU in Ireland (Eurobarometer 69 June 2008 – 82% of Irish voters said their country had benefited from EU membership) • What about the functioning of institutions? – 42% of Irish “no” voters and 33% of “yes” voters thought that EU institutions would not be blocked

POSSIBLE OPTIONS 1) Renegotiate Lisbon Is there political will? Changing the text would require new ratifications 2) Abandon it 3) Another Irish vote

CONCESSIONS – 76% of Irish “no” voters and 38% of “yes” voters supported the view that the “no” vote would allow the Irish government to renegotiate “exceptions” within the Treaty a) Commissioner for each MS (6% of “no” voters) Art. 17(5) EU: “As from 1 Nov. 2014, the Commission shall consist of a number of members, including its President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, corresponding to two thirds of the number of Member States, unless the European Council, acting unanimously, decides to alter this number.”  Status quo might go in favour of the power of the Commission but not efficiency

CONCESSIONS b) Irish military neutrality (6%) c) Protecting the tax system – low corporate-tax rates (6%) d) Gay marriages, abortion, euthanasia (2%) e) Avoiding an influx of immigrants (1%)

IRELAND: 2 OCTOBER 2009 67% YES VOTES

EUROPEAN UNION BEFORE LISBON EU institutions EUROPEAN COMMUNITY supranational organisation ECSC (expired) EUROATOM COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP) intergovernmental cooperation POLICE AND JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (PJC) Intergovernmental cooperations Area of freedom, security and justice

Free movement of goods, workers, services and capital Agriculture Visas, asylum, migration transport Competition, taxation and approximation of laws Economic and monetary union Employment Common commercial policy Customs cooperation Social policy, education, vocational traiing and youth Culture Public health Consumer protection Trans-Euroepan networks Industry Economic and social cohesion Research and technological development Environment Development cooperations Euratom EUROPEAN COMMUNITY(I. pillar)

COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY(II pillar) • Foreign policy • E.g.preserve peace, human rights, democracy, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, relations with third countries • Security policy • EU security,disarmament, financial aspects of defence, long-term security measures

POLICE AND JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (III pillar) • Prevention and combating of racism and xenophobia • Prevention and combating of crime, especially terrorism, trafficing in human beings, sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime

EU LAW BEFORE LISBON • European Community law (I pillar) • II pillar law • III pillar law

CHARACTERISTICS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW • Transfer of sovereign powers of Member States on the Community • Legal system sui generis • Direct effect • Supremacy of EC law

CHARACTERISTICS OFII PILLAR AND III PILLAR LAW • Intergovernmental cooperations • No direct effect • No supremacy of EU law • Weaker power of EU institutions

Treaty on European Union Treaty on European Community Treaty on European Energy Community Treaty on European Union (TEU) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) Treaty on European Energy Community TREATY STRUCTURENICE - Lisbon

The most important Lisbon changes • EU Structure – elimination of pillars, disappearance of the EC • Clarification of the vertical division of powers • Institutional changes • Changes in Procedures and instruments of decision-making

EU according to Lisbon EU Institutions CFSP Former EC competences + PJC II I III

STRUCTURAL CHANGES • First and third pillars merged, by submitting third pillar to supranational methods as well • EC does not exist any more (Euratom continues) • EU acquires legal personality and becomes subject in international relations

NEED FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM • Institutional deficiency (Maastricht/Amsterdam/Nice) - Institutional reform needed to keep up with the EU’s deepening and widening - Improvement of: decision-making efficiency, EU representation, transparency/legitimacy and achievement of EU goals • Supranational vs. Intergovernmental method - Supranational representation  Commission - Intergovernmental representation  Council

EU INSTITUTIONS • European Parliament • Council (of the European Union) • European Commission • Court of Justice of the European Union • Court of Auditors • European Council (institution after Lison) • Other bodies: Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the Regions, European Central Bank, European Investment Bank • Europol, Eurojust, agencies, etc.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION • supranational pillar - initator of the legislative process • CFSP – legislative initiative shared with MSs • Principal policy-maker in the EU • Overseas the implementation of the EU law in Member States (“guardian of the Treaties”) • Politically responsible to the EP • 28 Commissioners

EUROPEAN COMMISSION POST-LISBON • Promotes “the general interest of the Union” • Driving force of EU integration (deepening & widening) • Exclusive right of legislative initiative  legislative proposal is in the general interest of the EU • It can achieve these goals only by cooperating with the EP and the MSs BUT: 1) Does this challenge its independence 2) Would the Lisbon abandonment of the system of one Commissioner per MS have reduced the power of the Commission and its President? 3) Does acting in the “general interest of the Union” require representation of each MS?

PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Prominent role internally & externally Art. 17(6)(b) TEU: “The President of the Commission shall decide on the internal organisation of the Commission, ensuring that it acts consistently, efficiently and as a collegiate body.”  appoints Vice-Presidents and makes a member resign - Post-Lisbon slightly strengthened role – no College approval needed • Competing powers (post-Lisbon): 1) President of the European Council 2) High Representative José Manuel Barroso -> Jean-Claude Juncker

European President? European Commission President? High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy? WHO WILLOBAMA CALL? ? ? ?

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS • Legislative institution • Different formations – 1 representative from each MS at ministerial level (e.g. GAC, ECOFIN) • Levels of decision-making • MinisterialCOREPER I and II working groups • Presided by the the rotating Presidency • Except: Council of Ministers of Foreign Affaies – presided by the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy • Decision-making: qualified majority, simple majority, unanimously

EUROPEAN COUNCIL • “Summit” • Defines general political directions and priorities • Heads of State or Government of MSs, together with its President and the President of the Commission – post-Lisbon High Rep. takes part in its work • Meets at least 4 time a year • Post-Lisbon: recognized as an EU institution

PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL • New function! Attributed to an individual for 2,5 year • Herman Van Rompuy-> Donald Tusk

PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL • Reaction to the weaknesses of the rotating six-months depersonalised Presidency of the Council • The Presidency of the Council/European Council was, at the start, intended mostly for internal purposes, but over the years it acquired a central role externally in CFSP • Post-Lisbon: Individual Presidency of the European Council remains contrasted to MSs’ Presidency of he Council • Role: chair meetings of the European Council; ensure its functioning; present a report to the EP; ensure external representation of the Union in CFSP at his/her level and in that capacity (15(6) TEU)  Will the President of the European Council become the most prominent figure internally and externally? Is his external role competing with that of High Representative?

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY • Union Minister of Foreign Affairs (Constitution) • Amsterdam: High Representative for CFSP (18(3)EU) • Catherine Ashton -> Federica Mogherini

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE • Roles: 1) Presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council 2) Commission Vice-President Duties (Art. 18 TEU): 1) Conducting the EU CFSP 2) Responsible for external relations in the Comm. 3) Ensuring the consistency of EU external action

COMMISSION PRESIDENT VS. HIGH REPRESENTATIVE • High Representative  Commission Vice-President • Unlike other Vice-Presidents, not appointed by the Comm. President but by the European Council • In case of conflicting responsibilities, the Council role prevails: Art. 18(4) TEU:“In exercising these responsibilities within the Commission, and only for these responsibilities, the High Representative shall be bound by Commission procedures to the extent that this is consistent with paragraphs 2 and 3.” • Abandoning of the previous independent Comm. initiative: Art. 30 TEU: “Any MS, the High Representative, or the High Representative with the Commission’s support, may refer any question relating to the common foreign and security policy to the Council and may submit to it initiatives or proposals …” Commission loses?

COMMISSION PRESIDENT VS. PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL • Verhofstadt (College of Europe, 18 Nov. 2002): “Can one person express consensus of Europe when Europe rather seldom reaches consensus on burning international issues?... Presidentialism of the EU does not seem to me an appropriate option for Europe’s future institutional structure.” • Prodi (EP, 5 Dec. 2002): “Such a position would open a rift in our institutional structure.” • The influence of the President of the European Council largely depends on the individual holding the position  Commission loses

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT • Legislative institution • max. 751 • Minimum 6, maximum 96 per MS • Direct elections every 5 years; number of MEPs distributed according to national quotas • Last elections: 2014 • Croatia has 11 MEPs

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT • MEPs grouped according to political affiliation, not national • Largest party: EPP, followed by S&D; Greens … • Eurosceptics also represented (EFD – 32) • President: Martin Schulz (until January 2017)

CONCLUSION • Why do we need institutional changes & are they good?  The Treaty of Lisbon - institutional improvements? 1) Further integration (deepening and widening) 2) Decision-making efficiency  EU efficiency in general 3) Transparency & democracy  EU legitimacy 4) Union representation  President of the European Council, High Representative or Commission President? • Any institutional change might change the institutional balance + balance among MSs – to whose advantage? 1) Commission  supranational/integration interests 2) Council/MSs  intergovernmental/national interests 3) EP  more transparency and democracy, but not necessarily more efficiency in decision-making

Motives, Evolution, and Institutions of European Integration