Safety Management Systems (SMS) An Introduction for Senior Management

1. Safety Management Systems(SMS) An Introduction for Senior Management

2. An Introduction to SMS The objective of this presentation is to provide the Senior Management with : • an overview of ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) on safety management in Annexes 6, 11 and 14, and their underlying concepts, and • a structured process for the implementation of a safety programme and an SMS, as proposed by ICAO

3. Session No. 1Basic ContemporarySafety Concepts

4. For Starters • The total elimination of risk is unachievable • Errors will occur, in spite of the most accomplished prevention efforts • No human endeavour or human-made system can be free from risk and error • Controlled risk and error are acceptable in an inherently safe system

5. Concept of safety (Doc 9859) • Safety is the state in which the risk of harm to persons or property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and risk management • Safety Management System is an organized approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structure, accountabilities, policies and procedures

6. Forensic Safety Management • Focus on the outcome (s) • Unsafe acts at the tip of the arrow • Blame & punishment for failure to “perform safely” • Address specific safety concern exclusively

7. The Underlying Paradigm Rule-based – The world as it should be • Aviation system – as pre-specified – is perfect • Compliance based • Outcome oriented • Accident investigation

8. Inefficiency and Perversity The beatings will continue until morale improves 2. Punishment 1. Exhortations to professionalism and discipline 3. Remedial Training 4. Add more procedures & regulations

9. TECHNICAL FACTORS HUMAN FACTORS TODAY ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS 2000s 1950s 1970s 1990s The evolution of safety thinking

10. Organization Workplace People Defences Accident Technology Regulations Management Training Errors Working decisions and and conditions organizational violations processes Latent conditions trajectory A concept of accident causation Source: James Reason

11. Baseline performance System design Operational drift Operational performance Operational deployment System Performance in the Real World

12. Baseline performance Organization Operationalperformance “Practical drift” Navigational aids Reactive Proactive Predictive Managing Safety–Navigating the Drift

13. The Navigational Aids • Predictivesystems • Electronic safety data acquisition systems • Direct observation safety data acquisition systems • Reactive systems • Accident investigation • Incident investigation • Proactive systems • Mandatory reporting systems • Confidential reporting systems • Voluntaryself-reportingsystems

14. Baseline performance e l w organization d h o d g i L i M H Proactive Hazards Operational performance Predictive Reactive Reactive ASR FDA ASR MOR Accident and incident reports Surveys Direct observation systems Audits “Practical drift” Inefficient Highly efficient Very efficient Efficient Safety Data Systems and Levels of Intervention Safety management levels Desirable management level

15. Baseline performance Baseline performance System design System design Operational drift Operational drift Operational performance Operational performance Operational deployment Operational deployment Managing Safety: Collapsing the Drift

16. Emerging Paradigm Rule-based – The world as it should be • Aviation system – as pre-specified – is perfect • Compliance based • Outcome oriented • Accident investigation Performance-based – The world as it is • Aviation system – as pre-specified – is imperfect • Performance based • Process oriented • Safety data captured from daily, normal operations

17. Performance-based Safety Organizational processes Workplace conditions Latent conditions Active failures Defences Organizational processes • Policy-making • Planning • Communication • Allocation of resources • Supervision • … Activities over which any organization has a reasonable degree of direct control

18. Organizational processes Workplace conditions Latent conditions Active failures Defences Performance-based Safety Organizational processes • Inadequate hazard identification and risk management • Normalization of deviance Latent conditions Conditions present in the system before the accident, made evident by triggering factors

19. Organizational processes Organizational processes Workplace conditions Latent conditions Latent conditions Active failures Defences Defences Performance-based Safety • Technology • Training • Regulations Resources to protect against the risks that organizations involved in production activities must confront

20. Organizational processes Organizational processes Workplace conditions Workplace conditions Latent conditions Active failures Defences Performance-based Safety • Workforce stability • Qualifications and experience • Morale • Credibility • Ergonomics • … Factors that directly influence the efficiency of people in aviation workplaces

21. Organizational processes Organizational processes Workplace conditions Workplace conditions Latent conditions Active failures Active failures Defences Performance-based Safety • Errors • Violations Actions or inactions by people (pilots, controllers, maintenance engineers, aerodrome staff, etc.) that have an immediate adverse effect

22. Organizational processes Organizational processes Workplace conditions Workplace conditions Latent conditions Latent conditions Active failures Active failures Defences Defences Performance-based Safety Improve Identify Monitor Contain Reinforce

23. Performance-Based Safety: The ABC • Senior management’s commitment to the management of safety • Initial analysis of system and establishment of risk controls (safety risk management) • Continuous safety monitoring and analysis of safety data from normal operations (safety assurance)