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IMPROVING QUALITY AT ENTRY. Findings from QAG Review April 13, 2005. Entry quality matters for outcomes. The single greatest factor explaining why project outcomes at exit are not satisfactory Especially so regarding institutional capacity, ownership/commitment
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IMPROVING QUALITY AT ENTRY Findings from QAG Review April 13, 2005
Entry quality matters for outcomes • The single greatest factor explaining why project outcomes at exit are not satisfactory • Especially so regarding institutional capacity, ownership/commitment • In a large number of cases, weak M&E at entry and in implementation • Projects rated less than satisfactory at entry are almost twice as likely to not have satisfactory outcomes as others.
Issues at entry put more of a burden on supervision • With issues at entry, supervision should correct them by seizing opportunities (MTRs, restructuring) for on-course correction. • Good quality at entry is an “inheritance” to be conserved and sustained in supervision.
Sixth Quality of Supervision Assessment (QSA6) • Supervision assessments were carried out for randomly selected 130 operations approved by the Board prior to FY04 and active on July 1, 2004. • Operations were rated on a scale of 1 to 6 – 1 being Highly Satisfactory and 6 being Highly Unsatisfactory. • 10 operations could be classified as CDD/Social Fund type of operations • Seven of the 10 operations were rated Satisfactory, 2 Moderately Satisfactory and 1 Unsatisfactory. This is consistent with the overall findings of 90% Moderately Satisfactory or Better.
Quality at entry Issues • About one-fourth of the sample in QSA6 had quality at entry issues and • 60% of these operations are considered unlikely or uncertain to reach DOs as against … • 13% of operations without problems in quality at entry. • The main issues at entry quality noted, lie in lack of: • an inadequate results framework; • realism of DO assumptions; • readiness for implementation; • realism of overall risk ratings of operations;
SD/CDD Operations at entry • Of the 10 operations, panelists assessed: • 6 likely to achieve the DO; • 4 had a sound results framework; • 6 were ready for implementation; • 6 had realistic assumptions about reaching the DOs; (cont’d)
SD/CDD Operations at entry • About 40% of the CDD/SF sample operations had deficient quality at entry. • About the same percentage of these are considered unlikely or uncertain to reach DOs.
Trailing areas in SD/Social Fund • Risk assessment, esp. Political, governance aspects and institutional capacity • Project approach and design alternatives • Institutional capacity assessments and capacity building • Readiness on TA, staffing & management arrangements • M&E (baselines & outcome indicators) for institutional and policy reforms, DOs, poverty and social aspects
What’s key in highly satisfactory quality at entry • Strategic relevance • Thoughtful choice of approach • Strong policy and institutional understanding and design • Readiness for implementation • Candid assessment of risks To get all these – excellent staff and managerial inputs and processes.
Essentials of Project Design:1 • Client/stakeholder buy-in: check it, build it • Anchor the operation clearly in the country and sector context and strategy (CAS, Transitional Strategy, PRSP) • Build on analytic work (AAA, OESW, analyses of other agencies, by clients) • Develop synergy with other donors, NGOs, other Bank operations, AAA • Be clear on WHY the operation is being done, and why a Bank involvement (value added?) • Clear links between objectives & components
Essentials of Project Design: 2 • Be clear on outcomes: what will be achieved? when? how would this be measured? by whom? against what? does the client have the capacity for M&E? can the outcomes be attributed to the project? what are reasonable proxies for intermediate outcomes? • Be realistic in scope, complexity, time-frame, political economy, institutional capacity – match to what has been/can be shown as feasible • Look at alternative approaches/project design – sequencing, phasing • Keep it simple wherever possible • If complexity can’t be avoided, face it head-on and explicitly in resource implications, staffing, sustained attention
Development Objectives • No more than one or maximum two • Number of DOs will at least equal number of components – careful! • Avoid numerous sub-components with sub-objectives • Make DOs realistic and easier to track • If a project proves too complex – do restructure
Economic and Financial Analysis • Economic rationale for public action (should government be doing this?) • Improving efficiency (cost/time) and equity (participation of the poor, women, other vulnerable groups) • Fiscal impact – recurrent costs, sustainability, absorptive capacity • Are Bank funds truly complementary to domestic resources?
Project Scope • Program/sector wide approaches (most complex designs, often weak environments) • Public vs. private sector – even in a post-conflict country (El Salvador), in rural education, the project successfully turned over school management to parents and community leaders • Focus on specific issue – access to basic services (education, health care, infrastructure) - can still mean complexity, to be addressed!
What to do about risks? • Know what they are – be clear-eyed, especially on institutional, governance areas • Be explicit about the risks and effects on outcomes • Connect analysis of risks with design • Manage risks where possible – how will their evolution be monitored? • Be clear on residual risks and course of action for client/Bank if they materialize
Examples of good practice Philippines: KALAHI-CDSS Project • Directly related to the country’s development agenda • Well conceived outcomes in terms of improved governance and communities’ capacity to design and implement community investment • Incorporates lessons from similar programs in and outside the country; • Design based on good analytical studies • High commitment as evidenced from fast processing and effectiveness • Design includes a pilot phase to allow the derivation of lessons and fine-tuning of the approach • Risk of elite capture addressed by putting in place arrangements for ensuring accountability and transparency • Appropriately designed arrangements for cooperation with NGOs and local government • Candor in identification of risks and introduced measures well designed training, organizational arrangements, monitoring and supervision systems.
Examples of good practice Albania: Second Community Works • Combines lessons of past experiences and blended well with global practice and adapts the combination to the macro-economic environment and to fiscal decentralization • Built on lessons from past experience and innovating for the future by piloting in new areas • High degree of coordination with donors in the developing targeting criteria to reach poor municipalities • Risk assessments were done with candor and rigor; for addressing social risks, developed adequate risk management strategies, including strong community participation in decision-making and project monitoring, • Good institutional capacity assessment carried out and TA and training arrangement well prepared. • Good and innovative M&E system in place.