Whately’s Revolution

1. Whately’sRevolution John P. McCaskey Stanford University

2. Whately’s Revolutionary Footnote “ [Induction is] a Syllogism in Barbara with the major* Premiss suppressed. { “ As Archbishop Whately remarks . . . Every induction may be thrown into the form of a syllogism by supplying a major premise. . . . ” * Not the minor, as Aldrich represents it. ”

3. “Why can’t a woman be more like a man?

4. “Why can’t induction be more like deduction? “Induction takes its force from the syllogism. So it suffices to discuss the syllogism which is, as it were, principal.” “Induction, therefore, so far as it is an argument, may, of course, be stated syllogistically.” “Induction and example are subsumed under syllogistic justification. Thus what we have said about them is enough.” “An inductive inference can always be looked upon as an aspiring but failed deductive inference.” “. . . like social workers, providing under-privileged inductive inferences with the necessities enjoyed by valid deductions.” “This view takes inductions to be defective deductions—deductions that do not quite make the grade.” “Induction takes its force from the syllogism. So it suffices to discuss the syllogism which is, as it were, principal.”

5. Aristotelian epagōgē, or the “From-Induction Deduction” Cicero Coins inductio Scholastic Recovery Francis Bacon’s New Organon Humean Problem of Induction Mill’s Methods Canonical History of Induction

6. Correct History of Induction 2 4 Socratic Scholastic Humanist Whatelian 3 1

7. Socratic Induction 1 What is piety? Prosecuting a wrongdoer, even if your own father. That’s an example. What is piety itself? Doing what pleases the gods. But gods disagree. And there are many kinds of disagreement: Disagreement over which number is greater. Disagreement over which thing is larger. Disagreement over which thing is heavier. Disagreement over just and unjust. Disagreement over beautiful and ugly. Disagreement over good and bad. Piety is what pleases all gods. But is it pious because it pleases the gods or does it please the gods because it is pious? “ Two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates: inductive reasoning and universal definition. What is the difference? What is loved vs. what loves. What is led vs. what leads. What is seen vs. what sees. So . . . what is admired vs. what admires. I don’t know which. ” Let’s start over. Isn’t everything pious also just but not vice versa? Yes. Then piety is a kind of justice. What kind?

8. Mentions of epagogein Aristotle’s Works 1 “ We need to distinguish how many kinds of dialectical reasoning there are. One kind is induction, another is deduction. Now, what a deduction is has been explained earlier. Induction, however, is a proceeding from particulars to a universal. For instance, if the pilot who has knowledge is the best pilot, and so with a charioteer, then generally the person who has knowledge about anything is the best. 1 Categories 0 On Interpretation 12 Prior Analytics 13 Posterior Analytics 27 Topics 2 Sophistical Refutations 14 Rhetoric 5 Physics 11 Metaphysics 4 Eudemian Ethics 3 Nicomachean Ethics 2 ” . . .

9. Properties “Primitively Universal,” aka “Distinguishing by Nature” 1 In Greek: proton katholou; idionkatahauto Three sides Three angles Angles sum to 2R Lack bile Long-lived Contrariety Maximum difference Complete difference Goodness Fitness for function Property that causes change Property with respect to which change takes place Computer image by Anil Sabharwal

10. Guidelines for IdentifyingPrimitively Universal Properties 1 Use observations and comparisons to . . . Categories • Ensure property applies in individual cases. • Test kinds broader and narrower. • Identify linked contraries. • Ensure the predicate can be applied broadly. • Use terms that are unambiguous. • Identify temporal qualifications. • Identify dependencies. • Use language that makes clear in what way exceptions are allowed. • Check relationship of whole to parts. • Be clear whether relationship is absolute or relative. • . . . On Interpretation Prior Analytics Posterior Analytics Book V Topics Sophistical Refutations Rhetoric Physics Metaphysics Eudemian Ethics Nicomachean Ethics . . .

11. Epagōgē&Inductioin Antiquity 1 This procedure, which arrives at its aim from several instances, may be named inductio, which in Greek is called epagôgê; Socrates made extensive use of it in his discussions. “ Topics On Invention Galen Stoics Epicureans Quintilian ” Cicero Aristotle Socrates

12. The Neo-Platonic Reinterpretation Philoponus 2 Simplicius Neo- Platonists Aristotle discusses these types of justification [induction and paradigm] at greater length in the second book [of the Prior Analytics], showing how they differ from syllogistic justification, that they are useful, and how they are subsumed under syllogistic justification. Alexander of Aphrodisias “ Clement Galen Stoics Epicureans Quintilian Galen Stoics Epicureans Quintilian ” Cicero Cicero “ [Definition is the] summation resulting from Division. Aristotle Aristotle ” Socrates Socrates

13. Prior Analytics B 23 “ Ἐπαγωγὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστι καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς συλλογισμὸς τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου θάτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ συλλογίσασθαι. ” 2 “ Induction then is—or rather, the from-induction deduction— deducing one extreme [to belong] to the middle through the other extreme. ” Late 13th century Byzantine manuscript. Princeton MS. 173.

14. “ a deduction from induction is deducing . . . ” (1) Man, horse, and mule are long-lived animals. (1) C1, C2, C3 are A. 2 (2) Man, horse, and mule are bileless animals. (2) C1, C2, C3 are B. By conversion of (2): (3) Bileless animals are man, horse, and mule. (3) B is C1, C2, C3. (4) Bileless animals are long-lived. (4) All B is A. By (1) and (3):

15. The Neo-Platonic Reinterpretation • The great Alexandrian synthesis: • better known by nature vs. better known to us • prior vs. posterior • knowing the fact vs. knowing the reasoned fact • deduction vs. induction • deduction as a priori vs. induction as a posteriori Philoponus 2 Simplicius Neo- Platonists Aristotle discusses these types of justification [induction and paradigm] at greater length in the second book [of the Prior Analytics], showing how they differ from syllogistic justification, that they are useful, and how they are subsumed under syllogistic justification. Alexander of Aphrodisias “ Clement Galen Stoics Epicureans Quintilian ” Cicero “ [Definition is the] summation resulting from Division. Aristotle ” Socrates

16. Scholastic Transmission “ Everything that is this man, or that man, etc. is an animal. Every man is this man, or that man, etc. Therefore, every man is an animal. ” Wilson Aldrich Avicenna Averroes al-Farabi “ [In induction it] is required to suppose that he has listed all the things. ” Philoponus 2 Albert Aquinas Scotus Ockham Simplicius Neo- Platonists Alexander of Aphrodisias Peter of Spain 0 Zabarella Boethius Clement 1 Induction: an Enthymeme in Barbara with the minor premise suppressed. Isagoge Survived in Boethius’s translations and commentaries Peter of Spain’s Tractatus 0 2 Categories Galen Stoics Epicureans Quintilian 10 On Interpretation 13 Largely replaced by B’s On Categorical Syllogisms Prior Analytics 27 Posterior Analytics Cicero Fell out of use, then lost Replaced by B’s De TopicisDifferentiis Topics B’s Topics Aristotle Socrates

17. Scholastic Transmission 2 2 Socratic Scholastic Induction: an Enthymeme in Barbara with the minor premise suppressed. 1

18. The Humanist Revolt 3 Wilson Aldrich Avicenna Averroes al-Farabi • Increase in scope • Attention to the Topics • Interest in Cicero • Access to Platonic dialogues Philoponus Albert Aquinas Scotus Ockham Simplicius Neo- Platonists Alexander of Aphrodisias Peter of Spain Buridan Zabarella Boethius Clement Galen Stoics Epicureans Quintilian Renaissance Humanists Cicero Valla Agricola Boethius acts like one who has stolen a horse and tries to hide the theft by cutting and dyeing the horse’s hair. Cicero defines induction as follows . . . . Boethius, who followed a different school, disagrees . . . “ Aristotle ” Socrates

19. Baconian Induction 3 • Idols: Poorly defined notiones • Concepts, not propositions • Comparisons, not enumerations • The predicate, not the subject • Final Cause • Material Cause • Efficient Cause • Formal Cause Wilson Aldrich Avicenna Averroes al-Farabi Philoponus Albert Aquinas Scotus Ockham Simplicius Neo- Platonists Alexander of Aphrodisias Peter of Spain Buridan Zabarella Boethius Clement • Ignited French gunpowder is hot. • Ignited German gunpowder is hot. • Ignited English gunpowder is hot. Harvey Galen Stoics Epicureans Quintilian Renaissance Humanists Whewell Bacon Cicero Valla Agricola “ RegulaSocratis ” Aristotle Socrates

20. Humanist Induction 3 2 Socratic Scholastic Humanist Induction: “RegulaSocratis” 3 1

21. Scholastic Induction 2 2 Socratic Scholastic Induction: an Enthymeme in Barbara with the minor premise suppressed. 1

22. Whately’s Revolution 4 “ [Induction is] a Syllogism in Barbara with the major* Premiss suppressed. Wilson Aldrich Avicenna Averroes al-Farabi Philoponus Albert Aquinas Scotus Ockham Simplicius * Not the minor, as Aldrich represents it. ” Neo- Platonists Alexander of Aphrodisias Whately Peter of Spain Buridan Zabarella Boethius Everything that is this man, or that man, etc. is an animal. [Every man is this man, or that man, etc.] Therefore, every man is an animal. Clement Induction: an Enthymeme in Barbara with the major premise suppressed. Galen Stoics Epicureans Quintilian [What belongs to the observed individuals belongs to all.] Being an animal belongs to this man, and that man, etc. Therefore, being an animal belongs to all men. Renaissance Humanists Whewell Bacon Cicero Valla Agricola Aristotle Socrates

23. “As Bishop Whately remarks…” 4 “ Every induction may be thrown into the form of a syllogism by supplying a major premise. . . . Mill The uniformity of nature will appear as the ultimate major premise of all inductions. De Morgan ” Whately Hamilton Hamilton De Morgan Mill

24. Induction as Inference 4 Mill Bain “ Induction is a proceeding from particulars to a universal. ” De Morgan Whately Hamilton 2 3 4 Jevons Bacon Whewell Whately Mill De Morgan Bain Jevons  ? To be purged Better sense Induction: Inferring general propositions The original and logical sense Yes! Derivative of deduction Reasoning Inferences Judgment Propositions  ? Correct bad notions Every induction ends with a concept Original and strict sense Description is not induction The sense nowadays No! Simple Apprehension Notions, Terms

25. David Hume & the“Problem of Induction” 4 “ Why is a single instance, in some cases, sufficient for a complete induction, while in others myriads of concurring instances, without a single exception known or presumed, go such a very little way towards establishing an universal proposition?Whoever can answer this question . . . has solved the problem of Induction. 1843 Cassirer Fowler Mill Bain De Morgan Where’s Hume? Hume Hume Keynes Whately • Presumptions in any inference: • Sense perception • Memory • Uniformity of nature • In inductive inference: • Belief in uniformity of nature • Various defenses: • Mill’s • Reid’s • Hume’s • Venn’s own Hamilton ” Jevons 1921 Venn “ Hume’s sceptical criticisms are usually associated with causality; but argument by induct-ion . . . was the real object of his attack. . . . Hume’s statement of the case against induction has never been improved upon. 1906 “ Note 2.—Since the time of Hume, the nature of our conception of Cause has formed one of the principal topics of philosophical controversy. . . . (a controversy, however, which possesses a historical rather than a practical or scientific interest). 1870 The very concept of an experimental inference involves a great petitioprincipii.Induction owes all its force to the premise that the future will be like the past, which is just what the induction itself seeks to infer. Whewell 1889 ” ” “ ” — as Hume relentlessly insisted —

26. Whately’s Legacy 2 2 • Induction is about universal propositions, not universal concepts. 4 • It’s about propositional inference not abstraction. Socratic Socratic Scholastic Scholastic Humanist Humanist Whatelian • It’s a risky kind of inference to be understood with reference to the better kind, deduction. 3 3 1 1 • Uniformity principle is a presumed major premise. • Logicians and mathematicians displace philosophers of mind.

27. “Why can’t induction be more like deduction?

28. Correct History of Induction 2 4 Socratic Scholastic Humanist Whatelian 3 1