The Problem of Evil II

1. The Problem of Evil II Mackie on the logical problem and Swinburne’s theodicy.

2. J.L. Mackie A very compact version of the argument: • God is omnipotent. • God is wholly good. • Evil exists. According to Mackie, these three claims (once their logical relations are made explicit) are inconsistent: they cannot all be true.

3. Adequate Solutions • An ‘adequate solution’ must remove the inconsistency. • So, given that there is a real logical incompatibility between three claims, an adequate solution must backtrack, i.e. it must withdraw (at least) one of the claims. • Generally, the withdrawn claim is replaced by a similar but weaker claim that • Satisfies the theist, and • Removes the inconsistency.

4. Examples of Adequate Solutions • Limit omnipotence: If God’s ominipotence isn’t absolute, it might turn out that God cannot prevent all evil. • Dismiss evil: If what we call ‘evil’ is somehow illusory (or not really evil), then an absolutely omnipotent and wholly good God might exist. • Limit God’s goodness: If God is ‘good’ in a limited or incomplete way, then an omnipotent God can be reconciled with the existence of evil. What does Mackie think of these solutions, and of the views of philosophers who adopt them?

5. Fallacious Solutions • The general idea here is simple: a fallacious solution looks like an adequate solution, but in fact it cheats. • The pattern Mackie sees here involves implicitly rejecting one of the three inconsistent claims, while explicitly defending it. • For instance, someone might claim that God is absolutely omnipotent, but then assume, when explaining evil, that there are limits on God’s power.

6. The central question “I shall also be considering whether an adequate solution could be reached by a minor modification of one or more of the constituent propositions, which would, however, still satisfy all the essential requirements of ordinary theism”

7. Limited Omnipotence • A popular way to limit omnipotence is to say that God can do or create anything, so long as it’s logically possible. • This isn’t universally agreed amongst theists (Descartes, for example, seems to think that even logic and mathematics are up to God to determine). However, • If accepted, it might provide a starting point for the claim that evil is logically necessary, or at least a logically necessary ‘counterpart’ to good.

8. Evil as a Means • Means-ends relations are often invoked here: we often do things we’d rather not do to achieve something we value. • But applying this to God conflicts with omnipotence: the link between what we do and what we achieve here is causal. • Could an omnipotent God really be constrained by causal relations?

9. The ‘greater good’ response • The idea here is to drop talk of means, and simply claim that the world is better overall with some evil in it than it could be if there were no evil. • Some Christian theologians both regard Jesus’ death on the cross as a great evil, and simultaneously regard it as a much greater good, one that could not exist without that evil. • Others say the opportunity for Christians to convert non-believers is a good that can’t be had without non-belief, and that is good enough to more than compensate for the evil of non-belief.

10. Orders of good and evil • Mackie considers the view that first order evil (pain and suffering) might be more than compensated by second order good (sympathy for others, the struggle to reduce pain and suffering and progress in that struggle). • But for any such second order good, we can also find second order evils (cruelty, increases in pain and suffering).

11. Free Will • An important version of this kind of reply invokes free will: • The good/value of human free will outweighs the evil that we do. • Given that we are free, that we do some evil is inevitable (logically so). • Freedom here seems to be a third-order sort of good. • But does the existence of freedom really imply that we will do evil? Couldn’t we always freely choose good?

12. Two Puzzles • What is free will? Is mere randomness enough? Or is it determination by reason? If the first, it seems worthless; if the second, it seems we can’t do anything but what our ‘reason’ tells us to. But what else could it be? Further, can it fit with God’s omniscience and omnipotence? • Omnipotence: Can an omnipotent God create limitations on her own power?

13. Richard Swinburne • The project of theodicy: • ‘theodicy’ comes from ‘theo’, meaning God, and ‘dikē’, meaning right or justification, thus (roughly) the justification of God. • The aim is to reconcile the existence of a perfect God with the existence of evil. • Swinburne’s approach is to argue that, if there were a God, s/he would allow certain evils to occur. So when such evils are observed, this isn’t evidence against God’s existence.

14. What would a Perfect God Give to us? • Not just pleasure and contentment; • “Deeper” good things: responsibility, great value for our lives. • What’s needed for these deeper goods? • Preliminaries: A taxonomy of evils. • Moral evil • Natural evil

15. On having responsibility • Swinburne suggests that God would give us real responsibility, a share in the creative process that determines how the world will be. • This, he says, will require that we can choose to harm, as well as help others. • “A good God, like a good father, will delegate responsibility.” • What are the limits here? A good father won’t allow a 10 year old to murder his younger sister, even in order to give the boy ‘responsibility’! • How can we, without being evil already, choose to do what’s wrong and hurtful to others?

16. The blessing of suffering at the hands of others • “Being allowed to suffer to make possible a great good is a privilege, even if the privilege is forced on you.” • So, “I am fortunate if the natural possibility of my suffering if you choose to hurt me is the vehicle which makes your choice really matter.” • This is because that your choice matters is a great good, and outweighs my suffering.

17. Challenge and Response • Doctors can’t use my suffering (in some experiment) to benefit others (even greatly) without my permission. • Is it OK for God to do so? Swinburne says yes– but what do you think of his reasons? • May we do this to our children, in some limited ways? • Does that make less limited uses OK for God? • Can it be OK for God to risk even extreme cases of such use? (Can an omniscient God ‘take chances’ at all?)

18. Minimizing Evil • Swinburne suggests that the limits of our lifespan and the degree of pain and suffering we can feel corresponds to the kind of limit a parent might impose on the harm one child would be allowed to do to another. • Is this a way of minimizing monstrous evils? Or is it perfectly true, and an important point?

19. Natural Evil • Swinburne declares that ‘natural evil’ is to “make it possible for humans to have the kind of choice which the free-will defence extols”. • First, it allows us to learn how to do harm (and good) to others, and it does so without compromising our freedom (if God told us such things, we’d know there was a God, and mind our P’s and Q’s). • Second, it increases the range of significant actions we can engage in, individually and collectively.

20. A hard life • If natural evils were much less, we’d have no occasion to develop or show great courage, make great efforts, be heroic. • Animal suffering doesn’t come to much, since they aren’t as brainy as we are (sic). • Further, higher animals enjoy similar higher goods, in their efforts to live, eat, mate, raise their young etc.

21. Who will agree? “(T)he reader will agree with me to the extent to which he or she values responsibility, free choice, and being of use very much more than thrills of pleasure or absence of pain.” Swinburne’s choice: pleasure, or productive pain? (Is this really a fair summary of our situation?) A final offer: the after-life as compensation. (What would Ivan say to this?)