110 likes | 231 Views
Foreign Aid and Retaliation in the WTO Krogh Seminar – Final Research Presentation. Zachary Kay, Matthew Quallen. The Realist Critique Anarchic international system Great powers create and manipulate international institutions ( Dreher et. al. 2009, Faye and Niehaus 2011).
E N D
Foreign Aid and Retaliation in the WTOKrogh Seminar – Final Research Presentation Zachary Kay, Matthew Quallen
The Realist Critique • Anarchic international system • Great powers create and manipulate international institutions (Dreher et. al. 2009, Faye and Niehaus 2011) Power and International Institutions
Will the realist paradigm control in the WTO? Our Case: the WTO
“Power Hypothesis” (Guzman, Simmons) Strong states muscle out weaker ones? (methodological deficiencies) • Retaliation in the Literature (Davis, Bermeo) 15-20% of Cases • Foreign aid as a political tool (Morgenthau; Lim and Vreeland;Lawrimore and Varghese) Aid to control international institutions? State of the Literature
We hypothesize that the United States will reduce bilateral official development assistance to states that file or join suits against it in the WTO Hypothesis
Our Data -WTO Dispute Settlement Gateway -Vreeland et. Al • Independent variable Dichotomous Indicator • Dependent variable American ODA Data
US ODA to states that file against it (1) and those that do not (0) This seems to support our original hypothesis Preliminary Result
Normalization We take logs of especially skewed variables • Controls Taking baselines from Vreeland we control for: imports, exports, and total trade flow with the US; Pariahs; War; GDP per capita; Democracy; US military assistance (arms aid) • Fixed-Effects We also control for country fixed-effects • Time lagged We lag and lead our independent variable to accommodate the lengthy causal mechanism Methods
Natural Log Raw Data NormalizationUS Official Development Assistance *What effect will this and the introduction of our controls have on our results?
No significant support for our hypothesis • Dispute Settlement as a two-level game • WTO Legitimacy Conclusions