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Preventing the Entry of Weapons of Mass Effect into the United States

Preventing the Entry of Weapons of Mass Effect into the United States. Task Force Report Lydia Waters Thomas 10 January 2006. Charge to the Task Force. Purpose

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Preventing the Entry of Weapons of Mass Effect into the United States

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  1. Preventing the Entry ofWeapons of Mass Effect intothe United States Task Force Report Lydia Waters Thomas10 January 2006 Pre-Decisional Draft

  2. Charge to the Task Force • Purpose Recommend specific steps the nation can take to prevent the entry into the country of weapons of mass effect (WME) and the people who would use them • Scope, for this study: • WME = weapons capable of inflicting grave destructive, psychological and/or economic damage – includes CBRNE – excludes cyber threats • Border = physical, institutional and facility-based • Neutralization of terrorists, non-proliferation and securing of weapons materials excluded • Consequence management excluded Pre-Decisional Draft

  3. Task Force Members Federal Participants: Daniel Ostergaard, Kathryn Knapp, Richard Davis, Benjamin Gray, Michael Fullerton Pre-Decisional Draft

  4. Approach • Organization: Subgroups based on corridors of entry • Air: Norm Augustine, Chair • Land: Jim Schlesinger, Chair • Sea: David Abshire, Chair • Information Collection • Diverse group of experts at strategic, tactical and operational levels from U.S. government, allies, and private sector • Presentations on threats, vulnerabilities, current systems and plans • Meeting Dates (2005): March 21,22; May 9,10,18; June 13, 23; August 1,2,5,10; October 3 Pre-Decisional Draft

  5. Approach (concl.) • Analysis • Assessed information on threat, current systems, plans and practices in WME prevention • Identified critical deficiencies • Developed Recommendations Pre-Decisional Draft

  6. The Threat • WME attack is the gravest threat to the nation • Regardless of the scenario, consequences are unimaginable • WME includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive • Nuclear is the greatest threat in terms of consequences (although still a low likelihood) Pre-Decisional Draft

  7. Observations on WME Prevention Today • Progress has been made • Organizations established – Department, HSC • Programs underway – e.g., Container Security Initiative, Megaports Initiative • New facilities – e.g., Command Centers • Dedicated people, evolving capabilities Pre-Decisional Draft

  8. Observations on WME Prevention Today • However, there are critical deficiencies • Absence of an integrated systems approach • Absence of a systematic, risk-based approach to investment • Dispersed capabilities, leadership and decision making • Inadequate engagement with foreign partners • Outdated deterrence concepts • Lack of sufficient urgency and priority in technology innovation • Lack of citizen engagement Pre-Decisional Draft

  9. Addressing the Deficiencies • Conceptual Framework (A Systems View) • Adopt a strategy with three thrusts: • Neutralize terrorists • Secure WME and/or critical components • Detect and interdict in transit • Consider the problem in three dimensions • Geographical/Spatial • Functional • Operational Pre-Decisional Draft

  10. Geographical/Spatial Dimension Pre-Decisional Draft

  11. Geographical/Spatial Dimension Pre-Decisional Draft

  12. Functional Dimension Denial Detection Disruption Deterrence Interdiction Dissuasion Elimination Pre-Decisional Draft

  13. Operational Dimension • Institutions (governmental and private) • Tools • Transactional – process associated with purchasing, shipping, travel, etc. • Informational – intelligence collection or operational information • Technological – identity management (biometric, data mining) or detection (sensors, detectors) Pre-Decisional Draft

  14. Value of a Systems View:Fundamental Questions • What should be the relative balance of investments for the three basic thrusts: neutralizing terrorists, securing potential WME sources, and detecting WME in transit? • Are investments correctly balanced between air, land and sea corridors as a function of threat and risk? • How should investments in alternative detection technologies be balanced in relation to the threat? • How much of the investment portfolio should go to longer range technology development versus shorter range improvements? • What combination of approaches should be used for WME detection in non-U.S. controlled areas? • What functions should be assigned to specific government entities? • What interfaces must exist between different entities with complementary functions? Pre-Decisional Draft

  15. Risk Reduction Approach • Risk reduction should be the central decision-making criterion for WME prevention • With a systems view, trade-offs can be made based on benefits and costs rather than ancillary factors • Budget should result from risk calculation • Integrated WME budget with up or down approval Pre-Decisional Draft

  16. Layered Approach • Successfully used in civilian and military contexts: • Provides redundancy, flexibility and robustness • Layer is a combination of geographical/functional/operational dimensions • Failure of a single element is not fatal; protective effect is cumulative Pre-Decisional Draft

  17. Path Forward: Recommendations • Authority, Alignment and Incentives • Strengthen Leadership Structures: clarify and strengthen the role and authority of the Secretary and Homeland Security Council and adopt a model such as a Joint WME Prevention Office • Engage Internationally: better engage foreign governments and international organizations with increased capacity in DHS and in the diplomatic corps • Require Joint Effort: institute career incentives based on joint efforts and foster personnel exchanges • Improve WME Intelligence: include DHS as a principal driver for WME intelligence • Clarify the DOD Role in Disaster Response: require federal, state and local agencies and authorities to more effectively plan for contingencies that will require the unique capabilities of the military Pre-Decisional Draft

  18. Path Forward: Recommendations • Update Deterrence • Make Deterrence Policy Clear: reiterate policy of swift, certain and severe consequences for any nation associated with a terrorist act using WME • Expand Deterrence : use layered defense system to increase uncertainty and likelihood of failure for potential attackers and couple this with resilience in managing the aftermath to expand deterrence • Engage Citizens: develop locally controlled volunteer-based measures to demonstrate national resilience by assisting law enforcement with civil support functions such as traffic control and delivery of food and water Pre-Decisional Draft

  19. Path Forward: Recommendations • Institute a Risk-Based Process for Resource Allocation: • Create an open process for allocating all WME prevention funding. • Improve Private Sector Contributions to the Process for Risk Management: • Tapping its knowledge and vital interest in an effective defense program, engage the private sector in developing the risk management approach in partnerships similar to those in shipping security (CSI, C-TPAT) • Initiate a System Management Effort: • Adopt one of several models of integrated system management to guide and oversee the development and integration of a national WME prevention system Pre-Decisional Draft

  20. Path Forward: Recommendations • Innovation • Make Detection a Priority for Innovation: Make it a high national priority for the Secretary, the President and the HSC to bring together elements of the research community to undertake transformational research • Encourage and Nurture New Ideas: Drawing from organizational innovation models from government and industry, create an Innovations Office that encourages “out-of-the-box” ideas from all levels and sectors; provide a clear path for ideas to gain visibility and action Pre-Decisional Draft

  21. Additional Information Available in the Task Force Report • Specific Actions Supporting Recommendations • Example: Establish joint government/industry working groups. Pattern the groups after the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee to promote coordinated government/private sector efforts. • Additional Ideas and Observations in Appendix • Example: Eliminate unnecessary redundancies such as the multiple background checks and certifications required of cross-border truckers Pre-Decisional Draft

  22. Appreciation • The Task Force appreciates the efforts of many individuals and organizations, including: • Individuals in government, academia and industry who met with and presented to the Task Force • Agencies that hosted Task Force meetings and gave tours and demonstrations of their facilities • The writing team that assisted with compilation, synthesis, and analysis of information Pre-Decisional Draft

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