1 / 27

Managing Identity Threats

Managing Identity Threats. May 2010. Where are the threats ?. Web/App Server. Session. Vulnerabilities: Replay attack Offline dictionary attack Password sniffed in transit. Customer. Vulnerabilities: Session hijacking Man-in-the-Middle / Man-in-Browser attack. Vulnerabilities:

cynara
Download Presentation

Managing Identity Threats

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Managing Identity Threats May 2010

  2. Where are the threats ? Web/App Server Session • Vulnerabilities: • Replay attack • Offline dictionary attack • Password sniffed in transit Customer • Vulnerabilities: • Session hijacking • Man-in-the-Middle / Man-in-Browser attack • Vulnerabilities: • Trojan sniffers • Soliciting Email to enter credentials • Fake Phishing website • Vulnerabilities: • Masquerading as customer • Masquerading as tech support • Masquerading as organization Helpdesk

  3. Threats at the Customer (1/5) • Attack Objective: • Collecting ID & Password of end-user to impersonate as customer • Types of attacks • Trojan Horse / Virus Keyboard sniffer • Soliciting Email (Pharming) • Fake Phishing Website

  4. Threats at the Customer (2/5) • Trojan Horse / Virus Keyboard sniffer • What happens: • Malicious program that capture the end-user’s ID & password while it is entered by the user and send it to the hacker. • More complex sniffers may target knowledge-based authentication (KBA) to capture the questions-answer pairs or target visual-based authentication (VBA) to capture visual-pattern+password pairs.

  5. Threats at the Customer (3/5) • Soliciting Email (Pharming) • What happens: • User receives an email (or message) prompting them to enter their ID & password in some hacker website in order to “win” some prizes, “re-check” their account, etc. • Hacker website will collate captured IDs and Passwords and send it to hacker

  6. Threats at the Customer (4/5) • Fake Phishing Website • What happens: • User is redirected to a fake website through a compromised DNS, or invalid Wireless Gateway, or similar-looking URL (e.g. www.citi6ank.com) • Fake website will have a similar look-and-feel to the actual website, and may fool user to entering the ID and password • Fake website will collate captured IDs and Passwords and send it to hacker

  7. Threats at the Customer (5/5) • Best Practice: • Use 2-factor authentication at login to render the captured ID and passwords and other KBA, VBA information useless in the hands of the hacker. Web/App Server Session Customer DS3 Authentication Server SMS • Vulnerabilities: • Trojan sniffers • Soliciting Email to enter credentials • Fake Phishing website • Best Practice: • Strong 2-factor authentication using tokens or SMS OTP

  8. Threats in the Session (1/7) • Attack Objective: • To fool the application server to believe that the incoming connection is a previously validated session • Types of attacks • Session Hijacking • Man-in-the-Middle / Man-in-Browser attacks

  9. Threats in the Session (2/7) • Session Hijacking • What happens: • Users unknowingly rely on a malicious or compromised gateway to access the application. • After the user has logged in, the malicious gateway may transfer the authenticated session to the hacker’s browser

  10. Threats in the Session (3/7) • Man-in-the-Middle / Man-in-Browser attack • What happens: • The user’s web session is directed via a malicious reverse proxy which masquerades as the application server in real-time, while connecting to the actual server to maintain a valid SSL user session. • The proxy will re-enact the exact sequence of inputs from the user to the application, and render the same output back to the user. • Such an attack can render 2-factor authentication (using OTP tokens) useless • To attack applications using PKI tokens, the malicious reverse proxy is run within the end-user’s PC to gain similar access to the PKI token. This attack is also known as Man-in-Browser attack.

  11. Threats in the Session (4/7) • Man-in-the-Middle / Man-in-Browser attack • The Man-in-the-middle is able to defeat 2-factor authentication And potentially compromise the transaction • The Man-in-Browser can be carried out similarly to attack PKI tokens User: Alice, Pwd: XXX User: Alice, Pwd: XXX What’s your OTP ? What’s your OTP ? OTP is 123456 OTP is 123456 Welcome Alice Welcome Alice Application Server MITM Pay $X to Mr XYZ Pay $X to Mr ABC OK for $X to Mr XYZ OK for $X to Mr ABC

  12. Threats in the Session (5/7) • Best Practice: • In session-based attacks, the hacker may have already bypassed the authentication process. • It is therefore important to implement proper security to ensure the integrity of the transaction as well • There are 3 areas where security technologies can be applied: • Protecting the session • Re-validating the transaction through Out-of-band authentication • Requiring the user to provide OTP authorization code for non-repudiation

  13. Threats in the Session (6/7) • Best Practice: • Protecting the session • The IBM ZTIC is a USB-attached device that can verify the integrity of the SSL web session on behalf of the end-user. Hello Please login ZTIC Alice SSL certificate is flagged as invalid by ZTIC MITM

  14. Threats in the Session (7/7) • Best Practice: • Protecting the transaction • Use Out-of-band authentication to verify the transaction and use a OTP authorization code for non-repudiation SMS …. …. Welcome Alice Welcome Alice Pay $X to Mr XYZ Pay $X to Mr ABC MITM Please Confirm Transaction ID:9999 to Pay $X to Mr XYZ Auth Code: 123456 DS3 Authentication server Transaction is sent to user in SMS via OOB channel, and modification is detected by user ??!!!

  15. Threats at the Server (1/6) • Attack Objective: • Rogue administrator has elevated rights to the system, and will abuse the rights to get the end-user credentials • Types of attacks • Replay attacks • Offline dictionary attacks • Password sniffed in transit

  16. Threats at the Server (2/6) • Replay Attack • What happens: • Rogue administrator turns on verbose logs in the web server. All users’ login credentials are captured in the web server logs. • The administrator copies the login credentials from the logs (even if they were already hashed at the browser) and does a replay of the web session to gain access as the user.

  17. Threats at the Server (3/6) • Offline Dictionary Attack • What happens: • Rogue administrator gains access to the password database in the system. • The administrator copies the database to an external machine, and runs a brute-force attempt to find the users’ passwords against the password records.

  18. Threats at the Server (4/6) • Password sniffed in transit • What happens: • Similar to the replay attack, but carried out by the network administrator • Rogue network administrator turns on sniffing in the intranet. All users’ login credentials being transferred from the web server to the application server are captured in the sniffer logs. • The administrator copies the login credentials from the logs (even if they were already hashed at the browser) and does a replay of the web session to gain access as the user.

  19. Threats at the Server (5/6) • Best Practice: • The security risk posed by a rogue administrator is even higher than any phishing website. • It is important that administrators should be prevented from even gaining access to the users’ ID and password login credentials. • There are 3 areas where security technologies can be applied: • Use end-to-end encryption of passwords from browser to authentication server • Store passwords in a hash+encrypted manner • Implement 2-factor authentication for end-user logins

  20. UserID abc Pwd ****** Login Threats at the Server (6/6) • Best Practice: Web/App Server • Best Practice: • End-to-end encryption of passwords • Password storage in hash-encrypted mode • 2-factor authentication at login Session • Vulnerabilities: • Replay attack • Offline dictionary attack • Password sniffed in transit Customer 3. Passwords remain RSA encrypted at web-server logs 2. Encrypted password with session nonce protects against replay attacks DS3 Authentication Server 4. Passwords are stored hash+encrypted in DS3 Authentication Server. DS3 Server will RSA decrypt the password, check the session nonce before verifying the password. 1. In addition to SSL session encryption, Password is RSA encrypted with session nonce using Javascript or Java Applet for end-to-end encryption

  21. Social Engineering Threats (1/5) • Attack Objective: • To fool victim to carry out certain functions or reveal certain information • Types of attacks • Masquerading as customer • Masquerading as technical support • Masquerading as organization

  22. Social Engineering Threats (2/5) • Masquerading as customer • What happens: • Hacker is doing brute force attack on customer account and has locked the account. Hacker will try to convince Helpdesk to unlock the account

  23. Social Engineering Threats (3/5) • Masquerading as technical support • What happens: • Hacker pretends to return call from tech support company to convince administrator to reveal information about the system, and even the administrator password

  24. Social Engineering Threats (4/5) • Masquerading as organization • What happens: • Hacker may pose as the organization to convince the user to reveal the password; or • Hacker may pose as the organization to obtain answers from user on personal questions in order to gain access to the password reset function.

  25. Social Engineering Threats (5/5) • Best Practice: • Besides enforcing strong authentication for end-user logins, administrative or privileged accounts for internal systems should also be protected with 2-factor authentication. • Change or re-set password self-service screens should require the 2nd-factor credential as part of the change/reset password process. UNIX Windows OK GINA PAM_RADIUS UserID, Password + OTP OK UserID, Password + OTP RADIUS Authentication VPN Administrator DS3 Authentication Server Verify

  26. Solved Addressing the threats Web/App Server Session • Best Practice: • End-to-end encryption of passwords • Password storage in hash-encrypted mode • 2-factor authentication at login • Vulnerabilities: • Replay attack • Offline dictionary attack • Password sniffed in transit Customer • Vulnerabilities: • Session hijacking • Man-in-the-Middle / Man-in-Browser attack • Best Practice: • Verify the session • Use OOB to re-validate the transaction • User to provide OTP auth-code for non-repudiation • Vulnerabilities: • Trojan sniffers • Soliciting Email to enter credentials • Fake Phishing website • Best Practice: • Strong 2-factor authentication using tokens or SMS OTP • Best Practice: • Require strong authentication for internal administrative accounts • Require strong authentication for change / reset password • Vulnerabilities: • Masquerading as customer • Masquerading as tech support • Masquerading as organization Helpdesk

  27. Questions ? • Thank you. For enquiries, please contact: Data Security Systems Solutions Pte Ltd Website: http://www.ds3global.com info@ds3global.com

More Related