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JIU Review on Strengthening the Role of the United Nations System in Humanitarian Assistance for Disaster Reduction and Response. Lessons Learned from the Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami and Support for the Hyogo Framework of Action 2005-2015 Preliminary Findings and Conclusions
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JIUReview on Strengthening the Role of the United Nations System in Humanitarian Assistance for Disaster Reduction and Response Lessons Learned from the Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami and Support for the Hyogo Framework of Action 2005-2015 Preliminary Findings and Conclusions By Tadanori Inomata, Inspector, Joint Inspection Unit of the UnitedNations System
I. Introduction • About Joint Inspection Unit Only Independent System-wide Oversight Body for Strengthening Oversight Function of the UN system Organizations Current work: - Development of system-wide management criteria and accountability principles - Application of result-based management in agency management in ILO, WIPO and PKOs - System-wide coordination Issues • Purpose of presentation - Provide settings for exchange of views and information with members of IATF; and - Test Hypothesis, Preliminary Findings & Conclusions
The Purpose of the report • Strengthening the role of the United Nations system to coordinate and support international cooperation for disaster reduction and response through: - Improved measures of integrated programme and resource management and coordination; and - Streamlining and standardizing operational, administrative and financial practices related to disaster reduction and response.
Organization of work • Questionnaires: OCHA,ISDR; UN system Org.; and Humanitarian NGOs, ADB • Field missions: Tsunami affected areas ( Thailand, Indonesia and India) June; and Central America (CR and Panama) Sept. • Interviews with Representatives of Agencies; Heads of OCHA, ISDR, ESCAP, ASEAN, WB, DPKO, UNDP, UNICEF, IFRC, WFP, NGOs; • Bilateral donors and aid agencies:, CIDA JICA, SIDA, UKDFID and USAID. • Consideration of the Report by ECOSOC and UNGA 2006
Disaster • Disaster “means a serious disruption of the functioning of society, posing a significant, widespread threat to human life, health, property or the environment, whether caused by accident, nature or human activity, and whether developing suddenly or as the result of complex, long‑term processes” • Disasters on rise Exponential growth in IDPs in civil wars and natural and epidemic hazards [Note] Definition provided for in paragraph 6 of Article 1 of the Tampere Conventionon the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations, adopted at Tampere, Finland, on 18 June 1998 (The text of the Convention is published by the International Telecommunications Union).
Disasters on riseExponential growth in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in civil wars and natural and epidemic hazards • Armed Conflicts 1946 to 2003: 229 in 147 countries, only seven were inter-sate 1989 to 2003: 116 in 78 countries Annual number of civil wars: 7 in 1952 to 49 in 1991, 22 in 2003 • IDPs 1.2mn in 1982 to 25mn by human right abuse (against 13.4mn refugees) 52% in Africa, 80% women & children plus 25mn by natural disasters in 2004 • Natural Disasters 20major disasters in 1950s with $38bn damage to 82 with $535bn in 1990s Affected persons grew from 70mn in ’70s to 213mn ’90s; 90% were in Asia.
Size of Total Resources of the United Nations system • The United Nations system devoted little more than US$3 billion in 2003 to theoperational activities in the humanitarian sector, representing 30.3 per cent, the highest share in the total resources available for development which stood at US$ 9.97 billion. Its share grew from 23.6% in 1993, showing an annual growth by 15.3 per cent compared to the compound average of 7.4 per cent growth in the other developmental areas and was being accelerating over the last five years (1999-2003)[1]. • The un-ear-marked resources contributed to the United Nations system represented minor part recently declining to 15per cent of the world total resources used for humanitarian assistance in 2003, comparedto over $ 5 billion bilateral humanitarian assistance. In most Consolidated Appeals, some funding goes outside the appeal. In the case of the Tsunami, the contributions received outside the Appeal were six times the total requested in the appeal. • Three major trust funds under OCHA’s management total to $130 mn in 2004. [1] Report of the Secretary-General, Comprehensive Statistical Data on Operational Activities for Development for 2003, A/60/74-E/2005/57, 6 May 2005, Paragraphs 48-58.
Total Resources of the UN systemUS$ 15.9 billion in 2003 Development Assistance including Disaster Risk Reduction (includes prevention/recovery/ reconstruction) US$ 10.2bn * Includes the costs of the international criminal justice tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia Emergency Response (Humanitarian/peace-keeping operations) US$ 5.7bn UNRB, Funds & Programmes US$ 6.8bn Specialized Agencies US$ 3.4bn Emergency Humanitarian Assistance US$ 3.0bn Peace-keeping US$2.7bn*
UN system’s role in DRR Comparative advantage of the UN system vis-à-vis bilateral assistance is: • Global instrument of international goods: provides humanitarian assistance in a non-excludable and non-rivalrous way on time, to all victims, without discrimination, and regardless of gender, race and nationality; and • Implementation of Guiding Principles: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in GA RES 46/182 of 19 December 1991
Scheme of the JIU Review In view of the experience from the Indian Ocean Tsunami response, identify constraints on the implementation of humanitarian principles: legal, cultural, logistical and financial through the review of: • Principles in humanitarian assistance for DRR and • Management framework : resource management and governance
II.1 Principles and Process on Trial:Lessons Learned from Tsunami Efforts Effectiveness • Success : No significant secondary loss of life and large-scale epidemics averted, but assistance was supply driven and disjointed at the recovery stage; and Unprecedented scale of positive response to the Flash Appeal due to global impact of the disaster (many victims were foreigners and tourists). • Inadequate application of the humanitarian principles and the related guidelines at the field due to the difficulties as regards: (a) Low level of understanding by the affected countries of the framework and procedures of the United Nations Humanitarian system; (b) Lack of unequivocal legal and institutional framework for national disaster preparedness and management plans in the affected countries and lack of international early warning system; (c) Inadequate application of minimum standards of assistance to IDPs and absence of need for access to humanitarian information; (d) Uneven understanding and implementation of community-based approach to recovery and disaster preparedness; • Large scale impact of the Tsunami disaster caused difficulties to ensure smooth transition from response to recovery through reconstruction requiring more punctual function to be discharged by the RC/HC; and • Lack of central coordinating authority among international relief workers in affected countries: reliance on military assets for air transport and delay in recovery planning.
II.2 Review of principles and Regulatory Framework • Except for the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations (1998), there has been no single universal convention concluded on disaster reduction and response. The present state of international disaster law is a patchwork of over 130 diverse instruments between European nations. A body of international disaster law is needed. • The GA is yet to formally approve the Guiding Principles on IDP protection and some thirty IASC operating guidelines and procedures of emergency response. They are not embodied in national frameworks in developing countries • Need to ensure universal dimensions of humanitarian assistance (TTVI). • Lack of internationally agreed frameworks for logistical cooperation among the UN system and Member States in particular military air operations and early warning. • Poverty reduction guidelines of DAC donor countries disqualify the most vulnerable in the poverty pocket in middle income countries such as Costa Rica and Panama. • At the transition stage, the RC/HCs should be subjected to compliance procedures for establishing a country assistance framework for recovery and reconstruction. ⇩⇩⇩⇩⇩ Require intergovernmental negotiations • ECOSOC should start a process to streamline the principles, rules and guidelines in disaster management with assistance of a proposed inter-governmental expert body, i.e. an ECOSOC functional commission on humanitarian assistance for RDD with a view to developing an international regulatory framework.
III. Governance and Resource Management (1) • Need for integrated efforts to deal with entire disaster management process: prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, reconstruction and development • Coordinate agencies’ actions at each stage • Information sharing • Manage resources integrally • Result based management be introduced. • Set up a governance framework with an inter-governmental body under ECOSOC for objective setting and strategic planning and management: (1) Functional commission on humanitarian assistance for DRR to approve biennium system-wide work programme, as well as the operational support budget of the UN programme (see (2) below) and the administrative budget to strengthen common support services, overcome high turn-over in staffing, and provide core functions of OCHA/ISDR; (2) Financial system consisting of CAP, CERF, trust funds under OCHA’s management merged into a GA-established fund of a UN programme for humanitarian assistance for DRR; and (3) System-wide field structure to support national, regional and international platforms.
III. Governance and Resource Management (II) • Human Resource Management • 1. The OCHA has 61 posts under the regular budget of US$ 197.9 million in the biennium 2004-2005. There are 957 temporary posts funded by extrabudgetary resources including 534 positions (397 Local level and 137 national Officers), as of the time of formulation of the budget for the General Assembly. This included 19 extrabudgetary positions (17 Professional level and 2 GS (OL)) of the Secretariat of the ISDR. • 2. As regards the staffing of the secretariat of ISDR, as of 21 July 2005, there are 24 temporary posts of which 4 in recruitment process, 5 general temporary assistance for core activities and 7 general temporary assistance posts for the Tsunami Flash Appeal project. • 3. In general, one year contracts were issued subject to availability of funds to the staff members on extrabudgetary posts. The financial system based on trust funds obliges the secretariat to set aside a mandatory operating reserve of 15 percent or exceptionally 10 percent for OCHA, of the estimated annual planned expenditures which will be maintained during the implementation of trust fund activities to cover shortfalls and will be utilized to meet the final expenditures under the trust fund including any liquidating liabilities (See ST/AI/284 Annex II.A.1, P.5). Since liquidation of obligations and status of cash position are only verified at the audit completed on 31 March, the secretariat cannot extend staff contracts without attaching conditions subject to the availability of funds[1]. • 4. In the case of the ISDR staffing, beginning in 2005 this practice was revised and the secretariat has been offering the fixed-term contract of six months or the short term contract less than six months or consultancy with caveat that the appointment is subject to availability of funds: i.e. the appointment is firm for the initial 2-3 months and may be terminated thereafter if the cash position of the trust fund does not permit the continuation of the contract. As for the ISDR staff members on programme support cost funding, one year contracts were offered This situation should be compared to 8,829 staff members employed by WFP with contracts of more than one year in 2004, and usually 4-5year fixed term contracts offered for UNICEF and IFCR staff. • 5. The high turnover of the staff places considerable administrative burden on the recruitment sector. It does not allow OCHA and the secretariat of ISDR to accumulate and maintain institutional memory and professional knowledge unless the staff has to undergo a series of short term employments and experience plight of little stable livelihoods. In this context, the occasion of training opportunities are rare, ineffective and costly. This impacts adversely on the establishment of core and permanent capability of the secretariat. • [1]OCHA, Annual Report 2004, United Nations, p.18.
III.1 Humanitarian Assistance in Disaster Response and Reduction • Overarching Principles: Humanity, Impartiality and Neutrality (GA/RES/46/182, ’91) be applied to continuum of transition. • Traditional Dichotomy VS Integration of two Areas lead by IASC and ISDR have to be overcome. • Hyogo Framework for Action be consciously applied to integrate early warning, disaster preparedness, response, reduction and reconstruction • Field UN System Structure and Process - Implementation of the Principles - Feed-back to policy body; linkage between operational and non-operational activities
III.2 System- wide coordination & resource management at the field level • Subsidiarity principle • Country Framework • National Platform • Regional Framework • Modalities of agencies’ participation in system-wide resource commitment and management • Coherence at recovery and reconstruction stages
III.3 Good Practice in India • Formulation of recovery of livelihoods and reconstruction of the affected areas in many countries could not get under way due to the unprecedented scale of disaster and the absence of a mechanism to ensure the formulation of such plans. • Exception was the United Nations Recovery Framework in Support of Government of India for a Post-Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme established by the United Nations Country Team in India in March 2005.
III.4 United Nations Recovery Framework in Support of Government of India • Build on the experience gained by the United Nations agencies from the post-cyclone work in Orissa (1999) and the post-earthquake work in Gujarat (2001) • Reflects the values of the United Nations system including the Hyogo Framework of Action. • Despite the formal decline by the Indian Government of external relief assistance, the multilateral agencies including ADB and the World Bank could provide assistance actively through their ongoing programmes and under the coordination provided by the United Nations Disaster Management Team in India with the UNICEF acting as focal point for local NGOs and communities in the affected areas.[1] • The experience in India demonstrates that without the use of CAP and the full fledged and formal deployment of humanitarian assistance under the aegis of OCHA, there is a considerable potential for the United Nations system to ensure a seamless transition within the existing framework of UNDAF and CCA, provided that the agencies collectively commit themselves to implement the transition. • Although a basic concept of transition is recognized in the guiding principles for humanitarian assistance in Assembly Resolution General 46/182, such a collective framework for the transition should be established with a compliance procedure to implement it by an inter-governmental decision. [1] United Nations Country Team India, Recovery Framework in Support of Government of India for a Post-Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, New Delhi, March 2005, P.8.
Preliminary Findings and conclusions Findings • Inadequate application of principles and guidelines • Need for ownership of disaster management, response and reduction centered on the national platform • Need for a bottom-up planning and resource mobilization, and monitoring and management • Absence of a system-wide framework for global resource management • Lack of central coordinating authority and in particular an operational mechanism governing the transition Conclusions • 1. Streamlining and strengthening humanitarian assistance principles and guidelines at intergovernmental levels; • 2.1 Establishment of the integrated national platform: national plan of action/UN support framework covering both response and reduction; • 2.2 Use of CAP, CHAP and UNDAF/CCA process as essential support for the national plan of action; • 2.3 Assessment of measures required for international support and resource mobilization; • 3.1 Global assessment of resource requirements through bottom-up and feed-back from the field; and • 3.2 Programmatic and institutional changes in the funding and management framework at the global level. THANK YOU