Risk Management for Small Flight Test Teams: Lessons Learned

1. RISK MANAGEMENT FOR SMALL FLIGHT TEST TEAMS: LESSONS LEARNED SPINNING LIGHT AEROPLANES Robert Erdos MSc, PEng, DAR Chief Test Pilot Flight Research Laboratory National Research Council of Canada Ottawa, Canada

2. At Issue… • FTSW often facilitates discussion of flight test safety practices and risk management principles. • Most participants are from large organizations with large resources. • But, what if… • You are the flight test team; and • The client has limited resources or experience.

3. Presentation Outline • Outline an example of a small aircraft certification team; • Review applicable risk management strategies; • Relate an incident; and • Discuss lessons learned.

4. Flight Research Laboratory • Part of the National Research Council of Canada • Canada’s agency for “research, development and technology-based innovation” • Operates 9 specialized research aircraft • Diverse program of research • Commercial and government clients • From fundamental research to product development/certification • Fee-for-service work makes Lab’s personnel accessible to small companies • Contracted by Ultravia Aero Int’l in 1999.

5. The Project:Certification of the Ultravia Pelican • Successful Canadian kitplane manufacturer • Sought to certify under CAR 523-VLA • Two-place single-engine high-wing trainer • Rotax 912 engine • Max. gross weight 1450 lb • Design Vs0 = 43 KCAS • Ultravia = 5 full-time employees • NRC provided consulting flight test services • No one on the project had prior certification experience

6. The Project:Certification of the Ultravia Pelican Originated with JAA as JAR-VLA Adopted by Transport Canada in 1993 Based upon FAA Part 23, with a few Canadian amendments • Successful Canadian kitplane manufacturer • Sought to certify under CAR 523-VLA • Two-place single-engine high-wing trainer • Rotax 912 engine • Max. gross weight 1450 lb • Ultravia = 5 full-time employees • NRC provided consulting flight test services • No one on the project had prior certification experience.

7. The Situation • Very limited in-house resources • Time constraints • Financial constraints • Desire to please the client

8. President & Chief Designer, Ultravia NRC Test Pilot Risk Management Resources: Internal Axiom #1: Murphy’s Law Axiom #2: It’s Always Teamwork

9. Risk Management Resources: External • Transition from military or research test flying to civil certification can present challenges • Online resources present acceptable certification methodologies and lessons-learned • A good working relationship with the regulatory authority is essential

10. The Risk Management “Contract” • It is far more productive to discuss “risk” than “safety”. • The consulting test pilot can assume responsibility for the client’s most valuable asset. • Organizational cultures and expectations may vary. • Risk management protocols need to be stated explicitly. • A “contract” is the application of “plan the flight, fly the plan.” • It may be wise to have the client sign it.

11. The Risk Management “Contract”, Cont’d • Following a partial power loss or non-critical malfunction indication, a contingency approach to the nearest prepared landing area will be initiated. An off-airport landing will not be executed unless imminent complete loss of power or danger of significant damage to the aircraft precludes a landing on a runway; • Following a complete loss of engine power, a force-landing will be executed to the most suitable available area; • In the event of an inability to recover from a spin, or entry into an unrecognizable flight regime, efforts will continue to recover the aircraft to controlled flight to a minimum altitude of 4000 feet AGL. Upon reaching 4000 feet AGL, the test pilot will abandon the aircraft; and • Following a catastrophic structural failure, failure of the flight control system or uncontrollable fire, the test pilot will immediately abandon the aircraft. Axiom #3: Common Sense Varies

12. Spin Tests: Spin Chute Installation, Yes? • CAR 523-VLA certification for non-intentional spins requires recovery “from a one-turn spin or a three-second spin, whichever takes longer, in not more than one additional turn after initiation of the first control action for recovery”. • Typically relies upon an airframe-mounted spin recovery parachute • Small aircraft present W&B challenges

13. Pelican Weight and Balance: Spin Chute Installation, No. • System includes chute, structure, deployment and jettison mechanisms, rocket motor and interface • Prohibitively large mass at aft fuselage station. • Need to test at “4 corners” of W&B • Engine ballast offset prohibits light weights • BRS considered • Does not avoid considerable aircraft damage • Bail-out chute the only practical option

14. Sortie #71: One-Turn Spins, Revisited • Sortie was a continuation of spins conducted Heavy-Forward CG • Power ON spins repeatable with recovery after ~1 turn. • Strong influence of power. Can’t spin <3000 RPM • Recovery slightly slower in left spins • Very rapid spin rates after 1 turn (~240 deg/sec) • Prior sortie repeated to ascertain recovery compliance • Did not feel that recovery was in question

15. Sortie #71: Spinning, spinning, spinning… • 10’th repetition of the same test point • Clean 1-turn erect spin to the right • Recovery initiated after 1 turn…no effect • Prop stopped after 2-3 turns • Counter-spin control inputs held firmly • “Accidentally” discovered limited pitch rocking authority • Recovered, restarted engine, went home…

16. Sober Second Thought: • A plane lacking the control power to spin may lack the control power to recover • Rehearse all the recovery actions • Full forward stick may not be helpful until after rotation stops • Risk management for small test teams presents special challenges • Spin testing of very light plans not yet adequately addressed

17. Thank You Robert Erdos MSc, PEng, DAR Chief Test Pilot Flight Research Laboratory National Research Council of Canada Ottawa, Canada robert.erdos@nrc.ca 613-998-3180

18. The Bail-Out Option Reconsidered • Spin trajectory not vertical • Descending helix determined by inertial and aerodynamic forces • Highly wing-loaded airplanes will have a higher tangential velocity.

19. The Bail-Out Option Reconsidered, Cont’d • Lightly-loaded aircraft can have a very tight spin and a low tangential velocity • Confidence in a manual bail-out may not be warranted. Uh oh!