The Pseudo-Internal Intruder: A New Access Oriented Intruder Category

1. The Pseudo-Internal Intruder: A New Access Oriented Intruder Category Master’s Thesis Presentation Brownell K. Combs May 7, 1999

2. Outline • Why are we concerned with intruders and what can we do about them? • How does categorizing intruders help intrusion detection research? • What is the Pseudo-Internal Intruder? • What can the Pseudo-Internal Intruder do? • How can we defend against it? • How do these defenses work?

3. The Problem of Intrusions • CSI/FBI 1999 Computer Crime and Security Survey (4th Annual Report) • Approx. $124,000,000 in Financial Losses • Only 1% Claimed No Security Incident • CERT statistics show 67% increase in incidents handled annually from ‘94 to ‘98

4. Intrusion Detection Systems • Many think that it may never be possible to create ‘completely secure’ systems • IDS is the next best thing • Owners of systems want one or more of the following: • recognize presence of an intruder • prevent them from doing harm • make similar future intrusion more difficult • attempt to catch the intruder

5. IDS Research • Studying Intruders (techniques, habits, etc) is an important area of IDS research • Researchers in the field and IDS builders in industry must have some scheme with which to categorize intruders • These schemes serve as a basic framework for discussing and thinking about the issue of Intrusion Detection

6. Intruder Categories • 2 main approaches to placing intruders into different categories • Intruder oriented: focus on the intruder’s access to the system • Anderson’s classic external/internal scheme • Attack oriented: focus on the attack the intruder executes • Neumann’s modes of compromise scheme

7. What scheme do we need? • Least amount of category ambiguity for IDS Designers and SysAdmins • This best provided by narrowly defined categories that are distinct from one another • Example: How useful is it to have an ‘external intruder’ category that refers to both Internet Hackers and janitors inside the building?

8. Definitions • Physical Configuration - all of the hardware used in a distributed system included the location of each item • Network Configuration - how all of those hardware items are connected and how they interact with each other • Net/Phy Perimeter - separation between a distributed system’s net/phy configuration and the rest of the world.

9. Sample Physical Configuration

10. SampleNetwork Configuration

11. Pseudo-Internal Intruder • A new distinct category for the access oriented intruder categorization scheme • P-I Intruder is an intruder without the privileges of an authorized user and who has circumvented the perimeter defenses of a system to attack the system via its internal network (network configuration)

12. Box Diagram of Access Oriented Categories

13. 3 kinds of P-I Intruders • Insiders with physical access (desktop connection, wiring closets, server rooms) • Outsiders with same physical access as above (gained through subterfuge or force) • Outsiders with special data access (personal modems that circumvent perimeter defense)

14. Tools and Techniques • 1) Network Assessment Tools • Active and Passive • 2) Packet Sniffers • Hardware and Software • 3) Exploits • Steps executed in a certain order • 4) Denial of Service Attacks • Network Saturation and Traffic Misdirection

15. Example Scenario #1: Industrial Espionage Agent • #1 gains employment with custodial services and has access to wiring closets • Connects a hardware sniffer to the network for several days • Removes the sniffer and finds it captured sensitive communications between senior company executives • Mission Accomplished

16. Example Scenario #2: Disgruntled Employee • #2 is a basic network user with access to multiple desktop connection • Runs a network assesment tool and software sniffer off of a shared machine • Finds multiple vulnerabilities and an account and password of a SysAdmin • Logs in as SysAdmin (becomes an Internal Intruder) and deletes databases. • Mission Accomplished

17. Defending Against the Pseudo-Internal Intruder • Three phases: • Deny intruders access to the system • Mitigate the consequences of intruders gaining access to the system • Detect, Monitor, and Record any intrusions • Since Pseudo-Internal Intruders require access to the internal network, we will focus on it when examining these steps

18. Preventing Intruder Access • Physical Perimeter Security: stop as many potential intruders as possible from gaining physical access to the system (Guards, Gates, Locked Doors, etc.) • Physical configuration control: ensuring that unauthorized hardware is not introduced to the system and authorized hardware is not used for unauthorized actions (TEMPEST, Conduit, Metal Cases)

19. Mitigating Intruder Access • If an intruder cannot read information or write (affect a change) to the system then the danger of an intruder is diminished • Network configuration control: managing the aspects of the network configuration to ensure the highest degree of security • Encrypt Communications, Switched-Intelligent hubs and routers, smaller segments, etc.

20. Detecting Intruder Access • Network configuration monitoring: continuously observing all aspects of the network configuration searching for evidence of intruders • If an intruder does gain access to the system the most effective response will be a human one. Successful monitoring and reporting allows a quick response from SysAdmins

21. Case Study - Two Phases • Execute a set of Pseudo-Internal Intruder attacks against a testbed system with state of practice security measures • CSI/FBI ‘99 Survey showed only 42 out of 501 respondents used any intrusion detection • Execute the same set of attacks against the testbed system after implementing the security recommendations of the thesis

22. Case Study - The Attacks • 1)Packet Sniffer – Software [Laptop] • 2)Network Assessment Tool – Active [Rogue Outside Connect] • 3)Exploit – Ping of Death [Laptop] • 4)Exploit (Hacker Program) – WinNuke (Ping of Death) [Laptop] • 5)Denial of Service Attack – Ping Flood [Laptop] • 6)Denial of Service Attack – Smurf Attack [Rogue Outside Connect]

23. Case Study Phase 1 - Network Configuration

24. Case Study - Changes made for Phase 2 • Network divided into 2 segments • All Mission Crit. Communication Encrypted • Network Intrusion Detection Monitoring Device placed in Mission Crit. Segment • Network scanned for unknown IP and MAC addresses • RMON monitoring utilities used

25. Case Study Phase 2 - Network Configuration

26. Case Study - The Results • Security Changes addressed the vulnerabilities discovered in phase 1 • No access control for devices using network • No network traffic control mechanisms • No internal network monitoring for intruders • Network Configuration Monitoring and Network Configuration Control decrease the danger of a P-I Intruder to systems

27. Conclusions • The Pseudo-Internal Intruder Category addresses an area of system security that did not exist prior to the proliferation of distributed systems • The category provides a platform on which to understand and define the capabilities of this new type of intruder, thereby facilitating the detection and defense against such intruders

28. Access Oriented: Anderson • External: unauthorized users attacking a system through external data connections • Internal: • Legitimate: authorized for part of system • Masqueraders: unauthorized users logged in as legitimate users • Clandestine: users logged in that have the power to turn off some audit logs

29. Attack Oriented: Neumann • Compromise from outside: come from above or laterally at same abstraction layer (security and logic flaws) • Compromises from within: obtained with privileges of the given layer • Compromises from below: come from a lower layer of abstraction (OS, hardware based attacks)