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The Evolution and Conclusion of the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Chapter 14. The Afghanistan War. Early successes accomplished with limited ground troop deployment. Focus on air power and special forces troops.
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The Evolution and Conclusion of the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq Chapter 14 American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
The Afghanistan War • Early successes accomplished with limited ground troop deployment. • Focus on air power and special forces troops. • Strongly debated – large numbers of ground troops vs. air power and special forces. • Dramatic early successes. • Signs of trouble indicated by rising troop fatalities. • While goal of deposing Taliban government was achieved, destroying al-Qaeda was problematic. American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
Why Did Problems Arise? • Reasons for U.S. difficulties: • The role of Pakistan. • Geographic location – close to Taliban, al-Qaeda strongholds. • Ethnic ties between Pakistan Pashtuns and Taliban. • Taliban leaders had ties to Pakistani government officials. • U.S. military forces and defense budget had been downsized after Cold War. • Attention of Bush administration moved to Iraq. • Diverted money from Afghanistan war. • Diverted manpower (limited ability to increase troops). American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
The Iraq War • Operation Iraqi Freedom launched March, 2003 • Debates again about number of ground troops necessary for success. • Concerns in Congress about potential costs of war. • “Coalition of the Willing” forces had early successes. • Saddam Hussein made last public appearance in April. • Problems began to arise fairly quickly. • Interactive Timeline of Iraq War American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
Why Did Problems Arise? • Poor advance planning to address reconstruction. • Excluded State Department planners. • Unprepared to secure the country. • Overly optimistic assumptions. • Believed they could rely on Iraqi security forces to establish order. • Believed international community would help U.S. in Iraq. • Believed a functional interim government would be set up quickly. American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
Mistakes Made • Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) decisions: • De-Ba’athification – purge Ba’ath Party members from government. • Disbanded the Iraqi army and police forces. • Military abuses of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison. • War Crimes in Iraq • U.S. invasion benefitted bin Laden and al-Qaeda. • Bin Laden wanted to overturn secular governments. • Detainee abuses increased anti-American sentiment, increased al-Qaeda recruitment. American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
Changing Strategies – Domestic Politics • 2006 election resulted in Democrats taking control of both houses of Congress. • Bush was in 2nd term (lame duck president). • Focus on preserving legacy? • Focus on having influence on successor? • Iraq war was decidedly unpopular in US. • 2006 Pew Research Center poll: • 49% said military force in Iraq was a mistake. • 51% felt the war was not going well. • 50% believed US troops should be brought home as quickly as possible. American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
Declining War in Iraq Could the U.S.’s initial strategy in Iraq have been changed to achieve success? What do you think was the most likely factor that drove the change of strategy in Iraq? American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
New Strategy in Iraq • “Surge” – Bush sent more troops into Iraq. • New strategy – counter-insurgency. • Protecting Iraqi population from attacks by insurgents. • Argument: American public will tolerate casualties if it believes it is winning a war. • Encouraged the organization and mobilization of Sunni communities. • “Awakening” – separated Sunnis from al-Qaeda. • Brought about tense peace between Sunnis and Shia elements (Sunnis could protect themselves). • Reduced coalition casualties by about 50%. American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
War versus Nation-Building • US successes at replacing “unacceptable” regimes is extremely limited. • US has been involved in 18 nation-building projects since 1899. • Only successes: Germany and Japan. • More often leaves instability and anti-American sentiment. • Peace-building attempts in Iraq were unsuccessful. • Packer (2005) – never enough troops to ensure stability. • Disbanding Iraqi military and police forces created power vacuum. American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
Obama and Iraq • Obama promised to end the war in Iraq quickly during presidential campaign. • Wanted to focus on war in Afghanistan. • But could not be seen as “losing” the war. • Likely felt vulnerable to charges of being “soft on national security” or “soft on terrorism.” • July, 2009 - Department of Defense announced troops would be home within weeks. American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
Ending the War in Iraq • U.S. troops did not withdraw from Iraq within a matter of weeks. • Obama established a policy of withdrawing troops according to the timetable set by 2008 Bush agreement with Iraq. • All troops were to be removed by December, 2011. • Obama wanted to leave some troops after December, 2011 to continue to train Iraqi troops. • Iraqi prime minister refused to grant U.S. troops legal immunity. • Last troops out according to original timetable. American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
Obama’s War Obama pledges to remove troops Last US troops pulled out on December 18, 2011 Why didn’t Obama immediately begin withdrawing troops from Iraq? American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
Iraq War Results? • Removed Saddam Hussein from power. • Serious sectarian violence continues. • U.S. influence continues to erode • Embassy staff cut (2012) • $1 billion in training funds cut in half (2012). • 1.5 million troops served in Iraq from 2003-2011. • Estimated costs: $800 billion - $3 trillion. • About 4500 American military personnel died in combat. • Estimated 100,000 Iraqis died. American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
Iraq and its Consequences 10 year recap $1 trillion in taxpayer dollars spent on the war 4,487 US Troops killed 75 US Helicopters downed in Iraq 4,845 bombs dropped on Iraq during the “Shock and Awe” campaign American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
Obama and Afghanistan • During campaign, Obama declared Afghanistan to be the “right war.” • Initiated first surge of personnel in March, 2009. • Initiated second, counter-insurgency surge in November, 2009. • Announced troops would begin withdrawing by July, 2011. • Serious problems in Afghanistan in 2009: • Karzai government had lost credibility. • Taliban was taking over large portions. • Repeated attacks by Afghan military and police on coalition forces. American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
Obama and Karzai Relations Obama's ultimatum What do you think was the most likely factor that drove the change of strategy in Afghanistan? Timeline of War in Afghanistan American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
Ending the War in Afghanistan • May, 2011 - bin Laden was located and killed in Pakistan. • Obama announcement on Bin Laden's Death • Reduced urgency regarding al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. • Seen as a significant step forward in conflict against al-Qaeda. • Taliban unlikely to allow al-Qaeda to set up a base again. • End goal was to have almost all troops out by end of 2014. • Penn State Rally after Bin Laden's Death American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage
Afghanistan War Results? • Taliban had been ousted from control of the central government. • Al Qaeda no longer had a base of operations. • However, by 2012, hopes for Afghanistan had waned. • Unlikely to have a functional, democratic government by 2014. • Unlikely to be able to provide security (military, police) to entire country by 2014. • Taliban would likely stay in control of parts of the country. American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, 2nd ed., Ray, 2013, Sage