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Public Key Based Cryptoschemes for Data Concealment in Wireless Sensor Networks

Public Key Based Cryptoschemes for Data Concealment in Wireless Sensor Networks. Einar Mykletun , Joao Girao , Dirk Westhoff IEEE ICC 2006 , 1-4244-0355-3/06 Citation: 73 Presenter: 林顥桐 Date: 2012/12/17. Outline. Introduction A Desirable Homomorphic Cryptoscheme

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Public Key Based Cryptoschemes for Data Concealment in Wireless Sensor Networks

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  1. Public Key Based Cryptoschemes for Data Concealment in Wireless Sensor Networks EinarMykletun, Joao Girao, Dirk Westhoff IEEE ICC 2006 , 1-4244-0355-3/06 Citation: 73 Presenter: 林顥桐 Date: 2012/12/17

  2. Outline • Introduction • A Desirable HomomorphicCryptoscheme • Public-Key Cryptoscheme Candidates • Applications and Recommendation • Conclusion

  3. Introduction • Data aggregation is untrusted between sensors and the sink • Public-key based solutions provide a higher level of system security • But not popular • Too costly for computationally weak devices • A faster depletion of the sensor’s energy

  4. Introduction • Contrast a set of candidate solutions and give recommendations for the selection of the preferred scheme

  5. A Desirable HomomorphicCryptoscheme • Aggregation • Additively HomomorphicEncrytion which have the property that Enc(m1) ⊕ Enc(m1) = Enc(m1+ m2) • Security • Can be proved on math • The compromise of sensor node should not assist in revealing aggregated data • Key management should be simple • Chiphertext Expansion should be moderate • Probabilistic Encryption

  6. A Desirable HomomorphicCryptoscheme • WSN Lifetime • Efficient Computations • Sending ciphertexts should not require the transmission of large amounts of additional data • Electing aggregator nodes should not need to take into account security parameters • The use of elliptic curve cryptoschemes

  7. Outline • Introduction • A Desirable HomomorphicCryptoscheme • Public-Key Cryptoscheme Candidates • Applications and Recommendation • Conclusion

  8. Public-Key Cryptoscheme Candidates • Okamoto-Uchiyama(OU) • Based on the ablity of computing discrete logarithms • additive homomorphic: Enc(m1+m2) = Enc(m1) X Enc(m2) • Probabilistic encryption, and relating the computational complexity of the encryption function to the size of the plaintext p and q are random k-bit primes, n is approximately 1024 bits, k could be 341 L(x) = (x - 1)/p

  9. Public-Key Cryptoscheme Candidates • Benaloh • A probabilistic cryptoscheme whose encryption cost is dependent on the size of the plaintext p, q are large primes

  10. Public-Key Cryptoscheme Candidates • Elliptic curve ElGamal encryption Scheme(EC-EG) • This is equivalent to the original ElGamal scheme, but transformed to an additive group E is an elliptic curve, p is a prime with 163bits, G is a generator

  11. Public-Key Cryptoscheme Candidates • Elliptic curve ElGamal encryption Scheme(EC-EG) • EC-EG is additively homomorphic and chipertexts are combined through addition, i.e. map(m1 + m2) = map(m1) + map(m2) • This mapping needs to be deterministic such that the same plaintext always maps to the same point

  12. Outline • Introduction • A Desirable HomomorphicCryptoscheme • Public-Key Cryptoscheme Candidates • Applications and Recommendation • Conclusion

  13. Applications • Data Aggregation • The usage of additive encryption for calculating the average and for movement detection • Long-term data storage • Data is kept in the nodes for later retrieval • The nodes have restricted storage capacity, it is important to reduce the amount of values that are actually stored

  14. Recommendation • OU • Bigger ciphertext size • EC-EG • Expensive mapping function during decryption, to costly to revert

  15. Conclusion • The addition of ciphertexts • minimize bandwidth overhead • reduce the sensors’ energy consumption • EC-EG, Benaloh, OU are better

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