PHIL/RS 335

1. PHIL/RS 335 Evidential Challenge: Pt. 2

2. Gievett, “A Pascallian Rejoinder” • Geivett begins by recasting the ground of the issue somewhat. • Rather than frame the issue in terms of positive and negative atheism, or in terms of God-Talk and non God-Talk, Gievett prefers a distinction between Direct and Indirect atheological arguments. • Direct: positive atheism (God does not exist). • Indirect: 2 types. • Failure of natural theology (defined in the note on p. 163c1) + lack of evidence makes it unlikely that God exists. • Presumption of atheism (is this the same as the presumption of a-theism?).

3. Taking aim at the Presumption • Geivett is interested in the last of these possibilities which he identifies with Flew. • As he spells out (163c2) he is trying to address a number of concerns: articulating and criticizing the position he represents as Flew’s, justifying natural theology, and, ultimately, advancing an essentially Pascallian (that is, prudential) basis for believing in God.

4. Where is Flew? • As Geivett’s discussion of the presumption of atheism makes clear, Flew’s position is a subtle one that can be difficult to distinguish from similar, though fundamentally different, positions. • To label a-theism as negative atheism may ultimately be more confusing than helpful, as it potentially confuses Flew’sposition with agnosticism. • What Gievett does focus his attention on is the epistemological concern for the burden of proof and the analogy with a presumption of innocence. • As Gievett acknowledges, we shouldn’t make to much of this analogy (he recognizes that it is not an attempt to make an argument by analogy).

5. Theistic Responses • Geivett identifies two possible responses to what he’s characterized as Flew’sposition. • One can accept the challenge and try to provide a clear, unambiguous concept of the divine and then try to demonstrate it’s reference (“simple defeaters”). • Alternatively, one can challenge the presumption on the grounds that belief in God doesn’t require justification or that it requires justification different from the model advocated by Flew (“rejoinders”).

6. Simple Defeaters? • In order to simply defeat the presumption, some successful program of natural theology would have to be advanced. • As we’ve reviewed them, and as Geivett acknowledges, the traditional arguments have not been able to rationally “compel belief in God”. At best, it seems, they’ve provided enough reason to call into question positive atheism. • Geivett does insist, however, that this accomplishment, perhaps coupled with prudential concerns like those advanced by Pascal, could be a potential simple defeater. • At the very least, he insists, the limited success of the program of natural theology surely require a rebuttal before a negative atheism could be maintained (168c1).

7. A Rejoinder? • As Geivett acknowledges in section 4 of his article, the struggles of Natural Theology would seem to make a rejection of the presumption of a-theism a necessary first step in successfully addressing the atheist challenge. • In order to advance towards this first step, Geivett offers what he calls a “Pascalian Rejoinder.” • As he presents it, the rejoinder is based in two claims (170c2).

8. Presuming that God does not exist? • It is obviously less than certain that this gloss on Flew adequately captures the sense that Flew clearly employs when arguing for a presumption of a-theism. • See on this, Flew’s rejoinder to Geivett (176c1). • Given that Geivett chooses to interpret Flew in this way, it is not surprising that he concludes that Flew’s position is no different than positive atheism (174c1). • However, as Flew emphasizes in his rejoinder, his understanding of a-theism does not rule out an openness to the divine, which is what Geivett insists is a necessary first condition of any theistic demonstration.

9. What is Prudent? • On this question, Geivett seems on safer ground. • As he emphasizes, Flew’s position seems to amount to a “wait and see” attitude, but such an attitude may not adequately address the existential significance of belief. • It does seem important to know something about this issue, not just in a disinterested intellectual or abstract way (like knowing whether string theory is an adequate account of the fundamental forces working in the universe), but in a “I don’t want to burn in hell” way. • Geivettargues that Flew’s insistence on the logical priority of a-theism over all forms of God-Talk is just not appropriate given the importance of the issue. • We might wonder, however, if this importance isn’t just an effect of a theistic habit or prejudice. • After all, if we remain open to the questionableness of the divine, we might find compelling reason to believe in a God who would reward the a-theistic questioner and punish the “faithful” believer.

10. Clifford, “Wrong to Believe” • In this excerpt from “The Ethics of Belief,” Clifford argues that it is immoral to believe a claim lacking sufficient evidence to justify the belief. • He begins his argument by probing our intuitions using the thought experiment of of a ship-owner preparing to send an old, worn ship full of emigrants out on the open ocean. • As Clifford relays it, the ship-owner had reasonable doubts about the seaworthiness of the ship, but overcame them with hope, and the conviction of providence. • What should we say about this decision?

11. Belief and Action • Clifford’s analysis of the thought-experiment leads him to the conclusion that the ship-owner acted wrongly. • As he insists, this is true whether or not the ship fails to survive the voyage. • This analysis relies on a tight connection between belief and actions. • On this view, beliefs lead to actions, either immediately or down the line. • The implication of this extends far beyond examples like the ship-owner. As Clifford emphasizes, “No real belief…is ever truly insignificant; it prepares us to receive more of its like, confirms those which resembled it before, and weakens others…” (181c1). • As a result, even apparently trivial beliefs have significant consequences for our actions and our character.

12. The Social Significance of Belief • These implications are more profound then we might first think. • As Clifford recognizes, our beliefs have important social dimensions, both in terms of the social context from which they emerge and to which they return, as part of our common heritage. • “Our words, our phrases, our forms and processes and modes of thought, are common property, fashioned and perfected from age to age; an heirloom which every succeeding generation inherits as a precious deposit and a sacred trust…” (181c1). • We see this clearly in the ship-owner example (his belief had clear implications for the passengers) but it is true more broadly and extensively.

13. Everyone is Responsible • Clifford’s analysis suggests that everyone, not just people in important positions, are responsible to everyone else for the content and epistemological justification of their beliefs. • This is a significant responsibility. Is it a reasonable one to impose? • One thing we might consider is the psychological reality that we generally want to believe. • Epistemologically appropriate skepticism in the face of many claims that confront us is a difficult, even scary, position to maintain. Simple, unconsidered belief is much more comfortable.

14. Stolen Comfort • Clifford makes the case that we should resist this psychological impulse with an analogy to stealing. • Noting that the comfort of well-justified belief is the same as that of mere belief, Clifford argues that in the second situation, this comfort is unjustified, essentially stolen from our common intellectual heritage. • On this ground, Clifford suggests that it is our duty to do due diligence on our beliefs, a duty to our common humanity. • “That duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from a pestilence, which may shortly master our own body and then spread to the rest of the town” (182c 1). • It is also a theft from ourselves, inasmuch as we weaken our ability to appropriately evaluate beliefs every time we uncritically accept a belief as true without this due diligence (Ibid.).

15. Summing Up • “…it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (182c2). • The failure to sufficiently interrogate one’s beliefs, or to suppress legitimate doubt about them, “…is one long sin against mankind” (183c1). • What are the implications of Clifford’s position for belief in God?

16. James, “The Will to Believe” • In this essay, James considers epistemological issues like those raised by Clifford. • His aim is to establish the conditions under which belief in God is epistemically justifiable. • He begins with a specification of two basic concepts: beliefs and options. • James calls any proposed belief an hypothesis. Some hypotheses are “live,” by which James means that we might actually come to accept it. Others are “dead” in that they are not real possibilities for us, given the constellation of our other beliefs. • Clearly, the difference is not intrinsic but rather related to individual hypothesizers. • On option is a question about which of opposing hypotheses we should accept. Options are slightly more complex: they can be living or dead, forced or unavoidable, momentous or trivial. • For James, a “genuine” option is one which “forced, living, and momentous” (200c1).

17. Contra Clifford • James asserts that when an option is genuine, and cannot be settled by intellectual means, one may and indeed must let one’s non-rational nature make the choice. • One may believe what one hopes to be true, or what makes one happiest. • This is obviously a rejection of Clifford’s insistence that in such cases one is morally obliged to suspend judgment. • For James, to suspend judgment is itself a choice, and one with the same risks of affirmative choice: “losing the truth” (200c2).

18. Genuine Options? • Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, James goes on to exclude a number of significant options from the list genuine ones. • Options in the science are typically not momentous he suggests, and so here the requirement of epistemologically acceptable justification is appropriate. • The same is true, presumably, of all sorts of intellectual concerns where, “The attitude of skeptical balance is the absolutely wise one if we would escape mistakes” (200c2). • What he notably does not consider are examples like Clifford’s, where the wellbeing of others is concerned.

19. A Theory of Religion • Perhaps James can be excused for this oversight, because he has as his goal evaluating the status of what we can call the Religious Option. • To do so, he has to offer an, admittedly generic, theory of Religion. • To do so, he boils religion down to two claims: • “[T]he best things are the more eternal,” that is, the most basic, definitive things. • Human beings are better if they believe 1, even if it cannot be demonstrated or justified.

20. The Religious Option • So, the religious option is the option between accepting the truth of this account of religion or denying it. • Is this a genuine option? • Either it’s live, or the conversation ends here. • It’s momentous, according to the second of the two claims. • It’s also forced, because “waiting to see” we lose the good specified in 2. • Contrary to expectations, and the bulk of the Natural Theological considerations we’ve examined, Claim 2 is for James the key to the whole. • How does this alter the analysis of someone like Flew? If James is right, than this seems a better way of responding than that offered by Geivett.

21. So Should We Believe in God? • On the assumption that the option is genuine,and that no intellectual analysis can decide it, James’s position is that we are free to believe what we want. • However, on the assumption that humans are governed by two epistemological imperatives, believe truth and avoid error, not every belief is equally supported. • James assumes that if God exists then the knowledge that God exists is an immensely valuable sort of knowledge in itself, whereas the knowledge that God does not exist, if God does not exist, is worth much less. • Someone like Clifford suspends judgment because he would rather miss out on the truth than risk being wrong. James himself regards the value of being right about God’s existence as worth any risks that belief might bring with it. • And so he concludes that it is better to believe than not. • Not because there’s evidence, but rather in the wish to believe that God exists if God does in fact exist.