Regime vs. Opposition under Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia

1. Regime vs. Opposition under Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia Vladimir Gel’man (European University at St.Petersburg / University of Helsinki) University of Michigan, September 28, 2017

2. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • Russia – consolidated electoral authoritarian regime (meaningful elections with unfair competition and pre-determined results); • Challenges of disequilibrium to autocracies – from above (intra-elite conflicts) or from below (opposition-driven mass protests); • To what extent these challenges are threatening for regime’s survival? • How Russia’s rulers respond to these challenges? • What we might expect in the foreseeable future? • And what are the lessons from Russia for other autocracies?

3. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • Literature on electoral authoritarianism – mostly focused on causes and mechanisms of its crisis and collapse (”pro-democratic bias”?); • About 70% of autocracies after the World War II failed due to intra-elite conflicts (Svolik, 2012), the role of the mass protests is less important; • Recent wave of anti-regime mass mobilizations in post-Communist areas, especially Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004, 2014), Kyrgyzstan (2005, 2010), Moldova (2009), etc.; • Competing explanations of failure of authoritarian regimes – ”weak autocrats” (Way, 2015) or ”strong opposition” (Bunce, Wolchik, 2011)

4. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • Russia – a ”crucial case” for understanding of ”regime vs. opposition” conflicts under electoral authoritarianism? • Until 2011 – tremendous regime’s investments into authoritarian institution-building (reforming of electoral and party systems, strengthening of the ”power vertical”, isolation and marginalization of oppositions of various sorts), high level of mass support because of economic growth; • 2011-2012: bump on the road - relatively weak regime’s performance during parliamentary elections (49% of votes for the major party), relative decline of mass support, the re-emergence of the opposition amid generational changes; • Regime did survive but perceive major threats…

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6. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • Balance of sticks and carrots – crucial for survival of electoral authoritarian regimes; • “Authoritarian equilibrium rests on lies, fear, and economic prosperity” (Przeworski, 1991: 58); • In the 2000s, Russia’s regime mostly used carrots due to effects of economic growth (buying of loyalty), and rarely applied sticks (“fear”); • In the 2010s, potential for further buying of loyalty seemed exhausted, and the role of lies and fear increased; • Threat perceptions (Davenport, 1995) as the major factor of repressions

7. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • 2012 – repressive turn of Russia’s regime, “tightening of the screws” after Putin’s return to the presidency; • Regime’s attacks towards: • Opposition activists (the case of Bolotnaya square); • independent media outlets (lenta.ru, gazeta.ru, forbes.ru, rbc.ru, etc.); • NGOs (“foreign agents” law); • “cultural wars” (Pussy Riot case, etc.) • Some of regime’s rivals were discredited and further marginalized; • 2014 – overthrow of Yanukovych in Ukraine (added insult to injury)

8. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • What are the functions of repressions in authoritarian regimes? • Not only coercion and punishment of regime’s rivals but also signaling to the public (and to elites) about boundaries of permitted forms of their discontent (one might object certain policies but not the regime as such); • The use of mass repressions is risky game (empowering of coercive apparatus, the rise of internal tensions, elite purges as side effects, etc.); • Turn toward selective use of repressions as an alternative solution (fine-tuning of repressive policies)

9. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • Late-Soviet repressive policy as a role model for present-day Russia? • A “success story” in combating organized dissent in late-Soviet Russia (but not in other Soviet republics): winning combination of preemptive monitoring and preemptive coercion; • Few examples of political protests, the overall low number of political prisoners despite rising discontent, use of various methods of control, ranging from ban of certain jobs to forced emigration; • Organized dissent nearly exhausted by the time of Gorbachev’s reforms and played a limited role in protests of 1989-91 in Russia; • Regime’s problems were not eliminated but postponed and put onto the shoulders of next generation of leaders

10. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • Present-day Belarus: yet another success story of selective repressive policy? • Effective mechanism of monitoring due to the state control over economy and temporary job contracts in the public sector; • Effective use of: • coercion (disappearance of some opposition figures in the early 2000s), • divide-and-rule tactics (provoking internal schisms among regime’s rivals), • Incentives to “exit” rather than “voice” (Hirschman, 1970) – effects of emigration; • No serious threats to Lukashenko’s regime ever?

11. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • Putin’s triumph after 2014? • Skyrocketing of popularity (approval rate up to 86%); • No major discontent after annexation of Crimea; • Further weakening of the opposition (internal schisms, failure during 2016 State Duma elections)

12. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • … but the new challenges lies ahead? • The rise of Internet/social media + generational changes – effective counter-mobilization (spontaneous youth rallies in Moscow and other cities in March and June 2017); • Gradual overcoming of internal schisms among the opposition (the slow rise of a “negative consensus”); • The rising (yet silent) discontent among elites due to shrinking pool of rents and lack of positive prospects;

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14. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • Demonstrative killing of Boris Nemtsov (February 2015) – a new phase of “repressive turn”; • Outsourcing of the use of violence (still under control); • Further legal “tightening of the screws” (the law on “undesired” foreign organizations, strengthening of control over Internet/social media); • More intensive negative campaigning in the mainstream media against the opposition, mobilization of lower layers of the “power vertical” • Rising tides in anticipation of 2018 presidential elections?

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16. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • New tendency - increasing regime’s repressions against elites (including regime’s loyalists); • Since 2014 – criminal charges against five regional chief executives, some deputy ministers, head of federal custom service, top officials in the Ministry of Interior, and the minister of economic development…; • Side effects of fierce struggle over rents (the case of Sechin vs. Ulyukaev conflict); • Reformatting of the “winning coalition” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) as a mechanism of maintenance of elite loyalty

17. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • As of yet, threats for regime are insignificant: • Popularity of prospective presidential candidates (August 2017, Levada-Center): • Putin – 60% • Zyuganov (Communist Party leader, 73 y.o.) – 3% • Zhirinovsky (Liberal Democratic Party leader, 71 y.o.) – 2% • Navalny – 2% • Shoigu (minister of defense) – 1% • Yavlinsky (Yabloko party leader) – 1% • Don’t know – 30% • …. and 18% are ready to vote for a fictional candidate supposedly supported by Putin (!)

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19. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • Alexey Navalny (b.1976) – a new opposition leader from the younger generation; • In 2013, he got more than 27% of votes in Moscow mayoral elections; • Gathered more than 500000 signatures of voters for his nomination during pre-campaign online mobilization; • A series of rallies and meetings across Russia’s provinces in 2017 • In 2013 accused in economic crime (probation), legally ineligible for balloting, the court verdict is overturned by ECHR, but… • The Kremlin intended not to let him run…

20. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • If not Navalny, then what? • Dilemma of non-competitive elections: • either predictability of results with low turnout (demobilization strategy) or high turnout at any costs with risks of post-election protests (risks of counter-mobilization); • “70%/70% strategy” – rejected by the Kremlin as a risky game; • Fake candidates as false targets? • Still, no major immediate challenges but high threat perceptions in the Kremlin – previous success of repressive turn paved the way for further repressions (Davenport, 1995)

21. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • If Putin will be elected in March 2018, then there will be his second consecutive term in office (again!) or the fourth term in office altogether; • “The Autumn of the Patriarch” or “Will Putin’s system survive until 2042?” • High chances on the further rise of threat perceptions to the regime… • … but rather poor prognostic capacity of scholars elsewhere, including Russia

22. Regime vs. Opposition in Russia • Thanks for your questions and comments! (vgelman@eu.spb.ru)