Troubles and Rebirth: Opposition in Russia

1. Political Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth? Vladimir Gel’man (European University at St.Petersburg / University of Helsinki) Comparative Workshop on Mass Protests, London School of Economics, 14 June 2014

2. Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth • My “Political Opposition in Russia: A Dying Species?” (Post-Soviet Affairs, 2005) – 47 references since then; • The argument – consolidation of elites and the major institutional changes in Russia in the 2000s left no room for political opposition, which was doomed to a marginal role; • But during and after 2011-2012 protests the major re-emergence of political opposition in Russia has been observed; • What are the causes of these changes and their possible impact on political opposition in Russia and what we might expect for the future? What are the major challenges and strategic choices for the opposition in Russia in coming years?

3. Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth A brief vocabulary: «opposition» - actors and/or organized groups of open political opponents to the ruling group of Russia’s regime (irrespectively to their organizational forms); «systemic opposition» («semi-opposition», Linz, 1973) - dissenting actors and/or groups (officially licensed and/or controlled by the ruling group), who might oppose certain policies; «non-systemic opposition» («principal opposition», Linz, 1973) - all other dissenting actors and/or groups, which are emerged and/or operated beyond the control of the ruling group and opposing regime as such (they may varied by their degree of dissent, ideational stances, and mode of operation)

4. Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth • Before 2011-2012 opposition was weak, divided and pushed into various narrow «ghettos» (a «dying spices» phenomenon – Gel’man, 2005); • «systemic opposition» parties (KPRF, Yabloko) lost previous influence and more concentrated on their own survival; • «non-systemic opposition» groups were noisy but largely irrelevant constellations of incapable freaks with very narrow basis of support; • independent opposition movements and groups were by and large NIMBY-like, localized actors and/or (often deliberatively) avoided politicization; • no meaningful post-election protests in 2007-2008; deep divisions among the opposition

5. Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth • What has changed before 2011-12 wave of protests? • Three major factors: • (1) Generation change among opposition leaders and activists – no irreconcilable ideational divides, no past memory of mortal offenses; a different and more forward-looking political style vis-à-vis fading figures from the “roaring 1990s” (e.g., Navalny vs. Nemtsov); • (2) minor opening of political opportunity structure under Dmitry Medvedev’s «virtual thaw» – unintended consequences of rhetorical liberalization; • (3) shift of public demands for the «good governance» in the wake of 2008-2009 economic crisis (Chaisty, Whitefield, 2012) and populist response of the opposition on these demands (Navalny’s effects);

6. Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth • 2011 parliamentary elections – a turning point? • Effective negative campaign against United Russia (UR) increased public visibility of the opposition and turned into the large-scale mass mobilization; • The opposition slogan “vote for anyone but UR” ideally fit the perspective of negative consensus against the status quo regime and reflect populist trends; • «Systemic» opposition was the major beneficiary of anti-regime campaign, but remained passive and inept; • Numerous «non-systemic» opposition groups either emerged during the campaign and/or joined the process of politicization

7. Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth • However, anti-regime 2011-2012 protests met their limits: • (1) the electoral arena still occupied by the ruling group and «systemic» opposition (no major alternatives for 2012 presidential elections); • (2) the scale of mobilization was not enough for major concessions of the ruling group: denial of ideas of bargaining between the ruling group and the opposition and/or of the cooptation of some opposition figures; • (3) «systemic» opposition parties still preferred status-quo regime to major political changes, rightly considering their chances for survival

8. Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth • «Non-systemic» opposition faced with severe constrains, partly inherited from the previous (pre-2011) experience: • Low organizational capabilities and limited pool of available resources; • Lack of political strategy, especially given the time constrains (opposition leaders became victims of their own success?); • Relative isolation, shortage of «influential allies» among the elites, including those of «systemic» opposition; • After 2012: taking to the streets and/or going to the polls – two tactics, small gains

9. Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth • «Non-systemic» opposition after 2012 presidential elections – what kind of lessons has been learned? • Employing previous tactics of mass mobilization without major positive effectsafter the decline of wave of protests (from 50000 participants of street actions in Moscow in December 2011 to 5000 in July 2013); • The formation of Coordinating Council of the opposition – a merely useless organizational entity? • The formation of new opposition parties – not a big success (RPR, Democratic Choice, Navalny) • The challenge of non-democratic sub-national elections: a difficult choice between run, boycott and «vote for anyone but…»

10. Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth • New trends on electoral arena: • Yekaterinburg, 2013 – Yevgeny Roizman, a local hero and political maverick, won mayoral elections; • Moscow, 2013 – Navalny got 27.3% of votes in city mayoral elections (despite many gloomy predictions); • Novosibirsk, 2014 – Lokot’ (KPRF) won mayoral elections as a leader of coalition of five opposition candidates, both left and right; • … but “the time of burning fires not came yet” (Navalny)

11. Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth • «Systemic» opposition after 2012 presidential elections – what kind of lessons has been learned? • The major strategy – active immobilism and avoidance of risks of being punished by the ruling group: • demonstrative loyalty, expelling of dissenters (e.g., both Gudkovs and Ponomarev from Just Russia); • endorsement and/or promotion of harshest anti-democratic legal initiativesby MPs from Just Russia and/or KPRF; • Silence, “doing small deeds” (Kudrin) and/or exit-like maneuvers (Prokhorov), etc.

12. Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth • Key challenges for the opposition lies ahead: • Kremlin’s «politics of fear»: from public discrediting to criminal prosecutions (and/or threats thereof) towards opposition leaders, activists, and allies; abuse of «divide-and-rule» tactics; • Low degree of public support of the «non-systemic» opposition despite the criticism towards status quo regime («resigned acceptance» effect (Rose et al., 2006)); • Time horizon problem – demobilizing effect of a need for preparing for the long-term struggle against well-entrenched authoritarian regime (incentives for «exit» rather than «voice»)

13. Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth • Major tasks for democratic opposition under authoritarianism (Stepan, 1990): • (a) Resisting cooptation into the regime; • (b) Guarding zones of the autonomy vis-à-vis regime; • (c) Disrupting regime’s legitimacy; • (d) Rising the costs of preservation of the status-quo rule; • (e) Creating a credible democratic alternative

14. Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth • The Kremlin’s harsh approach is likely to turn more citizens and new groups into regime’s enemies, thus making easier tasks (a) and (d) for the opposition; • Still, tasks of disrupting regime’s legitimacy and creating of a credible democratic alternatives are more complicated; • At the same time, the perspective of «civil society versus the state» (typical for Eastern Europe before 1989 and Latin America in the 1970-80s) looks irrelevant in case of Russia

15. Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth • What is to be done? • (1) maintenance of the «negative consensus» against the regime (no way to perceive status-quo as the «lesser evil»); • (2) building bridges and seeking allies both among elites and society-at-large (avoiding isolation); • (3) «concerting» - not an organizational unity but rather a mutual support and informal collaboration among various segments of the opposition; • (4) urgent need of advancement of new ideas and new credible public figures; • (5) avoiding «worse is better» approach

16. Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Rebirth • Thanks for your attention!