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Now That We’re Leaving Iraq, What Did We Learn?

Now That We’re Leaving Iraq, What Did We Learn?. Observations. Conventional wisdom is that surge combined with emphasis on liberal funding of projects and essential services worked Economic development efforts far less important than advocated in current “COIN” dogma

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Now That We’re Leaving Iraq, What Did We Learn?

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  1. Now That We’re Leaving Iraq, What Did We Learn?

  2. Observations • Conventional wisdom is that surge combined with emphasis on liberal funding of projects and essential services worked • Economic development efforts far less important than advocated in current “COIN” dogma • Lethal operations remain the decisive element of combat power • Removal of enemy crucial • Best technique is combat ops focused on them • We have not adequately reviewed what brought us tentative success in Iraq

  3. 4-10 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE: 3-89 CAVALRY MICRO-GRANT BEST PRACTICES Goal: Getting long term effects from issuing micro-grants, not just throwing money at the problem. Desired Effect: Twofold: 1.) Gets local Iraqis used to going through their own local government for economic assistance/problem solving; 2.) Puts a level of responsibility on the process at the local levels. • Process: • Early in the micro-grant fight we engaged the District Council economic committee chairman on the process of giving money to start up or expand businesses. • Working with the committee, blank micro-grant applications distributed to all the neighborhood chairmen with a two per “Hayy” goal for the initial batch and the committee as the point of collection. • Gave the committee an unclassified map of Rusafa so they could plot the locations of the businesses. (effectively translated street, building and muhallah into 8-digit grid) • The Iraqis collected the micro-grant applications, business owner and business pictures, and plotted the business on a map for 3-89 CAV. • 3-89 CAV visited nominated businesses for final vetting. • Concerns / Issues: • Chairman taking care of their friends and families with micro-grants • Solution: The committee was surprisingly helpful in weeding out these situations and identifying targeted micro-grant applicants. (trade shops: carpentry, generator repair, metal working) 3

  4. Lion Square

  5. MAR-MAY 2008 “March Madness” SADR CITY NEW BAGHDAD RUSAFA FOB LOYALTY GREEN ZONE LIONS SQUARE FOB RUSTAMIYAH KARADA $8,728,179 on 87 projects $396,500 on 144 microgrants 30 enemy Killed, 12 Wounded 111 Enemy captured

  6. Capture of Slugger Most Wanted – 28 October 2008 • Timeline of Events: • 25 Oct – Posters distributed targeting routes into Rusafa from Isam’s primary hideout in Sadr City. • 26 Oct - Recognizing his face on a wanted banner, an associate of Isam Sharuqi contacts 43/11 Iraqi Army Brigade in order to collect the reward of $3,500.00 dollars. • 27 Oct -43/11 IA develops the intelligence and conducts cross boundary coordination with 42/11 IA. • 28 Oct -Using the wanted banner to assist in identification, 42/11 IA and the source arrest Isam Sharuqi at a Barber Shop in Sadr City. • 29 Oct -3/89 CAV receives custody of Sharuqi WO Mohamed Dakhel Hameed, an intel officer from 42/11 IA, is responsible for the capture of Sharuqi.

  7. Recommendations No more “Lions Square”-type projects (our good idea without local interest or support or even measureable definition of “success”) Enemy we face is more like Tony Soprano than Che Guevara; follow the money, and limit their access to it COIN is not just non-lethal primacy; too complex for bumper sticker slogans Stop using amount of money spent or number of projects completed or ongoing as a measure of unit/individual success “…projects would be limited in number by me based on a unit’s ability to follow up and account for the actual impact of the project and the effort expended.” A strategic AAR on Iraq is overdue; those who were actually executing operations need to have the loudest voice (company/battalion commanders, effects officers, etc.).

  8. Questions? The most effective economic development tool in the squadron…

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