two types of evil and suffering

2. two types of evil and suffering

3. two types of evil and suffering

4. moral evil Luke 13:1-2: There were some present at that very time who told him about the Galileans whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrifices. “Do you think that these Galileans were worse sinners than all the other Galileans, because they suffered in this way?

5. two types of evil and suffering

6. two types of evil and suffering

7. natural evil Luke 13:3-4: “No, I tell you; but unless you repent, you will all likewise perish. Or those eighteen on whom the tower in Siloam fell and killed them: do you think that they were worse offenders than all the others who lived in Jerusalem?”

8. two types of evil and suffering

9. various versions of the problem of evil

10. the logical problem

11. the logical problem • Logical Problem

12. the logical problem • Logical Problem • It’s logically impossible that God and evil coexist.

13. the logical problem • Logical Problem • It’s logically impossible that God and evil coexist. • Evil exists.

14. the logical problem • Logical Problem • It’s logically impossible that God and evil coexist. • Evil exists. • Therefore, God does not exist.

15. the logical problem • Problem with the logical problem: • There is no explicit contradiction between 1and 2.

16. the logical problem • Problem with the logical problem: • There is no explicit contradiction between 1and 2. • In other words, it is perfectly acceptable that God and evil could possibly coexist.

17. the logical problem • Problem with the logical problem: • There is no explicit contradiction between 1and 2. • In other words, it is perfectly acceptable that God and evil could possibly coexist. • So, there must be some hidden assumption(s) in the argument that it is impossible for God and evil to coexist.

18. the hidden assumptions

19. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-powerful, He can create any world He wants.

20. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-powerful, He can create any world He wants. • If God is all-loving, He would prefer a world in which evil does not exist.

21. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-powerful, He can create any world He wants.

22. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-powerful, He can create any world He wants. • Two problems:

23. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-powerful, He can create any world He wants. • Two problems: • There is a fundamental difference between logically possible worlds and actual worlds.

24. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-powerful, He can create any world He wants. • Two problems: • There is a fundamental difference between logically possible worlds and actual worlds. • If God has created creatures free, He cannot guarantee that they would do anything.

25. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-powerful, He can create any world He wants. • Two problems: • There is a fundamental difference between logically possible worlds and actual worlds. • If God has created creatures free, He cannot guarantee that they would do anything. • To force someone to freely do something is logically impossible.

26. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-powerful, He can create any world He wants. • Two problems: • There is a fundamental difference between logically possible worlds and actual worlds. • If God has created creatures free, He cannot guarantee that they would do anything. • To force someone to freely do something is logically impossible. • God’s omnipotence does not entail logical impossibilities; thus, God cannotcreate logically impossible worlds.

27. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-powerful, He can create any world He wants. • Conclusion: This assumption is not necessarily true.

28. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-loving, He would prefer a world in which evil does not exist.

29. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-loving, He would prefer a world in which evil does not exist. • Problem: This is not necessarily the case.

30. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-loving, He would prefer a world in which evil does not exist. • Problem: This is not necessarily the case. • There are numerous examples of some kind of suffering or harm being permitted to serve a greater good.

31. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-loving, He would prefer a world in which evil does not exist. • Problem: This is not necessarily the case. • There are numerous examples of some kind of suffering or harm being permitted to serve a greater good. • It is not necessarily true that God, though all-good, would prefer no suffering, for He may have an overarching reason or purpose for evil and suffering.

32. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-good, He can create any world He wants. • If God is all-loving, He would prefer a world in which evil does not exist. • Solution: Because neither of these assumptions are necessarily true, they do not show that 1and 2are logically inconsistent. In fact, we can actually prove that 1and 2are logically consistent:

33. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-good, He can create any world He wants. • If God is all-loving, He would prefer a world in which evil does not exist. • Solution: Because neither of these assumptions are necessarily true, they do not show that 1and 2are logically inconsistent, nor do they prove that the coexistent of God and evil in the same world is a logical impossibility. In fact, we can actually prove that 1and 2are logically consistent: • 3: God could have created a world with as much good but less suffering than the actual world, and God has morally sufficient reasons for the suffering that exists.

34. the hidden assumptions • If God is all-good, He can create any world He wants. • If God is all-loving, He would prefer a world in which evil does not exist. • Solution: Because neither of these assumptions are necessarily true, they do not show that 1and 2are logically inconsistent, nor do they prove that the coexistence of God and evil in the same world is a logical impossibility. • Furthermore, because of 3, we are able to show that 1and2are in fact logically consistent. Thus, the logical version of the intellectual problem is defeated.

36. the evidential problem • Logical Problem • Evidential Problem

37. various versions of the problem of evil

38. the evidential problem • Evidential (or Probabilistic) Problem

39. the evidential problem • Evidential (or Probabilistic) Problem • It’s highly improbable that God and evil coexist.

40. the evidential problem • Evidential (or Probabilistic) Problem • It’s highly improbable that God and evil coexist. • It is improbable that the Christian God would allow so much evil in his world. • It is improbable that the Christian God would allow such senseless and gratuitous evil in his world.

41. the evidential problem • Evidential (or Probabilistic) Problem • It’s highly improbable that God and evil coexist. • It is improbable that the Christian God would allow so much evil in his world. • It is improbable that the Christian God would allow such senseless and gratuitous evil in his world. • Evil exists.

42. the evidential problem • Evidential (or Probabilistic) Problem • It’s highly improbable that God and evil coexist. • It is improbable that the Christian God would allow so much evil in his world. • It is improbable that the Christian God would allow such senseless and gratuitous evil in his world. • Evil exists. • Therefore, it is highly improbable that God exists.

43. the evidential problem • Responses to the evidential problem:

44. the evidential problem • Responses to the evidential problem: • We are not in a position to say that it is improbable that God lacks good reasons for permitting the evil and suffering that exist in the world.

45. the evidential problem • Responses to the evidential problem: • We are not in a position to say that it is improbable that God lacks good reasons for permitting the evil and suffering that exist in the world. • We are finite creatures with limited perspective, understanding, and experience.

46. the evidential problem • Responses to the evidential problem: • We are not in a position to say that it is improbable that God lacks good reasons for permitting the evil and suffering that exist in the world. • We are finite creatures with limited perspective, understanding, and experience. • God is an infinite Being with unlimited and perfect perspective, understanding, and experience.

47. the evidential problem • Responses to the evidential problem: • We are not in a position to say that it is improbable that God lacks good reasons for permitting the evil and suffering that exist in the world. • We are finite creatures with limited perspective, understanding, and experience. • God is an infinite Being with unlimited and perfect perspective, understanding, and experience. • Thus, we are not in a position to judge that God probably has no good reason for the evil and suffering that will occur in our lives.

48. the evidential problem • Responses to the evidential problem: • When all of the evidence is examined, God’s existence is not improbable.

49. the evidential problem • Responses to the evidential problem: • When all of the evidence is examined, God’s existence is not improbable. • Four evidential arguments for God’s existence:

50. the evidential problem • Responses to the evidential problem: • When all of the evidence is examined, God’s existence is not improbable. • Four evidential arguments for God’s existence: • The Cosmological Argument