Iran’s Nuclear Program: Competing Narratives, Hard Choices

1. Iran’s Nuclear Program:Competing Narratives, Hard Choices August 29, 2014

2. On balance, Iran’s nuclear program is most consistent with? • Peaceful purposes • Attaining nuclear weapons • Other

3. Elements of Iran’s nuclear program

4. Iranian Nuclear Facilities

5. Iran: Role of Missiles in Deterrence & Warfighting Iran’s deterrence triad: (1) threat to Strait of Hormuz, (2) global terror, (3) long-range strike capabilities • Iran’s rockets/missiles and nuclear program are the core pillars of the third leg of the deterrence triad • Rockets used as strategic bombardment system to supplement missiles • Hezbollah's rocket force is part and parcel of Iran’s deterrent complex vis-à-vis Israel • Will likely employ nontraditional delivery means for future WMD capabilities (special forces, UAVs, merchant ships) • Possible future addition to the triad of a fourth leg: offensive cyber operations? Missiles are conventional bombardment systems, with a WMD delivery capability • Deter attacks on Iran by enemy air and missile forces • Mass fires against civilian population centers to undermine enemy morale (a lesson of the Iran-Iraq War) • Well suited to Iran’s doctrine of “resistance”: • Defeat the enemy by bleeding his civilian population and military • Thwart the enemy’s political and military objectives • Demoralize the enemy through relentless psychological warfare Additional elements of Iran’s deterrent posture • Instill fear in its enemies by projecting image of Iran as a ‘martyrdom loving nation’ • Cultivate a culture of resistance, jihad, and martyrdom to strengthen societal resilience • Coopt Shiite clerical networks to create overseas bases of support for Iranian policy • Create economic interdependencies with neighboring states to establish indirect leverage over the U.S. Operational Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran • Reciprocity and proportionality: ability to respond in kind, at a commensurate level • Indirection (proxies), ambiguity (deniability), and patience: enables Tehran to manage risk • Tactical flexibility: back down when firmly challenged, while seeking other weaknesses to exploit • Disaggregate enemies (i.e., drive wedges in hostile coalitions)

6. Iran: Role of Missiles in Deterrence & Warfighting Contribution of rockets/missiles to Iran’s national security • Deter attacks by being able to threaten a “crushing response” (Khamenei) • Permit a more rapid response than possible by proxy attacks—which is Tehran’s preferred course of action, but which may take weeks or months to organize • Sustained long-range rocket/missile fires can generate greater cumulative effects than can terrorist attacks • Also compensates for weaknesses recently displayed by failed Hizballah/Iranian terror attacks, atrophied terror capabilities • Missiles might enable them to separate Europe from the U.S. in a crisis • Now downplaying ambitions to build >2,000km range missile in order to isolate Israel from Europe and the U.S. • But work on satellite launch vehicles enables Iran to continue work on ICBM-capable systems Missiles as a means of waging psychological warfare • A key prop in Iran’s propaganda and spin—what would a parade be without them? • A symbolic surrogate for Iran’s nascent nuclear capabilities: Iran puts its missiles on parade to hint at its nuclear ambitions, because missiles are closely linked in many peoples minds with • nuclear weapons • Prop for banners declaring that “Israel should be wiped off the map” • A symbol of Iran’s long reach, ability to project power/influence in the region Part of Iran’s nascent policy of nuclear ambiguity, consisting of • Dual use facilities • Dual-use delivery means (such as missiles) • Ambiguous public statements calculated to hint at Iran’s nuclear ambitions • “Iran is already a nuclear power” (Ahmadinejad)

7. Elements of an Effective Missile Defense Response to Iran Avoid crossing Iranian redlines that would prompt retaliation—unless such steps are deemed necessary • For instance, a preventive strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure Deploy greater numbers of interceptors to counter Iranian saturation tactics • Allow more capable systems to allocate fewer interceptors per incoming missile, to stretch existing inventories • Develop NATO expeditionary missile defense capabilities, building on experience in Turkey • Routinely deploy NATO missile defense assets to the Gulf and Israel for training exercises • Turkey, however, is likely to veto deployment of NATO missile defenses to Israel Close the rocket defense gap • Civilians won’t care whether they are being targeted by rockets or missiles; as terror weapons, rockets are as effective as missiles Enhance ability to conduct offensive strikes to attrite Iran’s missile force and ease burden on coalition • U.S. and coalition aerospace forces, supplemented by long-range naval and ground fires • An option for dealing with Iranian rockets and SRBMs, but not MRBMs (which are based far from Iran’s borders) • Implications of Iran’s mobile launchers and hardened silos? Closer cooperation needed to create synergies among GCC defenses and between U.S. and GCC defenses Greater emphasis on civil defense: citizens need to know that government is taking care of them • Especially in the wake of the “Arab Spring,” Gulf States must be seen meeting the needs of their citizens Counter Iranian propaganda with coalition information explaining that threat is being addressed • Important for strengthening societal resilience, political resolve of U.S. allies

8. Challenges Posed by Iran’s Rocket/Missile Force Large size of Iran’s missile inventory (200-300 SRBMs/up to 400 MRBMs) will permit saturation tactics against US-Israeli/US-GCC missile defenses • Mitigated somewhat by relatively small number of TELs, and rapid growth of U.S./GCC missile defenses: • U.S. has deployed eight Patriot PAC-2/3 batteries to four countries (Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Qatar) • GCC Patriot PAC-2s: Kuwait, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain • GCC Patriot PAC-3s: Kuwait, UAE, and possibly Saudi Arabia • GCC THAAD: UAE and possibly Qatar US and GCC states lack ability to deal with the Iranian rocket threat • Israeli can defend against Hamas rockets, but lacks the numbers and types needed to deal with all aspects of the Hizballah rocket threat Possible Iranian use of rockets and missiles to provide synergies? • Use of terrorists or mortar/rocket teams to suppress missiles defenses in the Gulf or Europe, thereby increasing prospects for successful missile strikes? Possible use of Lebanon/Syrian coastline as a staging area to operate against AEGIS ships—the seaborne leg of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense? • Will depend in part on the outcome of the Syrian civil war • Potential emergence of a rudimentary Iranian reconnaissance-strike complex in the Eastern Mediterranean? • AEGIS ships are fast moving, well armed targets, but Iran may be tempted to try Turkish vulnerability during Syrian crisis underscores need to be prepared for ‘Black Swans’ • Europe pay heed! • Potential for a similar scenario someday playing out in Iran—in which the Islamic Republic threatens to lash out at its enemies, in response to perceived interference in its internal affairs?

9. Potential Contribution of Missile Defenses vis-à-vis Iran Deterrence by denial • Convey message that use of missiles by Iran will yield few benefits, while risking a punishing response • Need to back this up with a threat of deterrence by punishment, by holding Iranian strategic assets at risk… • But if Tehran believes that the regime’s survival is at risk, neither denial nor punishment may be sufficient to deter • So avoid putting Tehran in such a position… Alter Tehran’s risk-benefit calculus • Influence Iran to use less effective means (e.g., proxy operations) to project power/respond to an attack • Requires U.S. and allies to avoid crossing Iranian “red lines” which could lead to rocket/missile use: • Ability to export oil; • Threats to territorial integrity; • Overt attempts at regime change, and; • A direct attack on Iran • But EU refusal to designate Hizballah as a terrorist group makes it more likely that • Tehran will conduct proxy terrorism in Europe, if its missile capabilities are neutered • Hizballah is currently free to gather intelligence in Europe in preparation for such attacks Damage reduction to facilitate escalation management, enhance crisis stability • Permits defenders to act with greater restraint Assure allies/preserve cohesion of the Western alliance • Defeat Iranian wedge strategies Diminish one of Tehran’s most important propaganda tools • By raising questions about utility of Iran’s missile force • Evidence that Tehran is concerned: frequent statements by Iran that enemy missile • defenses are useless

10. Natanz Enrichment Facility

11. Fordow Enrichment Facility

12. The story so far: key moments in the history of Iran’s nuclear program 8/2002: Opposition group reveals Natanz 5/2003: U.S.-led invasion of Iraq 10/2003: Iran-EU3 deal: suspension, Additional Protocol 2004: Partial suspension collapse, renewed deal 2005, January-March: Iran proposes series of measures in EU3 talks, but insists enrichment would continue 2005, June: Ahmadinejad elected Iranian president 2005, August: Iran rejects European incentive package, resumes U conversion at Isfahan 2005, September: IAEA Board finds “non-compliance,” but postpones reporting to Security Council 2005, October: Iran-EU3 talks resume, no progress

13. The story so far: key moments in the history of Iran’s nuclear program (II) 2006, January: Iran resumes enrichment work 2006, February: IAEA Board refers Iran to Security Council; 1st small cascades begin testing with UF6 at Natanz 2006, March: UNSC statement asks Iran to suspend 2006, June: UNSC resolution requires Iran to suspend 2006, June: P5+1 offer enhanced incentives package, talks with U.S. participation, if Iran suspends (Iran says open to talks, but declines to suspend) 2006, December: Security Council imposes 1st sanctions 2007, March: Security Council imposes add’l sanctions 2007, August: Iran and IAEA agree on “work plan” to resolve outstanding questions – appears to limit opening of new questions

14. The story so far: key moments in the history of Iran’s nuclear program (III) 2007, December: U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) says Iran stopped nuclear weapon design work in 2003 2008, June: EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana presents updated incentives package, U.S. Undersecretary Burns takes part in talks – no substantive progress 2009, Jan-March: Pres. Obama takes office, offers unconditional talks, sends letter to Khamenei 2009, June: Disputed Iranian presidential election 2009, September: Iran offers package of proposals on various international issues, barely mentions nuclear question 2009, September: Secret Fordow enrichment plant revealed 2009, October: U.S. Undersecretary Burns meets with Iranian negotiators and others in P5+1; negotiators in Vienna reach tentative deal on swap of LEU for TRR fuel

15. The story so far: key moments in the history of Iran’s nuclear program (IV) 2009, Nov-Dec: After domestic controversy, Iran proposes changes to TRR deal unacceptable to P5+1 2010, February: Iran announces it is enriching to 20%, ostensibly to provide TRR fuel in absence of deal 2010, June: Iran-Brazil-Turkey propose fuel swap deal – U.S. and others reject 2010, June: Additional UNSC sanctions (more U.S. and EU sanctions during 2010 also; Russia agrees no S-300) 2010, Dec.: New Iran P5+1 talks, no substantive progress 2011, May: Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant begins operation 2011, Nov.: Comprehensive IAEA report, including annex on “possible military dimension” 2012, Feb.: IAEA report on additional enrichment capacity, including to 20% at Fordow

16. Building, slowdown, acceleration, while the impasse goes on… Source: Institute for Science and International Security

17. The U.S. narrative • Iran’s “civil” nuclear programs is a figleaf for a weapons program – otherwise no need for enrichment • Iran threatens U.S. and world security – supports terrorism, threatens Israel, sponsors militias that kill U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, seeks to dominate the Gulf • P5+1 offers are very generous – Iran’s rejection of P5+1 promise of help on civilian nuclear energy makes clear that civil power is not Iran’s real goal • Iran has repeatedly violated its safeguards obligations, continues to conceal its nuclear weapons work • Iran has never been negotiating in good faith, has only “suspended” when it wasn’t technically ready to move forward • Iran is defying the entire international community

18. The Iranian narrative • Iran’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful, within NPT • Iran was forced into concealment by Western efforts to stymie nuclear supply • Iran needs nuclear power to avoid using up its valuable oil and gas, needs enrichment to fuel reactor if there’s a cutoff of supply – has post-79 experience with supply cutoffs • Iran has given the IAEA transparency far behind what it is obligated to provide, corrected all past issues – only remaining disagreements are over Western fabrications, in areas far beyond the IAEA’s mandate • Iran voluntarily suspended its enrichment and reprocessing activities – got nothing in return • Iran has the same rights as all other NPT members

19. The Iranian narrative (II) • Iran does not support terrorism; it supports legitimate social movements (Hezbollah, Hamas…) • Iran has not threatened or waged aggressive war against any other state for centuries • Much of the world supports Iran’s legitimate rights • The United States will never accept the very existence of the Islamic Republic – so no value to Iran of nuclear deal • The United States and Israel have waged an unrelenting campaign of threats and intimidation, and have manipulated the IAEA and the Security Council • The EU3 and the P5+1 have never negotiated with Iran in good faith – incentives package proposes to “discuss” benefits for Iran after Iran gives up all its cards

20. The European narrative • With 2003-2006 suspension, Europe had a major success in showing it can pull together as a team, play a leading international role • While hoping for more active U.S. participation, EU-3 secured U.S. backing for proposals • Iran negotiated in bad faith, simply strung out the talks to get maximum benefit while giving nothing up • Tougher sanctions are essential to get Iran to back down • Issues related to Iran’s other foreign policy behavior are more complex than the United States makes them out to be • Military strikes should be considered, but only as a last-ditch option

21. The Russian narrative • Iran, while sometimes annoying, is a legitimate player in the international system, with its own rights and interests that have to be addressed – and a legitimate recipient of arms sales and civil nuclear sales • Nuclear cooperation with Iran increases Russia’s ability to influence Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons • Iran should stop enrichment and buy a share in the International Enrichment Center at Angarsk, so that it can take part in the profits of enrichment without gaining any access to the technology • Sanctions are not likely to be effective – the only solution is a real deal that addresses Iran’s interests, as well as those of the United States and others • Unilateral U.S. military action (like Iraq) is unacceptable

22. The Chinese narrative • All issues between Iran and the West should be resolved through dialogue • The key issue is compliance with the NPT. While China would prefer that their be no enrichment in Iran, if Iran complies with the NPT, all other issues can be addressed through compromise • Sanctions are not likely to be effective; China opposes them • Unilateral U.S. military action (like Iraq) is unacceptable • The real solution is for the United States and Europe to offer Iran strong security guarantees and economic incentives, so it no longer feels it needs nuclear weapons • China, as a major player in the international system, supports nonproliferation, has supported the UN resolutions, and has participated in the P5+1 effort

23. Key questions for negotiators • What should you demand initially? • What should you be prepared to settle for? • What should you offer – or threaten – to convince the other side to give you some or all of what you want? Can you put together a package of carrots and sticks that’s big enough, and believable enough, to convince the other side? • What issues should you focus on, in what order? • Nuclear issue? • NPT compliance • Enrichment capability • Transparency/verification • Issues where there are common interests? • Counter-narcotics • Incidents at sea • Possibly Iraq, Afghanistan • Terrorism, Israel, human rights, U.S. sanctions and threats…

24. Facts any policy must cope with • Iran has ~8,000 centrifuges installed at Natanz • 20% enrichment is expanding • Iran has substantial enrichment knowledge – can’t be destroyed or negotiated away • Intense U.S.-Iranian hostility, distrust • U.S. has many issues with Iran – Iraq, Afghanistan, terrorism, Israel, etc. – going well beyond nuclear issue. And Iran has many issues with the United States • Limits what can be offered for nuclear deal (e.g., diplomatic recognition, security assurances) • Many other states – Europe, Russia, China, Israel, Gulf states, etc. – also have major interests at stake • Iran has huge reserves of oil and gas – impossible to completely isolate, exclude from world economy

25. Facts any policy must cope with (II) • Israel, Gulf states have major concerns over growing Iranian power, will push hard for their preferred outcomes • All outcomes will have an impact on nonproliferation regime, credibility of Security Council, and more • Iranian government is sclerotic, factionalized, legitimacy-challenged, has immense difficulty making hard choices • Negotiated deal would require giving Iranian advocates of compromise enough to convince Ayatollah Khamenei to say “yes” • No faction can afford to be seen as buckling to foreign pressure • Some factions do not believe compromise would bring any benefit • Iranian government has succeeded in framing issue as “colonial powers trying to take away our God-given right to technology” – makes compromise difficult • U.S. government also likely to face domestic (and international) difficulties making hard choices

26. Balancing objectives • U.S. objectives: • No Iranian nuclear weapons • To the extent still practicable, broad and verifiable gap between permitted nuclear activities and a nuclear weapons capability • Addressing – or at least not making worse in a nuclear deal – Iranian behavior on Iraq, terrorism, Israel, etc. • Iranian objectives: • Preserving regime, avoiding attack • Status and prestige as leader of developing, Islamic worlds • Recognition of its regional power and role • Economic development • Civilian nuclear energy • Nuclear weapons option (or more?) • Improving relations with Europe, the United States, others

27. What’s the alternative to a deal? • “BATNA” • Best alternative to a negotiated agreement • What is the U.S. BATNA? • What is the Iranian BATNA?

28. BATNA Applied in the Iran Case(Chart from Sebenius and Singh)

29. On balance, Iran’s nuclear program is most consistent with? • Peaceful purposes • Attaining nuclear weapons • Other