Hume’s Three Definitions of Belief

1. Hume’s Three Definitions of Belief William Sweet

2. 1. Introduction2. What is religious belief?3. Hume on reasonableness and evidence4. What is belief (for Hume)?5. Where does this account of belief lead us?6. How does Hume’s account fit with religious belief?7. Conclusion

3. 1. Introduction: Hume wrote several books/essays dealing with belief, faith, and reasonFour principal sources- Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)- A Treatise of Human Nature, anonymously (1739–40)- Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, a discussion of major philosophical claims that bear on religion (e.g., proofs, problem of evil, etc.) Started writing in 1750 but not completed until 1776, shortly before his death. Published posthumously – and anonymously – in 1779. - Natural History of Religion, written abt 1751; publ. 1757

4. 2. What is religious belief?Is it ‘belief concerning events, persons, bearing on religion’?- problems with this viewExamples: Jesus is the son of God Jesus is the son of Mary Jesus is not the son of God Muhammad is the final prophet of Allah The world came into existence 4.5 billion years ago The world came into existence in 4004 BCE Jesus had five fingers on each hand There will be a last judgement

5. H.H. Price (1899-1984)Distinction between Belief-in and Belief-thatBelief-in: “an attitude to a person, whether human or divine”I believe in Justin Trudeau, in my wife, in Jesus, scientific method, etc -- Feeling/sentiment, Trust, disposition to act, = faith?What is the role of evidence here? Belief-that: “an attitude to a proposition” I believe that Justin Trudeau is in Halifax, that my wife is 173 cm tall, that Jesus was male, scientific method establishes evolution What is the role of evidence here? Religious belief is at least a belief-in Belief-in may be (is?) basic

6. 3. Hume on reasonableness and evidence (recap)Demonstration – is the “more perfect species of knowledge” [XII, p. 112], though only “objects of the abstract sciences” are capable of demonstration. Matters of fact, such as matters dealing with the existence of things, “are incapable of demonstration” (p. 113). Proof – deals with those matters for which there is no room for doubt: ‘all men must die’ or that ‘the sun must rise tomorrow’Probabilities - concern those cases where there is a “superiority of chances for one side over another”; as this superiority increases, it “begets ... a higher degree of belief or assent” So, we ought to limit our knowledge claims accordingly.

7. 4. What is ‘belief’?Hume seems to have several different understandings of ‘belief’1. something voluntary or, at least, within the control of the believer"A wise man [...] proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experiences as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds with more caution; he weights the opposite experiments; he considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: To that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgement the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. (ECHU X, Pt. 1, p. 110)

8. What is ‘belief’?2. something not voluntary, a sentiment, ‘triggered’belief is “a firmer and stronger conception of an object than that which attends mere fictions of the imagination” (VI, para 3). - belief is (often) the result of a “concurrence of several views in one particular event” that “imprints the idea more strongly on the imagination; gives it superior force and vigour” (VI, para 3). This ‘superiority’ “begets immediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature, the sentimentof belief”.

9. What is ‘belief’?3. ‘natural belief’"The sceptic . . . must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, though he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless esteemed it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body ? but 'tis vain to ask, Whether there be body or not ? That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings." Treatise I, 4, 2, 1

10. What is ‘natural belief’?there are some things that we believe that are1. Non-rational – we can’t give arguments for them2. Not *founded* on sense experience or reason3. “Unavoidable” / necessary as a precondition of reasoning / action4. (Universally held) These are what we may call ‘beliefs of naïve common sense’

11. 5. Where does this account of belief lead us?Sense 1, belief as voluntaryIf beliefs are voluntary, and if we should believe only when we have evidence, and in proportion to the evidence… (evidentialism)then where does this lead us?a. we ought not believe [either for or against] the existence of anything for which we lack appropriate evidence

12. Sense 1: (‘the absence of evidence is the evidence of absence… at least, sometimes)“If someone were to assert that there is an elephant on the quad, then the failure to observe an elephant there would be good reason to think that there is no elephant there [For example] in the absence of evidence rendering the existence of some entity probable, we are justified in believing that it does not exist, provided that (1) it is not something that might leave no traces and (2) we have comprehensively surveyed the area where the evidence would be found if the entity existed.”

13. b. even if we have a reasonable or justified belief, it is not (necessarily) a true beliefThe Indian prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, that arose from a state of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and which bore so little analogy to those events, of which he had had constant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it. (ECHU X. 1, para 10)

14. c. we should not believe anything that goes beyond present evidences – e.g., general principles (e.g., causality, order, stability), future events, a self independent of memories, intellect, will, …“[F]rom what impression cou’d this idea [of a self] be derived? … But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv’d; and consequently there is no such idea” (Treatise I, 4, 6)

15. Sense 2, belief as triggered and as sentimenta belief is “a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression”, (T Book 1.Part 3. Section 7) and “a more vivid and intense conception of any idea” (T 1, 3, 10)This is how perception works- we see something (have an impression of it), have an idea of it, and – if it is forceful – react- this is the more basic sense of belief – it is where we start

16. - this is not voluntary- this is non-rational (though not ungrounded)So, if beliefs are ‘triggered’ what can we say?- [what these beliefs are about] is not a matter of (objective) truth or falsity, ‘right’ or ‘wrong’- it is a matter of “sentiment” / feeling / not knowledge (cognitive) or argument- it is subjective; it is (in the current usage) ‘true for me’

17. There is no way of assessing, independently of the believer, the appropriateness or inappropriateness – the reasonability and unreasonability – of the belief.Hume talks about morality/moral beliefs, aesthetics (beliefs concerning beauty) as ‘sentiments’

18. Can reason assess all evidence neutrally?No. "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions [sentiments], and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (Treatise II, iii, 3)- Reason is just another kind of belief (a “generalised belief”)- Reason is limited; in little position to judge neutrally- It produces (other) belief (bec in the imagination) BUT then, it is in terms of our existing beliefs that we judge our (other, voluntary) beliefs

19. Sense 3: natural beliefsWe can’t give arguments for them - in fact, they are inconsistent with argumentsNot *founded* on sense experience or reasonBut “unavoidable” / we need these beliefs in order to act in the world; can’t act without believing themUniversally heldSo, we can reasonably believe [have a natural propensity to believe] some things without reason / evidence

20. Examples of ‘natural beliefs’ for Hume:• Self (really not just a bundle of ideas and impressions)• The external world• Causality• Order (in the universe)• Design? “The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflexion, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion.” (Natural History of Religion, para 1) • God?

21. 6. How does this fit with the introductory comments on religious belief?Hume (ironically?) says that many of our beliefs depend on “faith”“It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions.” ECHU XII, para 7

22. When it comes to religion?Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure. ECHU X, ii, 27Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the immortality of souls, is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in reason, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid foundation is faith and divine revelation. Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived.” ECHU XII, iii, para 9

23. 7. Conclusion: So, how does this fit with the initial reflection on religious belief?1. some theological beliefs are ‘under our control’ / voluntary and cognitive2. But our most basic beliefs are not Some beliefs are sentiments – trust, but stronger Some basic beliefs are natural3. Basic beliefs are the ‘control’ mechanism for voluntary beliefs. They determine what is ‘reasonable.’ (So, possibly, for the believer) faith/religious belief is a basic belief that is reasonable but needs no ‘reason’ for it.

24. Thank you