Procedural Posture

1. Procedural Posture • Plaintiffs (Boddie) brought a class action suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. • Asked court to declare unconstitutional Connecticut statute requiring fees and costs for service of process in divorce actions. • Also requested an injunction that would allow plaintiffs, as well as others in their class, to proceed without paying fees. • District court denied both requests and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. • Held that the legislature, not the court, should handle this problem. • Plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.

2. The Argument • Arthur LaFrance represented appellants while working for the New • Haven Legal Assistance Association. • The Center on Social Welfare Policy & Law, the National Housing Law Project and Community Action for Legal Services, Inc. filed an amicus brief, as did the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. • Raymond Cannon represented appellees while serving as Assistant Attorney General in Connecticut. • The following states filed an amicus brief in support of appellees: New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota & Oregon.

3. Role of Legislature – Appellee • Regulation of entry fees for the Connecticut Superior Court is within the exclusive domain of the Connecticut legislature. • Courts cannot overturn legislation merely because it is harsh, unwise, or they would have done it another way. • The development of an in forma pauperis statute necessarily requires the use of skills more appropriate to the legislative function of government. • Connecticut is experimenting with innovative concepts as it develops in forma pauperis procedures.

4. Litigation Barrier - Appellants • The court costs of a divorce proceeding in Connecticut are a substantial barrier to litigation. • Divorce proceedings are initiated by writ, summons and complaint. Service fees vary ($15-$150) and the entry fee costs $45. It costs a minimum of $60 to petition for divorce. • These indigent appellants are barred from Connecticut courts by their inability to pay court costs. • Welfare funds do not include provision for legal fees. • The state may not abdicate its responsibility in the hope that charities will fill the void thus created.

5. State Interests – Appellee • The prepayment of court entry fees required by Connecticut general statutes is a constitutional exercise of sovereign power. • The entry fees are reasonably related to legitimate state interests. • The revenue generated is used to support the judicial system. • Entry fees have the classical effect of reducing the amount of frivolous litigation.

6. State Interests - Appellants • The relief sought by appellants could properly have been rendered by the court below. • The fees generate revenue for the state. • Filing fees constitute only one-tenth of the total revenue produced by the judicial system. • Allowing low-income people access to the court without paying a fee does not significantly reduce the amount of money generated. • The fees prevent frivolous litigation. • Fees only prevent a low-income person from filing a lawsuit, irrespective of its merits. • It’s unclear whether fees actually deter frivolous lawsuits brought by the wealthy. • Other ways to prevent frivolous lawsuits: • make abuse of the process a tort • verifications under oath could be required in all actions, with contempt punishments for false statements

7. Precedent – Appellee • The Court should maintain the traditional concept that civil litigants are responsible for the costs incidental to bringing a legal action. • Connecticut courts cannot waive payment of costs. • One sues in forma pauperis as a matter of privilege.

8. Police Power - Appellants • Connecticut’s requirement that these indigent appellants pay court costs which they cannot afford is not a permissible exercise of the police power. • A classification based upon economic discrimination is disfavored and must be both necessary and reasonably related to the objectives sought. • There is no necessity on rational basis for barring litigation by the poor. • Barring divorce actions has destructive consequences upon the family units of the poor.

9. Civil vs. Criminal – Appellee • The Griffin Doctrine should be limited to cases concerning the personal liberty of an accused. • There is no legal precedent to extend the Griffin Doctrine to civil litigation. • Divorce is not a right of sufficient magnitude to qualify for relief on the extraordinary grounds of the Griffin Doctrine. • The Griffin Doctrine is only justified in a criminal type proceeding where the state is an actual participant having an adversary interest. • Appellants claim that the relief in this case may be of a limited nature.

10. Civil vs. Criminal – Appellant • Only the State has kept appellants from its courts. The State, through its agents, is the real appellee here. This is exactly what Griffin involved. • Appellees’ contention that a voluntary act precludes constitutional safeguards hardly merits response. • Criminals in this country, by a voluntary act of crime, surround themselves with constitutional safeguards. • Appellees apparently favor those who break the law over those who keep it.

11. Due Process – Appellee • The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment only protects rights that are constitutionally guaranteed. • Divorce is not a constitutionally guaranteed right. • Divorce can only be granted by statutory authority.

12. Due Process - Appellants • Appellants were denied due process of laws when they were denied the opportunity to petition for redress of grievances. • The 1st Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances is incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. • The right of a poor person to petition for redress of grievances without payment of court costs is deeply rooted in the common law which preceded the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of due process.

13. Equal Protection – Appellee • Appellants are not denied equal protection. • The Equal Protection Clause does not require a state to finance any of the expenses of civil litigation incurred by indigent parties. • “In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the ‘Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety of because in practice it results in some inequality.’” Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 68.

14. Equal Protection – Appellant • Appellants were denied equal protection of the laws when they were denied access to the courts solely because of their poverty. • The Equal Protection Clause forbids economic discrimination in the extension of significant rights. • The rights of divorce, remarriage and procreation, all involved here, are sufficiently significant to come within the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause.

15. Majority Opinion • Only way to divorce was through the court system; thus, the state played a primary role and monopolized the means through which a couple could divorce. • A couple may agree to separate, but they cannot absolve themselves of the legal obligations that attend to the marital relationship. • Notes high level of importance placed • upon marriage in society

16. Majority Opinion, continued • The fee requirement, on its face, offends due process by barring an individual’s right to be heard. • Distinguishes Griffin • While in Griffin the transcript could be waived as a convenient but not necessary predicate to court access, here the State invariably imposes the costs as a measure of allocating its judicial resources.

17. Brennan Concurrence Connecticut statute violated indigent parties’ due process and equal protection rights. Brennan stated that the majority opinion did not go far enough when defining the extent of due process rights.

18. Douglas Concurrence • Should have been decided based on “the principles developed in the line of cases marked by Griffin v. Illinois.” • Due Process Clause had “proven very elastic in the hands of judges.” • Mentioned fishing licenses and bond requirements to prevent eviction, asked whether the indigent might be excused from paying those fees as well.

19. Douglas, continued • The Equal Protection Clause, while not mathematically precise, contains more definitive guidelines. • Discrimination based on wealth should be prohibited along the same lines as discrimination based on religion or race.

20. Black Dissent • Marriage is entirely within control of the states, and by extension so is divorce. • States possessed a unique interest in marriage, and the statute requiring fees did not violate the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.

21. Black Dissent, continued • Black used textual argument to say that his fellow justices cannot create new rights that are not in the Constitution. • People have the sole power to amend the Constitution through their legislature. • Griffin pertains to criminal cases, not civil cases. • Divorce is a private dispute that does not involve the government as a party. It does not deny life, liberty or property as opposed to criminal punishment.