MNR TYPE-D EMERGENCY PLAN REVIEW 2012 March

1. MNR TYPE-D EMERGENCY PLAN REVIEW 2012 March

2. What is the Type D Procedure? • The Type D Procedure is the part of the reactor emergency plan that is implemented when there is felt to be a risk of significant releases from the facility. • a situation that could lead to an effective dose in excess of 1 mSv (100 mrem) • or the introduction of a gamma radiation field greater than 0.25 mSv/hr (25 mrem/hr) at 25 meters from the Reactor Building. • Builds on the plan in place for > 50 years • Other procedures (Type B and C) under the emergency plan address possible incidents confined to the facility. • There has never been a need to implement the Type B, C or D procedures.

3. CNSC Requirements Ontario Nuclear Emergency Plan Part VIII Type D Procedure National and International Standards McMaster Crisis Management Plan Hamilton Crisis Plan

4. What the Procedure Addresses • Activate the reactor and University emergency orgs. • Notify off-campus emergency organizations • Control the area surrounding the reactor (The Controlled Area) • Manage the emergency and control the reactor • Assess releases and determine protective actions • Implement Protective Actions in the Controlled Area • Communicate Status and actions • Terminate the response when the emergency is over

5. TYPE-D PLAN: Key Features • The Emergency Planning Zone for MNR is the central campus area – NO protective actions expected to be required outside this area. This is based on an ANSI standard for research reactor EP. • The approach is predictive – MNR will activate the plan at the earliest reasonable point if significant fuel damage appears likely. It may be that no releases actually occur.

6. Emergency Planning Zone • Basis: ANSI/ANS-15.16 Emergency Planning for Research Reactors – Internationally recognized standard. • “Area for which offsite emergency planning is performed to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an accident.” • EPZ set to include areas where there is a possibility of exceeding 10 mSv (1 rem) effective dose and 50 mSv (5 rem) thyroid dose • Defaults “based on highly conservative calculations” • For reactors up to 10 MW  EPZ is100 meter radius • MNR licensed to 5 MW, normally operates at 2 – 3 MW • MNR has a full containment shell – this is not credited in determining the EPZ (conservative).

7. Emergency Planning Zone – Per ANSI Standard

8. EPZ and Initial Controlled Area

9. EPZ and Initial Controlled Area

11. Recovery Normal Operations Fuel Damage Release Containment Failure Initiating Event Symptoms Type D Emergency will be declared in this range

12. Predictive Approach – Conservative Plan Activation • Initiating events that may lead to Type D Emergency have been identified. • Large Pool Leak • Flow Blockage • Other unspecified (radiation or contamination outside facility) • Indicators that Type D may occur identified • Aids staff in making early determination that Plan should be activated • The initiating events are so rare that we will start evaluating need for plan activation when they occur – expected to provide early warning, possibly a “false alarm”

13. Protective Actions • Early Evacuation of Controlled Area • before any release • no contamination monitoring of evacuees • preferred when possible • Sheltering within Controlled Area • stay inside buildings – reduces exposure and contamination potential • Evacuation within Controlled Area • post-release • must monitor all evacuees prior to leaving controlled area • Thyroid Blocking for Emergency Workers • administer KI tablets • will be available if required for emergency workers inside the controlled area

14. What’s in a mSv? • About 1/10th of a Whole Body CT scan • 12 Chest X-Rays • About 40 Toronto – Vancouver airline flights • Moving to Colorado from Boston (annual dose). • Regulatory Dose Limit for a member of the public

15. Protective Action Levels From Province of Ontario Nuclear Emergency Plan Part 1 1 KI will be available if required for those working in the Controlled Area

16. Emergency Dose Limits For Workers Radiation Protection Regulations: During the control of an emergency and the consequent immediate and urgent remedial work, the effective dose and the equivalent dose may exceed the applicable dose limits prescribed by sections 13 and 14, but the effective dose shall not exceed 500 mSv and the equivalent dose received by the skin shall not exceed 5 000 mSv. Does not apply in respect of pregnant NEWs May be exceeded by a person acting voluntarily to save or protect human life

17. Key Players in Early Emergency Response • MNR Emergency Organization • Management of the Controlled Area and the Reactor • McMaster Crisis Management Group • Management of Campus • Interface to public and organizations / regulators • City of Hamilton Emergency Control Group • Coordinate provision of assistance to University • Any off-campus protective actions (none expected)

19. Access Control Point Team Perimeter Teams Plume Assessment Team Emergency Control Centre MNR Controlled Area Survey Team Operations (Controlled Area)

21. MNR Emergency Organization • Emergency Control Centre • Overall control/coordination • Run by MNR Emergency Director • Interface to University CMG – Information and resources • Decisions regarding actions inside Controlled Area • Advise regarding actions outside of Controlled Area • Provide information and status to CMG • Nominal Location – NRB G101. Alternates –UCC, JHE, IAHS

22. MNR Emergency Organization – cont. • Reactor Operations Team • Manage emergency in facility • Provide status/information to ECC • Reactor Operations Personnel + Radiation Surveyor • Perimeter Team • Post Controlled Area perimeter with radiation hazard tape • Patrol perimeter – prevent unauthorized entry/exit • Provide continual surveys at perimeter • One Security Officer and one Radiological Assessor per team

23. MNR Emergency Organization – cont. • Controlled Area Survey Team(s) • Conduct surveys inside Controlled Area • Implement protective actions inside Controlled Area (per ECC) • Provide data to ECC • Two Radiological Assessors per team • Access Control Point Team • Control entry to and exit from Controlled Area • Contamination monitoring and decon as required on exit • Exposure control and registration of emergency workers entering • Collection point for resources and personnel • Nominal location – McMaster Accelerator Lab • Four Radiological Assessors

24. MNR Emergency Organization – cont. • Plume Assessment Team • Conduct surveys outside Controlled Area – verify absence of significant effects • Collect and analyze environmental samples • Provide data to ECC • 1 Radiological Assessor and one Driver per Team • Counting Room Team • Sample analysis and Counting, Filter collection • Specially trained Radiological Assessor • Ventilation Control Team • Shut down ventilation to buildings in the Controlled Area if directed by Emergency Director • Physical Plant UCC Staff

25. Resources Two Security Officers with Vehicles Two UCC Personnel for Ventilation Control Also require  - To be trained as Radiological Assessors – able to perform field measurements

26. Staffing Requirements

27. McMaster University CMG • Overall responsibility for emergency management for the rest of University • Provide logistical support to MNR organization • Decisions for protective actions on-campus - outside the Controlled Area (none expected) • Interface with City of Hamilton ECG – information, advice on protective actions, support • Interface with Regulatory Agencies • Interface with Hamilton Health Sciences • Provide information to public/media

28. City of Hamilton Emergency Control Group • Per Province of Ontario Nuclear Emergency Plan – Part VIII • Any protective actions required off-campus • Support to McMaster if requested (e.g. fire fighting, police to assist in access control) • Information to public and media • Interface with Province

29. Province (Emergency Measures Ontario) • Monitor progress of emergency • Provide assistance as requested by City • Take over management of off-site response if requested by City (Per Part VIII of Province of Ontario Nuclear Emergency Plan)

30. Type D Walkthrough • There is NO credible accident scenario that leads to significant off-site radiological doses. • Events identified in the safety analysis have frequencies well below 10-6 per year. That is, there is less than a one in a million chance of occurrence in a given year. • However the incredible events have been reviewed and the hypothetical consequences determined. • One EXAMPLE scenario from the Safety Analysis has been chosen as a basis for this walk-through. It is a highly unlikely event but is useful as a demonstration of how the plan will function. • Note – even in this event, the dose to the most exposed individual outside the Controlled Area is about 0.5 mSv (50 mrem)

31. Scenario • During routine operation on the evening shift, an unspecified accident at a beam port facility causes a large rupture in the beam tube liner. • Reactor cooling water starts to leak through a 40 cm2 hole in the side of the pool • The reactor is staffed by two operators (minimum staffing) • It is 18:00 on a weekday during term – the campus is crowded with evening classes

32. Characteristics of Selected Scenario • Everything that can go wrong –goes wrong – at the same time • Pool drains over period of time depending on size of leak, eventually exposing core • Crane failure prevents isolating core in second pool • Exposed fuel partially melts releasing fission products • Containment impaired over first two hours of release by unspecified compressed air in-leakage • Largest releases and doses of examined scenarios • Delay provides time to activate emergency plan and evacuate Controlled Area prior to release

34. Scenario - Initiation

36. Recovery Normal Operations Fuel Damage Release Containment Failure Initiating Event Symptoms Type D Emergency will be declared in this range

38. Access Control Point – Personnel Monitoring Crisis Management Group Access Control Point – Emergency Worker Unit Controlled Area Survey Teams Emergency Control Centre Plume Assessment Team Perimeter Survey Teams

39. Communications Cycle • As required and at least every thirty minutes, the Emergency Director will • Receive an update from the Reactor Operations Team • Progress of emergency, planned releases • Receive an update from the Protective Action Manager • Radiological conditions in controlled area and plume, recommended protective actions • Receive an update from the Access Control Point Manager • Status, contamination level on evacuees • Provide an Update to the Crisis Management Group advisor • Progress of emergency, radiological conditions in CA and plume, Protective Actions implemented in Controlled Area, Protective Actions recommended outside the CA (for implementation or communication to Hamilton ECG and HHS), request for assistance. • Crisis Management Group provides updates to Contact Organizations and Media.

41. Siren Voice Message Examples • NUCLEAR EMERGENCY – EVACUATION • Attention.  There is an emergency condition at the nuclear reactor.  Please evacuate all buildings in the Controlled Area immediately and proceed to a safe location outside the yellow tape.  Follow the directions of Security and Health Physics personnel.  There is an emergency condition at the nuclear reactor. • NUCLEAR EMERGENCY – SHELTER IN PLACE • Attention.  There is an emergency condition at the nuclear reactor.  Remain Inside and shelter in place until you receive further directions from Security or Health Physics Personnel.  There is an emergency condition at the nuclear reactor.  Shelter in place.

45. Consequences • Release terminated after 30 days • Highest dose impact for a person standing at boundary of Emergency Planning Zone throughout release about 0.5 mSv • normal background doses are about 3 mSv per year • All doses outside of Controlled Area are less than lower Protective Action Levels • Probable doses to members of MNR workforce at or above occupational dose limits, but less than emergency dose limits • Many non-radiological consequences for University

46. Flow Blockage • Limiting estimate – three assemblies blocked while reactor continues to operate • 48 plates severely damaged • Limiting Source Term: • 14% of short lived noble gases • 11% of long lived noble gases • 7% of radioiodines • Leakage from containment starts 1.2 hours after isolation – due to assumed pressurized air leakage. • Assumes reactor continues to operate • Large Servo Error Scram Fails • Short Period Scram Fails • Fission Product Monitor Scram Fails

48. Containment tested annually OLC – corresponds to 0.8% of free volume per hour at pressure of 0.5 psi Safety analysis based on leak rate of 1 % per hour (86.4 m3 per hour) at 0.5 psi It is assumed that for first 2 hours, containment is pressurized by instrument air – later by unspecified source and gas dewars (1 kg hr-1) Reference Leakage

49. Scenario 2: Flow Blockage - Initiation