Animal Rights

1. Animal Rights

2. In this lecture… • Speciesism • Are humans unique? • Marginal cases • Do animals have rights?

3. Speciesism • We do not treat non-human animals in the same way we treat human beings. We kill animals for food, keep them confined and use them in painful experiments. • What is the relevant difference between humans and animals that justifies this difference in treatment?

4. Speciesism • It is wrong to punch people because doing so hurts them. If that is enough of a reason not to do it, why do we think that we are morally justified in causing pain and suffering to animals?

5. Speciesism • Speciesism is a prejudice for one’s own species and against other species. It involves the assigning of different moral status, value or rights to different beings on the basis of their species membership.

6. Speciesism • The ‘moral status’ of a being or entity answers the question whether the being or entity is morally considerable. • To have moral status is to be the kind of being towards which moral agents have, or can have, moral obligations.

7. Speciesism • Speciesism assumes that non-human animals have lower moral status, or no moral status at all. As such, animals are often abused, exploited, or treated as mere objects for human use.

8. Speciesism • Speciesism, in other words, entails unequal treatment of humans and non-human animals. • According to the principle of formal equality, however, unequal treatment is not justified unless some morally relevant difference exists.

9. Speciesism • Some believe that speciesism (i.e. the unequal treatment of humans and animals due to unequal moral status) can be justified because humans are superior to non-human animals in morally significant ways.

10. Speciesism • If we value the lives and interests of human beings more than the lives and interests of non-human animals, this is because we value certain characteristics or capacities that are uniquely ‘human’ (i.e. not possessed by other animals).

11. Speciesism • The most obvious property shared among all human beings that excludes all non-human animals is our membership of a particular biological group: the species Homo sapiens.

12. Speciesism • However, from an ethical perspective, group membership (or group identity) alone has no moral significance. • Like racism and sexism, speciesism involves unequal treatment on the basis of species membership, which is not morally justified.

13. Speciesism • People who oppose speciesism argue that a difference of species is not a morally relevant difference –inthe same way that a difference of race (or sex) is not a morally relevant difference between human beings.

14. Speciesism • Counterargument: Racism and sexism are wrong because there are no morally relevant differences between the sexes or races. Between people and animals, however, there are significant differences.

15. Speciesism • For example, it is wrong to deny educational opportunities to blacks or women on the grounds that they are incapable of benefitting from those opportunities. • The same reasoning, however, does not apply to cows, or dogs, or even chimpanzees.

16. Speciesism • Speciesists may argue that we humans are more self-aware, and more capable of choosing our own actions than other animals. This enables us to think and act morally, and so entitles us to a higher moral status.

17. Speciesism • Another argument in favor of speciesism is that it is ‘natural’ to treat one’s own species favorably. • Almost all animals treat members of their own species better than those of other species.

18. Speciesism • Faced with a difficult choice between saving a human and saving an animal, most people would probably react in a speciesist way. • A child and a dog are trapped in a fire. You can only save one of them. Which one will you save?

19. Are humans unique? • What is distinctive about humanity such that humans are thought to have a higher moral status than non-humans? • Is there any moral justification for unequal treatment of humans and non-human animals?

20. Are humans unique? • Anthropocentrism is a form of speciesism.It is the belief that we humans are the central or most significant species on the planet (in the sense that we humans are the only species that have moral status and intrinsic value).

21. Are humans unique? • The term ‘anthropocentric’ means ‘human-centered.’ • The basic assumption of anthropocentrism is that the natural world (i.e. plants, animals, rivers, mountains, etc.) has value only insofar as it serves human ends or human interests.

22. Are humans unique? • From the perspective of anthropocentrism, nature is just a means, not an end in itself. • The natural world, on this view, does not have intrinsic value.It only has instrumental value for us, i.e. it exists as a means to human ends.

23. Are humans unique? • According to anthropocentric reasoning, non-human animals are part of the natural world, and as such do not have intrinsic value. • The question is: Are we humans also part of the natural world?

24. Are humans unique? • The idea that humans are in some way special or set apart from the rest of nature has its roots in religion, which often depictsman as God’s special creation, the only creature endowed with a soul.

25. Are humans unique? • French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650) suggests that non-human animals have no moral status because they have no souls. • For Descartes, animal are automata, or ‘machines of nature’. His view of animals is a classic expression of anthropocentrism.

26. Are humans unique? • According to Descartes, because the soul is necessary to consciousness, animals cannot feel pain or pleasure. • We now know that Descartes is wrong. Many animals do feel pain and pleasure, and some species are ‘conscious’ in the sense that they engage in purposeful behavior.

27. Are humans unique? • From a biological point of view, humans are members of the species Homo sapiens. • But this is irrelevant from the moral point of view. Species membership, as said earlier, is not a morally relevant characteristic.

28. Are humans unique? • Those who believe in Darwinian evolution think of humans as basically the same as other animals. • Geneticists tell us that we humans share much of our DNA with other organisms. The differences between humans and other animals are more a matter of degree than of kind.

29. Are humans unique? • The genetic differences between human beings and our closest evolutionary relatives – chimpanzees – are proportionately very small: human beings and chimpanzees have approximately 98.4 percent of their genes in common.

30. Are humans unique? • Some believe that humans are morally considerable because of the distinct human capacities we possess. • Capacities such as thinking, planning and reasoning distinguish humans from animals as these capacities are believed to be uniquely ‘human.’

31. Are humans unique? • Most important of all, humans are moral agents in the sense we can make judgments about what is right and what is wrong. • Non-human animals are not moral agents. They cannot make moral judgments and therefore cannot be held responsible for wrongdoings.

32. Are humans unique? • We are different from other animals because of our rational nature, our superior mental capacity, and our roles as moral agents. • It is in virtue of these characteristics that humans are regarded as ‘persons’, and only persons possess the real dignity that is deserving of full moral respect.

33. Are humans unique? • Counterargument [1]: Scientific evidence has accumulated that many animals possess mental capacities that once thought were unique to human. Gorillas and chimpanzees, for example, exhibit abstract reasoning powers and have the capacity to communicate through language.

34. Are humans unique? • Counterargument [2]: Many social animals, such as primates, dolphins and whales, have been known to exhibit moral behavior and characteristics: attachment and bonding, cooperation and mutual aid, conflict resolution, and awareness of the social rules of the group.

35. Are humans unique? • There is strong evidence in other animals of reconciliation and consolation after conflict – kissing, embracing and grooming for example, to restore social bonds. Like humans, they cooperate and form social ties.

36. Are humans unique? • Some intelligent non-human animals, such as dolphins and chimps, have similar mental capacities as humans. Do you think that these animals should be granted personhood status? Do you think they should have the same rights as human persons?

37. Marginal cases • Some philosophers argue that while humans are different in a variety of ways from one another and from other animals, these differences do not provide a philosophical justification for denying non-human animals moral consideration.

38. Marginal cases • What is it that really differentiates humans morally from animals? • Most of us, if asked this question, would initially respond by citing some mental capacities, for example, self-consciousness, rationality, autonomy, ability touse language to communicate, etc.

39. Marginal cases • The problem with this response is that, for each of these capacities, there are some human beings who lack it. • Does it imply that those human beings who lack these capacities are not entitled to the same moral status and rights as other humans?

40. Marginal cases • If rationality, intelligence and language, etc. are necessary conditions for moral consideration, should human infants, the severely retarded and brain-damaged humans be excluded from moral consideration?

41. Marginal cases • If human infants, the senile, the comatose, and the mentally handicapped have moral status, animals should, too, have moral status because there is no known morally relevant capacity that those ‘marginal humans’ have that animals lack.

42. Marginal cases • The ‘argument from marginal cases’ is a philosophical argument challenging the view that only humans have superior moral status. • If ‘marginal humans’ deserve the same moral consideration as ‘normal’ human beings, why not animals too?

43. Marginal cases • Consider a cow. We ask why it is acceptable to kill this cow for food –we might claim, for example, that the cow has no concept of ‘self’ and therefore it cannot be wrong to kill it. • However, many small children may also lack this same concept of ‘self’.

44. Marginal cases • So if we accept the self-concept criterion, then we must also accept that killing children is acceptable for exactly the same reason as it is acceptable to killing cows, which is absurd. • Sothe concept of ‘self’ cannot be a relevant criterion.

45. Marginal cases • For any criterion or set of criteria (e.g. rationality, autonomy, self-awareness) there exists some marginalhumans who are mentally deficient in some way which would inevitably entail the exclusion of them form having moral status.

46. Marginal cases • If we are justified in denying moral status to animals, then we are justified in denying moral status to marginal humans. • We are not justified in denying moral status to marginal humans. Thus, we are not justified in denying moral status to animals.

47. Marginal cases • The argument from marginal cases requires us to ‘treat like cases alike’, but babies, the intellectually impaired and the senile currently have rights that animals do not have. • Thus, to avoid the charge of speciesism or anthropocentrism, we have to give the same rights to animals.

48. Marginal cases • Counterargument [1]: Most of us believe that society (families, government, charities, etc.) has the duty totake care of the needs of every baby, every mentally impaired person, etc. Does it imply that society has the duty to take care of the needs of every animal?

49. Marginal cases • We feel a special obligation to care for babies and the handicapped members of our own species,who cannot survive in this world without such care. In contrast, most animals manage very well on their own, despite their lower intelligence and lesser capacities, and therefore do not require special care from us.

50. Marginal cases • Counterargument [2]: Those who reject the argument from marginal cases may argue that only persons or moral agents can have moral status and moral rights. We grant rights to human infants because they will become moral agents and therefore deserve our respect.