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EECS 690. April 9. A top-down approach:. This approach is meant to generate a rule set from one or more specific ethical theories.
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EECS 690 April 9
A top-down approach: • This approach is meant to generate a rule set from one or more specific ethical theories. • Wallach and Allen start off pessimistic about the viability of this approach, but point out that adherence to rules is an aspect of morality that must still be captured.
The Big Picture Theories (in Western thought) • Utilitarianism • Deontology • What will be the authors’ questions about these theories is what the computability requirements would be for each. This approach may shed a unique light on the practice of morality itself.
Consequentialism: • Utilitarianism (a subset of consequentialism) might initially appeal to us because of Bentham’s focus on calculability. • James Gips, in 1995, supplied this list of computational requirements for a consequentialist robot: • A way of describing the situation in the world • A way of generating possible actions • A means of predicting the situation that would result if an action were taken given the current situation • A method of evaluating a situation in terms of its goodness or desirability
Some difficulties: • How can one assign numbers to something as subjective as happiness? • Do we aim for total or average happiness? • What are the morally relevant features of any given situation? (People, animals, ecosystems?) • How far/wide should the calculation of effect go? • How much time is a moral agent allowed to devote to the decision-making process? • Note that these are not only problems generated while thinking about the computability of moral theories, they are problems that concern peoples’ application of these moral theories, and they are issues that have not been widely settled, and not for lack of discussion.
A note: • The authors do a good job of avoiding the question “how do humans do this?” when discussing ethical algorithms and behaviors. It may well be that general human behavior is not a good model to emulate for ethical systems. • This raises the question of what standard to hold ethical systems to. Do we tolerate the same range of moral failure among these systems? These are questions that might fit here, but for the sake of organization are addressed later in the book.
Asimov’s Laws of Robotics • A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. • A robot must obey orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law • A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws. (Later, a Zeroth law was added: A robot may not harm humanity, or, by inaction, allow humanity to come to harm)
Laws of Robotics • Asimov was really serious about this, and was (I think foolishly) optimistic about the usefulness of robotic laws as stated. (Asimov’s short essay on the robotic laws forthcoming on the Further Resources section) • This doesn’t fit with consequentialist theories very well because of its reliance on special duties • The zeroth law is hopelessly vague for an action-guiding principle, and the first law alone can generate conflicts. • There may be a real pressing difficulty with negative responsibility
Specific versus Abstract • Specific rules are very easy to apply, but have limited usefulness in novel situations. Still, perhaps part of what ethical systems require is a few specific rules for specific circumstances, though these alone would not be sufficient. • Abstract rules are more generally useful, as they allow adaptation, but are correspondingly difficult to apply.
The Categorical Imperative • Act only as you could will that your maxim become universal law. • A computer would need to appreciate: • a goal • a maxim (a behavior-guiding means to the goal) • an understanding of the implications for achievement of the goal by making the maxim universal • Lying, for example, could not be a universal law, because its goals would be thwarted by its being universalized. (This provides a problem, according to critics of Kant.)
Language vagueness and morality • Our language is full of words that are vague but that have clear applications and misapplications. (e.g. ‘baldness’ is a vague concept, but Captain Picard IS bald, and the members of the band ZZ Top are not) • Perhaps by focusing on the clear applications of moral rules, we might achieve something useful for the less clear cases.