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Ending Civil Wars: Determinants of Implementation Success

Ending Civil Wars: Determinants of Implementation Success. April 2, 2001 Hoover Institution. Overview. The Project The Findings Recommendations. List of Cases. Failed Partial Success Success Angola, 92-93 Bosnia and Herze- El Salvador,

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Ending Civil Wars: Determinants of Implementation Success

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  1. Ending Civil Wars:Determinants of Implementation Success April 2, 2001 Hoover Institution

  2. Overview • The Project • The Findings • Recommendations

  3. List of Cases FailedPartial SuccessSuccess Angola, 92-93 Bosnia and Herze- El Salvador, govina, 95-00 93-95 Angola, 94-98 Cambodia, 91-93 Guatemala, 92-98 Rwanda, 93-94 Lebanon, 91-00 Mozambique, 92-94 Somalia, 92-93 Liberia, 90-99 Namibia, 89 Sri Lanka, 87-88 Nicaragua, 89-91 Sierra Leone, 98 Zimbabwe, 1980

  4. Puzzle 1:What constitutes an adequate security “guarantee”? N U M B E R S O F T R O O P S < 2,500 2,500-7,500 7,500 – 60,000 O U T C O M E Success Partial Success Failure

  5. Puzzle 2:Which cases get the most international attention? Mission Years Total Expenditure

  6. Puzzle 3 Given a world of limited resources and attention, which of the following tasks would you prioritize when implementing a peace agreement? Human Rights? Local Capacity Building? Disarmament? Demobilization? Elections? Refugee Repatriation? Police and Judicial Reform?

  7. It’s simple to predict when implementation will succeed: when it is easy and when there are lots of resources.

  8. Conflict Score • More than 2 parties • Disposable Resources • No Agreement/Coerced Agreement • Collapsed State • Likely Spoilers • Hostile Neighbors • >50,000 soldiers • Secession

  9. Cases By Difficulty (From Most to Least Difficult) Sierra Leone Bosnia Liberia Sri Lanka Cambodia Lebanon Somalia Angola I Angola II Zimbabwe Rwanda Mozambique El Salvador Nicaragua Guatemala Namibia

  10. Willingness Score • Great Power/Regional Power Interest • Resource Commitment • Risk Lives

  11. Interest & Difficulty: Case Outcomes Lebanon Cambodia Nicaragua Guatemala El Salvador Bosnia Liberia Namibia Sierra Leone I Mozambique Zimbabwe Sri Lanka Rwanda Angola I Somalia Angola II

  12. …It means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly, but able to pose a credible deterrent threat, in contrast to the symbolic and non-threatening presence that characterizes traditional peacekeeping. United Nations forces for complex operations should be sized and configured so as to leave no doubt in the minds of would-be spoilers as to which of the two approaches the Organization has adopted. - Brahimi Report

  13. Peacekeeping Expenditures Total Expenditure (millions) Expenditure Per capita Mission Population

  14. Kosovo and the DRC

  15. “If we had gone to the Security Council three months after Somalia, I can assure you no government would have said, “Yes, here are our boys for an offensive action in Rwanda.” - Iqbal Riza

  16. “There is no way I or anyone in this situation can presume you are dealing with a party out to dupe you. We came in believing that each side was talking in good faith.” - Oluyemi Odeniji SRSG, Sierra Leone May 14, 2000

  17. “A key to understanding the failure of the Lusaka Accords is to unravel how the U.N. officials could certify UNITA compliance with cantoning its troops and demobilizing its army, while unofficially acknowledging that UNITA withheld 15-25,000 soldiers.” - Angola case study

  18. “You can’t go to the Security Council and say, ‘We think Indonesia is going to implement a scorched-earth policy and we need a foreign intervention now.’ The politics of the council are such that you can’t paint a worse-case scenario.” - Unnamed Diplomat

  19. “I deeply regret that we were unable to prevent the senseless bloodshed of August and September. But if we compare the prospect now with that of two years ago, we see that East Timor is one more case where time and patient diplomacy have brought hope to what had been a hopeless situation.” - Kofi Annan December 14, 1999

  20. Policy Recommendations • Need to treat great/regional power interest as hard constraint • Without great/regional power interest, don’t do the hard cases • Need for better strategic assessment concerning case difficulty • If there are spoils, spoilers, and hostile neighbors, don’t implement unless you have the capability to manage them • Need for intelligence gathering and analysis capability • Need for contingency planning

  21. Given a world of limited resources and attention, which of the following tasks would you prioritize when implementing a peace agreement? Human Rights? Local Capacity Building? Disarmament? Demobilization? Elections? Refugee Repatriation? Police and Judicial Reform?

  22. Policy Recommendations: Subgoals Ambitions must be commensurate with resources and permitted strategies Priority in implementation should go to demobilization of soldiers and demilitarization of politics Reconceptualize relationship between democracy and human rights and peace implementation Pursue civilian security and local capacity building

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