Stability, Security and Development

1. Stability, Security and Development GP3200 August 13, 2013 Security, Civil Affairs II Dr. Robert E. Looney relooney@nps.edu

2. Today • Post-Conflict Success Stories (from August 8) • Rand – Factors Relating to Peace • Rand Case Study, El Salvador • Civil Affairs Team in Kenya • The Security Dilemma • Iraq Case Study – Social Capital and Criminal Gangs • World Bank, Assessment of Afghanistan • Extra • Rand Assessment of Factors Affecting Peace (Rand approach towards assessing the factors affecting peace, the security situation and the likelihood of renewed fighting)

3. The Search for Progress I • Failed State assessment provides one picture of many parts of the world. However picture not that bleak: • In past two decades, improvements in quality of life across the developing world have demonstrated that progress in living standards is not only possible but also frequent • New studies show that progress can come in many forms and even in the most challenging contexts • One measure of progress the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – useful quantitative framework, but does not adequately capture the distribution of progress across society, the sustainability of progress over time or subjective conceptions of progress itself. • The measures summarized below try to capture these elements. Countries classified as: • Stars • The surprises • The Potentials • The Conundrums

4. Sector Definitions of Progress

5. Development Progress by Country and Sector

6. The Search for Progress II • The Stars • Sustained progress for more than two decades • Thailand – successful transformation from an agrarian economy dependent on primary exports to an economy based largely on manufacturing and services • Vietnam – progress broad improving across multiple sectors at same time. • Impressive reductions in poverty (from 58% to 15% between 1993 and 2008 with • improvements in human development – under-five mortality declined from 56 to 14 deaths per 1,000 births between 1990 and 2008 • problem strong progress came with rising inequality both in income and human development – widening gaps between rural and urban regions, between wealthy and poor and between ethnic minority groups and the rest of the population

7. The Search for Progress III • The Stars (contd.) • Mauritius in contrast to Vietnam has managed to grow rapidly while at the same time reducing income inequality • Bangladesh has achieved dramatic reductions in child mortality, in particular among the lower income groups • The Surprises • These countries exemplify progress that has emerged against the odds. • Impressive improvements have been made in countries • recently devastated by crisis and war (Cambodia, El Salvador, Eritrea), • with ongoing conflict (Somaliland); • with highly inaccessible topography (Laos); • and with challenging political situations (Eritrea).

8. The Search for Progress IV • The Surprises (contd.) • Cambodia—remarkable comeback from devastating genocide under the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979) and years of instability which resulted in the killing of up to a quarter of the population: • Education – once considered one of the region’s best – was destroyed. • Schools were closed, universities left to decay and members of the educated class were killed or fled • An estimated 75% of teachers, 96% of university students and 67% of all primary and secondary school pupils were killed or died of overwork • Nevertheless Cambodia is not moving towards universal primary enrolment, while also making substantial strides in access to secondary education and in efforts to improve quality

9. The Search for Progress IV • The Surprises (contd.) • Rwanda, by 1994 after four years of civil war and genocide was in a state of almost total collapse. • Health, infrastructure and human capital were almost completely destroyed, and thousands of people were injured or displaced • In a period of only 16 years, and despite poverty remaining extremely high (around 60% of people live below the poverty line), the country has made significant progress: • especially in health, life expectancy has doubled and under-five mortality has declined by more than half • Somaliland: Many stories of emergence from conflict involve successful transitions of power. • Somaliland found an innovative solution to power sharing, combining traditional and modern approaches of governance -- the Beel system and Sharia Law together with “modern” governance institutions.

10. The Search for Progress V • The Surprises (contd.) • Laos – small, landlocked, rugged and largely subsistence-oriented country managed to improve its sanitation coverage from 18% in 1995 to 53% in 2008. • This places the country second in terms of absolute progress and first in terms of relative progress in the world. • The Potentials – countries that have made improvements rapidly over a limited period of time – not clear yet if this can be maintained over the longer term. • Progress in this group is less stable and often lacks the diversification aspect present in some of the success stories. • Malawi has enjoyed seven years of uninterrupted growth driven mainly by the agricultural sector • Burkina Faso has had improvements in urban water supply, but these have been largely confined to the capital city although plans for expansion to other areas are underway

11. The Search for Progress VI • The Potentials (contd.) • The potentials reflect improvements that may not have stabilized fully but represent a great opportunity for sustained long-term progress. • A somewhat more ambiguous picture emerges in cases in which improvements have not yet affected all regions, sectors, or wider development outcomes • The stories often involve three steps forward, two steps backward and one step sideways • Indonesia had governance improvements that included • comprehensive reforms in formal state institutions (electoral, parliamentary, financial, judicial etc) and devolution of power to local authorities • However in practice • the expected benefits of many of these reforms have not materialized and • many challenges remain in terms of improving accountability and responsiveness as well as reducing corruption

12. The Search for Progress VII • The Conundrums • These countries are ones that have had best practice progress in terms of specific programs and sectors, but which have not (yet) had the positive impact on poverty at the aggregate level one might have expected • Egypt – agriculture has grown rapidly reaching 5% a year in the 1980s before settling at around 3.7% a year from 1991 to 2007 • However while rapid agricultural growth initially led to reductions in poverty, the link between agricultural growth and falling rural poverty broke down in the 1990s • Explanation controversial – thought to include a decline in the importance of agriculture in the economy and in employment • Limited potential to further intensify the sector and • limited development of services manufacturing and the urban economy in Upper Egypt, where much of the rural poverty is located.

13. The Search for Progress VIII • The Conundrums (contd.) • South Africa has had an impressive expansion of its social protection system. • Coverage of social grants has increased significantly from just over 2 million beneficiaries in 1996/97 to almost 14 million in 2009/10 • It is almost without peer in low- and mile income countries in terms of scale and its financing sound. • What make it a conundrum is that despite progress in social protection, inequality has increased and poverty reduction has been limited going from 56% in 1993 to 54% in 2008 • Some observers have noted that the impact of the grants program has been in relation to limiting further growth of poverty and addressing the depth of poverty • Nonetheless South Africa has yet to achieve sustained and large-scale progress as experienced by the stars. • India has had similar problems converting of good rates of growth and progress in social protection into wider advances in poverty and human development

14. The Search for Progress IX • Drivers of Progress • The case studies illustrate a number of factors that have been instrumental progress • These do not provide a comprehensive picture of all drivers of change, but rather show that it can occur even in the most adverse conditions • A more detailed examination of these countries suggests major contributions from: • Catalytic leadership • Policies that work • Institutional foundations • International partners

15. Factors Affecting Peace I • The ICAF method provides an excellent framework for conflict analysis • http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187786.pdf • The Rand approach compliments ICAF • Our knowledge of the factors affecting peace or the restart of war has increased considerably in recent years • The four main factors usually studied include: • 1. Motivations for fighting: factors affecting the desire of faction(s) to fight. • For the opposition, these may include government repression or incompetence, political exclusion and historically based hatred • For the government a motivation might be opportunity to crush the opposition or fear the opposition would undermine it if power-sharing occurred • 2. Means: factors affecting the ability of the opposition to mount and conduct a war. • These include recruits and sustained resources, whether from internal or external sources

16. Factors Affecting Peace II • Main factors (contd.) • 3. Circumstances: Factors affecting the favorable conditions of fighting, such as • weakness or strength of the government; • external and internal support beyond the providing of resources covered under means; and • the presence or absence of international intervention, including mediators and guarantors. • 4. Aspects of decision-making; factors affecting decisions, which depend on the above factors • but also on values, perceptions, fears and other aspects of psychology. • These factors have been the basis of extensive empirical testing with a + or – indicating whether a factor in question is hypothesized as increasing or decreasing prospects for continued peace in a post-conflict setting

17. Factors Relating to the Prospects for Sustained Peace

18. Factors Relating to the Prospects for Sustained Peace (contd.)

19. Other Factors Related to Peace

20. Factors Affecting Peace III • General observations from the empirical literature: • Most of the literature agrees on the population centric approach: • on grounds that the cooperation of the population is critical to insurgent success and • that providing security for the population is the number-one priority • Peacekeepers face several dilemmas. • The duration dilemma refers to the trade-offs between effective long-term peacemaking and peacekeepers outlasting their welcome • The size-of-force dilemma is related: Although larger forces may be more effective at their task, they may increase nationalist resentment

21. Degree of Security I • Degree of security a spectrum from very secure to very insecure

22. Degree of Security II • The degree of security related to series of primary factors, depending on whether some resistance continues even in the nominally post-conflict environment: • Resistance effort (a function of motivations and means) • The security effort • The favorability of circumstances for establishing security and • A requirements function – not a factor like the other elements above, but rather describes how the factors interact to produce a degree of security

23. Conceptualizing the Degree of Security

24. Degree of Security III • Whether there is significant resistance is a major factor – • Depends on decisions whether to restart or re-escalate conflict rather then cooperate • If we understood and could measure: • the degree of security, • security effort, • resistance and • favorability of circumstance • We could plot out various scenarios • The major relationship is that the security effort required grows substantially with resistance level and is quite uncertain unless resistance is minimal

25. El Salvador

26. El Salvador Overview I • Peace agreement signed in January 1992 by the Salvadoran government and the FMLN marked the end of a 12 year civil war that resulted in 800,000 people dead and 70,000 severely wounded • Provisions in the peace accord aimed to address core issues that had started conflict in first place: • A socioeconomic structure based on great inequalities • between small minority of landowners and • A large number of poor agricultural workers with little or no land of tier own • Opposition to an authoritarian government supported by a powerful military

27. El Salvador Overview II • The Accord sought to compel political, social and institutional change by • redistributing land, • democratizing political practices and • reforming the military and placing it under civilian control • Such measures would transform El Salvador • Implementation thus encountered strong resistance from those who stood to lose the most • Salvador has been at peace for over 20 years and is politically stable -- making it a model of successful UN sponsored nation-building. However -- • War has left disquieting legacies • Rates of violent crime are very high due to failed reintegration process and widespread availability of wartime weapons.

28. El Salvador I • Cultural and Social Aspects • Prewar socioeconomic indicators were very poor • Almost half the population 15 years and older illiterate • Life expectancy below 60 years • Civil war only made this situation worse: • Government gave priority to military spending over spending on education and health care • Near the end of the war in 1990, 56 percent of the population was living in poverty • 5 percent more than in 1980 • Massive human rights violations with government forces and associated death squads targeting civilians supporting the FMLN • Overall more than 40,000 civilians killed during the war mostly by armed and paramilitary forces

29. El Salvador II • Land tenure is a key issue in El Salvador and is widely perceived to be one of the root causes of the civil war. • As of 1980, 1 percent of the population owned more than 70 percent of the land • Concentration of land ownership had been increasing for decades • with the acreage for peasant households decreasing from 7.4 to 0.4 hectares between the end of the 19th century and early 1970s. • Majority of Salvadoran society composed of agricultural laborers, many of them without any land of their own • Number of landless peasants increased from about 30,000 in 1961 to 167,000 in 1975 when they represented more than 40% of the population

30. El Salvador III • Shortly before and during the war, USAID attempted to promote a major land reform planned to benefit 80,000 peasant families • One key aim of the reform was to prevent further recruitment of peasants by the FMLN. • The involvement of the Armed forces of El Salvador (FAES) in implementing land reform, resulted in increased murder rates of civilians in areas where it was active • Government also largely undermined the reform by failing to support the new land owners and their cooperatives because of lack of access to credit and limited technical skills • First attempt at land reform proved a failure—disparities between rich and poor increased during the war

31. El Salvador IV • Economic Aspects • Salvadorian economy experienced growth in the 1960s and 1970s but the civil war reversed those gains • Economic growth slowed greatly averaging 1.3 percent during the 1980s • Reconstruction needs at the end of the conflict were considerable with damage to infrastructure around $1.5 billion • Exports declined during the war, mainly because of an unfavorable global economic environment. • The fact that the local currency the colon wa overvalued made this situation worse. • Only sources of revenue that increased for El Salvador during the war were U.S. economic assistance and remittances of Salvadorians who had fled the country • As with land issues, US made some attempts to spur economic reforms

32. El Salvador V • Since the end of the War, El Salvador’s economic performance has markedly improved. • Heightened confidence in the country’s budget management led to an influx of capital and the ability to renegotiate external debt • The poverty rate decreased from 66 percent before the peace to 38 percent in 2012 • El Salvador was less dependent on aid that some other post -conflict countries. • In 1992 aid as a percentage of national income reached 7% and fell rapidly thereafter • Compared with 80% for Mozambique which reached a peace accord around the same time

33. El Salvador VI • The liberalization of the economy which included the privatization of some state services as well as the replacement in 2001 of the colon with the U.S. dollar have met with criticism • Agricultural and manufacturing sectors suffered the most from the changes • Financial sector transportation, construction and commerce sectors largely benefited • The considerable amount of remittances from Salvadorians abroad has in part, cushioned the population from the shock of structural adjustment.

34. El Salvador VII • Institutional Aspects • During the war the US provided training, equipment and intelligence to the FAES. • However the FAES suffered from problems with morale and proficiency • U.S. contribution to training was a mixed success • Even with precise intelligence on FMLN positions, FAES were reluctant to launch attacks • One reason fro thee problems is to be found in the tanda system which created special bonds among members of the same officer-training cohort • By ensuring they were all commissioned and promoted together regardless of individual competence • Members of the same tanda were careful to protect each other from investigation or prosecution.

35. El Salvador VIII • Another reason lies in recruitment methods which aimed at increasing the number of soldiers without great regard for skills or training. • Forced recruitment practices were widespread and recruits were subjected to abuse • U.S. efforts to improve respect for human rights among FAES personnel were unsuccessful • Corruption and false accounting (through the addition of” ghost soldiers to units which enabled officers to obtain extra pay and supplies) were widespread. • Some early attempts to improve El Salvador’s criminal justice system were initiated with US support during the war. • However faced with alack of political will on the part of the government the USAID Administration of Justice project was unable to undertake comprehensive reform • However may have laid groundwork for new attitudes

36. El Salvador IX • What local factors posed the greatest challenges? • 1. Geographical and geopolitical • A key factor that gave rise to and perpetuated the conflict was superpower support for opposing sides • Prospect of their backers withdrawing that support in the post-Cold War geopolitical environment motivated both sides to sue for peace • 2. Cultural and Social • Struggles over land tenure in densely populated country and extreme and increasing concentration of land-ownership figured significantly in causing the conflict • Land reform after the conflict was focused on providing reintegration opportunities for ex-combatants • The reform program was completed five years after the conflict but benefitted only small slice of the population

37. El Salvador X • Reintegration efforts had a limited effect • Initial causes of the crisis, inequitable land ownership and lack of economic opportunity were not resolved. • Did not cause a renewal of the conflict, but the availability of weapons after the war it did lead to a transfer of he dynamics of violence to the criminal sphere. • 3. Economic • The civil war slowed economic growth to a crawl and crated a major need for reconstruction. • External assistance financed implementation of the peace agreement but did little to address the country’s underlying economic problems • Still since the end of the civil war the country’s economic progress has markedly improved and poverty has been reduced.

38. El Salvador XI • 4. Institutional • Salvadoran military and police had a history of • Incompetence • Abrasiveness • Involvement in politics inconsistent with democratic norms • Professionalization and de-politicization of the military and the building of a new national police force key thus key elements of the nation-building effort. • Despite difficulties in implementation, marked improvement made in these areas • What local factors modified or circumvented to promote enduring peace? • Ten years after the end of its civil war, El Salvador remained at peace, Its democracy had been consolidated and it had made some socioeconomic gains.

39. El Salvador XIII

40. El Salvador XIV • Although external factors may not have sparked El Salvador’s civil war – • Certainly helped sustain it and • Decisive in ending it • External • Actors funded and advised both sides, • Mediation brought it to a close • Pressures forced some changes in the internal factors that gave rise to the conflict • That mediation helped bring about a mutual accommodation among contending armed factions. • Result -- arrangements that have allowed them to peacefully share and alternate the exercise of power. • Deeper causes of conflict such as peasant landlessness modified more slowly and to a limited extent

41. El Salvador: Patterns of Governance

42. El Salvador XV • Conclusion • El Salvador better governed and more prosperous than at any time in its history • Unfortunately, also more violent. • In part this is a product of the war and aftermath • The civil conflict bred a culture of violence • The peace left many armed young men with little livelihood free from crime and • The reforms left a weakened security establishment

43. Civil Affairs - Case for Discussion I • Civil Military Operations in Kenya’s Rift Valley • Setting – aftermath of Kenya’s December 2007 to January 2008 postelection violence • Reserve Civil Affairs teams began a series of school rehabilitation projects in the Rift Valley • Most residents were displaced, markets and public places destroyed, and schools burned to the ground • Interesting case study of application of civil-military operations (CMO) in tense environment where: • people had concerns for their personal security and • a lack of confidence in their government to adequately respond to the crisis • U.S./ Kenyan governments recognized getting multiple ethnic communities to attend same schools would be important step in community healing

44. Civil Affairs Case Study: Kenya II • Situation an example of the application of civil-military operations (CMO) in a tense-environment • where people had concerns for their personal security, and • lack of confidence in their government to adequately respond to the crisis • Useful case because of follow-up assessments of • how host communities received the CA team • what it meant to recipients to have U.S. military-supported construction projects following instability • Case also illustrates the efforts • of multiple players within the U.S. Government • as well as those between United states and other partners – Kenyan government, community-based organizations and international aid agencies

45. Civil Affairs Case Study: Kenya III • Results: • In slightly over 2 years (April 2008-July 2010) four different CA teams supported rehabilitation of 14 schools • On average 70 percent of student body in area has returned to class • Coordination: • CA efforts well coordinated with the Provincial Administration and other key personnel • Groups such as the Kenya Red Cross and the International Organization of Migration provided basic humanitarian assistance – temporary housing and food • UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) provided education in the camps • Smaller NGOs engaged in peace-building activities among communities • In general Kenyan government was unable to provide in a timely manner all the support necessary for all the damaged schools

46. Civil Affairs Case Study: Kenya IV • Assessments • Effective communications: verbal and nonverbal was critical for success • Recognized the need to be clear as to intentions • Must follow up quickly with actions – not to much visiting • Wearing uniforms – effective in allowing wider range of local people to know who was providing assistance • Exiting • How CA team leaves community may be just as important as how it arrives • In Kenya month after CA team left – local population did not feel the U.S. military had left the region because locals do not see differences within U.S. military – SeaBee detachment still working on school

47. Civil Affairs Case Study: Kenya V • Conclusions • Successful application of civil-military operations • Communities and other stakeholders welcomed and cooperated with Civil Affairs team – left with very positive impression • CA tem maintained close relationships with provisional and village leadership, as well as U.S. government and NGOs personnel • Through close relationships the team had the opportunity to receive and follow advice of those who have expertise working in the area

48. Degree of Security: The Security Dilemma I • The Security Dilemma • The dilemma strongly affects perceptions, fear and behavior • Describes the perspective of an actor (a person, group, or state) • who facing an inherently insecure environment, seeks to increase its own security • but in doing so decreases the perceived security of other actors in the system • the actor thereby inadvertently decreases both its own security and the system’s overall level of security • The vicious circle of the security dilemma is active in both wartime and post-conflict situations • Individuals might purchase small arms and form groups for self-protection, but this will threaten former adversaries who will do likewise leading to increased tension and pressures to break the peace • Increasing the degree of post-conflict security requires reversing this vicious circle.

49. Degree of Security: The Security Dilemma II

50. Degree of Security: The Security Dilemma III • Implications of the Security Dilemma • Where credible commitments to peace are lacking, one of the main roles of international forces is to provide that credibility and thus reduce fears. • Increasing the strength of a state’s military may increase the security dilemma’s intensity if the rebels have reason to fear the government will renege on its peace promises • The intensity of the vicious cycle may reflect psychological, ideological and cultural matters as well as reality • The security dilemma need not be acute at the outset of an episode but may develop subsequently • Security dilemma was not acute among Shia, Sunni and Kurdish factions in Iraq before the 2003 invasion, but became a reality subsequently