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An Efficient and Secure RFID Security Method with Ownership Transfer

An Efficient and Secure RFID Security Method with Ownership Transfer. Authors: Kyosuke Osaka, Tsuyoshi Takagi, Kenichi Yamazaki, Osamu Takahashi Source: Computational Intelligence and Security, 2006 International Conference on Presenter: Hsin-Ruey Tsai.

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An Efficient and Secure RFID Security Method with Ownership Transfer

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  1. An Efficient and Secure RFID Security Method with Ownership Transfer Authors: Kyosuke Osaka, Tsuyoshi Takagi, Kenichi Yamazaki, Osamu Takahashi Source: Computational Intelligence and Security, 2006 International Conference on Presenter: Hsin-Ruey Tsai

  2. Five requirements • 1. Indistinguishability • 2. Forward security • 3. Resistance against replay attack • 4. Resistance against tag killing • 5. Ownership transferability

  3. Indistinguishability • No adversary can distinguish output from RFID tags.

  4. Forward security • Even if present data on RFID tags are leaked to an adversary, past data still remain secure. No tamper resistance

  5. Resistance against replay attack • No adversary can succeed in a replay attack that spoofs a legitimate RFID tag.

  6. Resistance against tag killing • RFID tags shall be resistant against a large number of incoming queries. no additional memory no upper limit

  7. Ownership transferability • Ownership is transferable without violation of previous and present RFID tag owner’s privacy.

  8. Analysis of Previous Schemes • Challenge–Response Type Schemes • Ohkubo Type Schemes • Other Type Schemes

  9. Hash Lock Scheme 03

  10. Randomized Hash Lock Scheme

  11. Hash-Based ID Variation Scheme 04

  12. The RKKW Scheme 05

  13. Kang–Nyang’s Scheme 05

  14. Ohkubo Scheme

  15. Modified Ohkubo Scheme

  16. Unidentifiable Anonymous ID Scheme

  17. Owner Change Scheme 05

  18. Proposed Method • The protocol of the proposed method consists of: • • A writing process • • An authentication process • • An ownership transfer process

  19. Proposed Method

  20. Indistinguishability

  21. FS & RA • Because of updated by changing symmetric key. Even if Eki (ID) is leaked to the adversary, neither the ID nor Ekj(ID) leaks to the adversary, where i> j. Unless the ID is leaked, the encryption function E satisfies the one-wayness. This means that the adversary cannot compute Ek j (ID) from Eki(ID) unless the ID is leaked.

  22. TK & OT • 1. Tags require no additional memory for storing random numbers each reading a tag. • 2. Tags have no upper limit of reading tags • 1. A protocol to be able to securely change an owner’s key used for encryption is built into the RFID system. • 2. Owners can change their key at any time..

  23. Efficiency of Proposed Method

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