Eliminative Materialism

1. Eliminative Materialism The Case Against Folk Psychology

2. Intertheoretic Reduction • Certain (usually older) theories can be seen as special cases of other (usually newer) theories • We say the older theory reduces to, or is reduced by, the newer theory • Kepler’s planetary astronomy reduces to Newton’s Laws of Motion • Newton’s Laws of Motion reduce to Einstein’s General Relativity • Common sense theory of sound reduces to physical theory of compression waves in a plastic medium • Common sense theory of heat reduces to kinetic theory • A genuine reduction occurs when, in the newer theory, we can derive a set of claims about certain objects and their relations which are relevantly isomorphic to (sufficiently mirror) the claims of the old theory • Note that this is a matter of degree • Within Newton’s system, one can basically deduce Kepler’s system • Within General Relativity, Newton’s Laws turn out only to be very close approximations requiring the assumption of low masses, low velocities, and short distances • Not every aspect of common sense theory of sound/heat reduces to physical theory

3. Intertheoretic Reduction • When a Reduction occurs, the language of the old theory may be dispensed with, but (a significant amount of) the structure of the old theory lives on within the new theory • Thus reduced theories are NOT eliminated • They are, in a sense, given legitimacy • They are incorporated into a new and more encompassing theory • Identity Theorists think that FP will reduce to Neurology • Functionalists and Classical AI theorists think that FP will reduce to a more abstract theory of formally specified symbols and operations • Dennett Rejects the question of reduction as inappropriate, misunderstanding the function and success of FP

4. Theory Elimination • When the resources of a new theory outstrip that of an old theory, and there is no portion of the new theory which sufficiently mirrors the old, the old theory is said to be eliminated • The New replaces the Old • The Old loses its legitimacy • Little to no structure of the old is preserved • Copernican/Newtonian (heliocentric) view of the Solar system eliminates the Ptolemaic/Aristotelian (geocentric) view • Kinetic theory of heat eliminates the caloric theory • Oxidation theory of combustion eliminates the phlogiston theory • Neuro-psychological theories of mental illness eliminate theories of humors and daemonic possession • We find is that we were seriously wrong about what objects existed and how they interrelated to produce the phenomena we were theorizing about

5. Eliminative Materialism • Folk Psychology is a “radically false” and “radically misleading” conception of human cognition and the causes of human behavior • FP will be replaced by a “completed neuroscience” • “Our mutual understanding and even our introspection may then be reconstituted within the [more powerful] conceptual framework of completed neuroscience”

6. The Case Against FP • Serious Explanatory, Predictive, and Manipulative poverty • History of Stagnation and Retreat • Little Hope of Integration into Overall Physical Theory • 1.–3. combine for a story of failure, stagnation, retreat, lack of promise • A priori, the likelihood of elimination is greater than that of reduction

7. 1. Explanatory, Predictive, and Manipulative Poverty • Normal mental processes poorly explained or not explained • Sleep, learning, memory, creativity, motor coordination, differences in intelligence • Abnormal mental processes poorly explained or not explained • Mental illness, effects of brain damage, intoxication, psychopharmacological effects • Special importance on explanation of learning

8. 1.c. Special importance on explanation of learning • No account of pre- and non-linguistic learning • No good account of learning a first language • No good account of the underlying dynamics and kinematics of learning in general • No good account of conceptual change in the individual

9. 2. History of Stagnation and Retreat • Virtually every other folk theory has been eliminated—motion, heaven, fire, life, etc.—unlikely we got this one right on the first try • Many domains of phenomena once explained via the intentional categories of FP, now explained in physical terms—behavior of seasons, weather, animals, geology—intentional categories of FP are in retreat • FP has not significantly advance in 3–4 millennia

10. 3. Little Hope of Integration into Overall Physical Theory • Biology, physiology, evolutionary theory, neurology—all show a high degree of integration into our basic physics • FP shows little or no hope of such integration • FP shows little or no hope of progressing Further to address its failings (stagnation again)

11. 4. Profile of of failure, stagnation, retreat, lack of promise • 1.–3. combine for a story of failure, stagnation, retreat, lack of promise

12. A Priori Argument • A priori, the likelihood of elimination is greater than that of reduction • More ways for Neuroscience to be successful while eliminating FP, than way for Neuroscience to be successful while reducing FP • See pp. 46-47 of Matter and Consciousness • See Also p.45 for “The Vision”

13. Some Standard Objections to EM • FP is not an empirical falsifiable theory • Rather it is the abstract descriptive core required to understand any system as intelligent and rational (no matter the instantiation) • Traditional functionalism, classical AI, Dennett’s intentional stance • Rather, its central core concerning Propositional Attitudes is normative, characterizing the ideal reasoner • Being normative it cannot be falsified (?) • Dennett? Fodor?

14. Some Standard Objections to EM • I can Introspect Beliefs, Desires Qualia, How could I be wrong about what I most directly know? • Self-Effacing/Incoherent—see p. 48 • Mountains out of Molehills

15. Clark’s Objections • Tension between the propositional modularity apparently required by our notion of mental causation and extreme holistic nature of neural nets • Could there be a deeper unity? • Deny that FP committed to inner propositions (Dennett, scattered causes) • Accept incompatibility and go eliminativist • (Not Noticed By Clark) Find a deeper unity, but of a structure which does not vindicate FP (Churchland, cf. p. 76 of Mindware)

16. Clark’s Objections • Thought is systematic (Fodor and Pylyshyn) • So internal representations must be structured • Connectionist models lack structured internal representations • So connectionist models are not good models of human thought • Clark’s two suggested responses • Classical symbol systems not the only way of supporting structured representations (Churchland) • Human thought might gain what systematicity it displays from the structure of human language (Clark? Dennett) • Bag-of-tricks—no central code or processor, but a bunch of different (possibly multi-tasked and/or redundant) modules (somehow) working in concert (Dennett, Churchland)

17. Clark’s Objections • Biological Reality • Artificiality of tasks • Choice of problem structure • Abstraction and over-simplification • Dimensionality of input • Lack of exploitation of real-world structure for problem solving • One-network-one-task attitude • Over-simplification of the structure and function of neurons