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Kripke on Materialism

Kripke on Materialism. Philosophy of Mind. The argument. 1. It seems possible to have A without B 2. There is no explaining away this apparent possibility So 3. it is possible. So 4. there is no identity between A and B.

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Kripke on Materialism

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  1. Kripke on Materialism Philosophy of Mind

  2. The argument • 1. It seems possible to have A without B • 2. There is no explaining away this apparent possibility • So 3. it is possible. • So 4. there is no identity between A and B. • Assumption that A=B implies necessarily A=B; and if not necessarily A=B then not the case that A=B.

  3. More recently

  4. Substitute pain and brains in the previous argument. Or pains and computational states. Or whatever.

  5. Explaining away the intuition of possibility. • Kripke offers us an explanation, in terms of epistemic counterparts, in the natural kinds cases. • But, he argues, this will not apply in the case of pain since the appearance of pain is pain. Unlike the case of heat.

  6. Reflections/questions • Does Kripke’s argument apply to beliefs or just to qualitative states? • The argument turns on our epistemic access to our own mental states. Is it an epistemic argument for a metaphysical conclusion? • Is the epistemic doctrine about pain plausible? • What about other possible explanations of contingency. He seems to be making an inductive argument from one failed explanation.

  7. Possible Replies • McGinn. • Lewis. • Horgan. • Descartes reply to all those! • Bayne. • Almog.

  8. Worry about what Kripke thinks is the relation between pain and our beliefs about it? How close? OK it is not like the case of heat… nevertheless pain is not the same thing as our believing that one is in pain. (Animals? Possible errors in one’s pain beliefs…)

  9. McGinn thinks the argument supports multiple realization and does not threaten a token-token theory. But surely we also have intuitions that threaten the token-token theory.

  10. Stephen Bayne Turns Kripke’s argument round…. Non-identities are necessary if true; but we have an intuition of contingency; therefore it is not true that mind and body are distinct. Maybe the argument leads to paradox.

  11. Lycan thinks that, there is only a problem for materialism if pains are construed as objects. But properties can also have essences.

  12. Horgan worries about the step from imagination to possibility. Perhaps Kripke needs to be more like Descartes (vs Arnauld) and appeal to our complete conception of pain.

  13. Almog… agrees with Kripke… no identity between pains and brains …. as they have different essences. No identities… but perhaps some other relation?

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