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Outline of Paper

Voting in the 2011 Welsh Referendum: Nationalism, Valence or What? Richard Wyn Jones (Cardiff University) Roger Scully (Aberystwyth University) Annual Conference of the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties specialist group Exeter, September 2011. Outline of Paper. Introduction

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Outline of Paper

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  1. Voting in the 2011 Welsh Referendum: Nationalism, Valence or What?Richard Wyn Jones (Cardiff University)Roger Scully (Aberystwyth University)Annual Conference of the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties specialist groupExeter, September 2011

  2. Outline of Paper • Introduction • Background to the Referendum • The Campaign & the Result • Modelling the Vote: Hypotheses • Modelling the Vote: Main Findings • Conclusions & Implications

  3. But first, a word from our sponsors… • The 2011 Welsh Referendum Study (ESRC Grant RES-000-22-4496) • Survey-based study of voting in the referendum • Conducted via Internet with YouGov • Two-Wave panel study, with first wave conducted as ‘rolling’ study through period of the campaign • N of panel study = 2569 • Further support from McDougall Trust for interview-based study of local and national campaigning

  4. The Background, 1 • Previous devolution referendums: 1979, 1997 • 1998 GOWA: Flawed Devolution Model • ‘Secondary’ legislative powers: responsibility without power? • ‘Body Corporate’ and other problematic aspects • 2004: Richard Commission Report • 2006 GOWA: • LCOs • Provision for Referendum on full transfer of primary legislative powers

  5. Wales 2011: the Background, 2 • 2007: ‘One Wales’ Labour-Plaid coalition • 2008-09: All Wales Convention • BUT continuing caution… • ‘Shadow of 1979’: unwillingness to believe the survey evidence! • Labour parliamentary opposition • Final agreement on referendum: March 3rd 2011

  6. The Campaign: General Context • Problems created by nature of the issue at stake: • No fundamental issue of principle • Difficult for campaigns to craft messages • Difficult to frame intelligible and legally accurate referendum question • Problems with PPERA: • No official campaigns • Constraints on spending (2011 < 1997!)

  7. The Yes Campaign • Support from all four party leaderships in NAW • Also widespread support from civil society • The ‘Establishment’ campaign • Paradox of Yes position: Main strength also main weakness – constrained precisely because it was so all-inclusive • Had to ‘wait for Labour’ • Limited in what it could campaign against (not LCOs, not UK govt) • Main stake-holders had other priorities (particularly 2011 election)

  8. The Yes Campaign

  9. The No campaign • Little mainstream support, meaning… • Little ability to raise resources: spending c.£5k • No prominent politicians active. Resulting inexperience obvious in: • Breakdown in message discipline (increasingly arguing for abolition) • Seem to have believed own propaganda (polls) • Failure to produce promised campaign material • Local campaigns very weak • ‘Grassroots campaign’ largely without roots • Some of the spokesmen very weak • Welsh-speaking voices just plain embarrassing

  10. The No Campaign

  11. Referendum Voting Intention 2007-11

  12. Voting intentions across last 4 weeks of campaign (3-day rolling averages)

  13. The Result Yes: 517,132 (63.5%) No: 297,380 (36.5%) Turnout = 35.6%

  14. Turnout in major UK referendums ‘Border Referendum’, Northern Ireland, 1973 58.7% EC Membership, UK, 1975 64.5% Devolution, Scotland, 1979 63.8% Devolution, Wales, 1979 58.8% Devolution, Scotland, 1997 60.4% Devolution, Wales, 1997 50.1% Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland, 1998 81.0% Elected Mayor & GLA, London, 1998 34.1% Devolution, North East England, 2004 47.7% Devolution, Wales, 2011 35.6% AV Electoral Reform, UK, 2011 42.0%

  15. Modelling the Vote: Hypotheses Referendum voting choices shaped primarily by: • Politics of national recognition • ‘Performance politics’ • Party Cues • Constitutional Preferences

  16. Referendum Vote: National Identity

  17. Referendum Vote: WAG performance evaluations

  18. Referendum Vote: Party Support

  19. Referendum Vote: Constitutional Preference

  20. Why Did Wales Vote Yes? • No great impact of campaign • Not mainly about attitudes to major parties in government (London or Cardiff) or party leaders or performance of government • Not much about social differences (e.g. national identity or language) • Mainly about now-settled views concerning how Wales should be governed

  21. And to find out more… Richard Wyn Jones and Roger Scully, Wales Says Yes: Welsh Devolution and the 2011 Welsh Referendum (University of Wales Press, 2012)

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