Peace by Cooperation ?

1. Peace byCooperation? The Stability Pact for S.E. Europe - Premisses, Problems, Consequences Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Reinhard Meyers Institut für Politikwissenschaft - Westfälische Wilhelms- Universität Münster

2. This file can be downloaded next week from our Website • www.uni-muenster.de/Politikwissenschaft/Doppeldiplom/ aktuelles.html There you can also find further material to accompany our seminars on International Theory, International Politics, and the EU Lost in the maze ??? Send email to meyersr@uni-muenster.de

3. UsefulReading • Mejlina Modanu: The European Union and Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Regional Integration and the impact of the enlargement process, in: New Balkan Politics Issue 7/8; to be found under www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk • [or on the seminar CD under Zusatzinfos: Nützliche Websites] SP website: www.stabilitypact.org • The new book by Prof.Dr.Rafael Biermann on the Stability Pact is to appear with Schöningh publishers in Paderborn at the end of April. Dr. Biermann is the author of the ZEI discussion paper on: The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe – potential, problems, and perspectives C 56/1999, downloadable under www.zei.de

4. EU „Ostpolitik“: Aims Support of socioeconomic modernisation + regional security contribution to/ precondition of stability for the whole of Europe Security international: implementation of the rules of peaceful coexistence and of a regime of conflict prevention/ conflict resolution between the nations of Europe domestic: conservation of social peace as precondition of a successful transformation to a market economy and a liberal democracy

5. Problem: how to break into the vicious circle ? domestic/ international security The vicious circle of Balkan politics precondition of precondition of regionalstability conservation of social peace precondition of successful modernisation/ transformation precondition of

6. How to break into the viciouscircle ? Develop a strategy of regime change using non-military instruments transforming SE Europe into a region of * sustainable stability * growing prosperity * firmly established peace Regional cooperation as the main instrument of problem solving

7. RegionalCooperation Instruments # Matchmaking: bringing together donors, implementing agencies, and recipient countries for joint priority setting # Peer review & peer pressure as methods to advance the reform process # Honest brokerage & good offices as instruments to bring together institutions that do not normally cooperate Object: to stabilize the S.E.European region after the conflicts of the 1990s enhancing regional cooperation and supporting ever closer integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures

8. Stability Pact for S.E.Europe: How it started Problem: During the Kosovo crisis, decision-makers realised that there had never been a coherent, longterm policy of conflict prevention in S.E.Europe. Rather, the international approach to the Balkans had been piecemeal and country-oriented, following the geographical direction Milosevic’s policies chose to take. The transnational character of many regional problems was hardly admitted; a predominantly reactive, „fire-brigade“ policy concentrated on managing crisis after crisis, from Slovenia to the Kosovo.

9. Stability Pact for S.E. Europe: How it started (2) „The previous policy of the international community vis-a-vis former Yugoslavia had two severe deficits: It concentrated on the consequences instead of on the sources of conflict, and it tackled the problems of the region individually and separately from the ones in other parts of Europe.“ Joschka Fischer, Cologne, June 1o, 1999

10. Stability Pact for S. E. Europe: Precursors a) EU Regional Approach adopted on February 27, 1996, as part of the Royaumont process following the Dayton Agreement • cooperation agreements with Albania & Macedonia;trade preferences for Bosnia/Hercegovina & Croatia; more than € 7 bn. expenditure since 1991 on strict, regularly monitored conditions b) EU Common Strategy for the Western Balkans, commissioned by the Vienna European Council in December 1998 The Union’s Regional Aproach of 1996 encouraged closer political and economic ties among the Balkan countries, but appeared late, with vague goals, and little incentives for the countries to actually carry out the proposed objectives. Differential bilateral EU approaches to individual countries undermined much of the Regional Approach in the second half of the 90s.

11. Stability Pact for S.E.Europe: Precursors (2) Problems: • Main focus on bilateral relations • Not enough attention paid to the Eastern Balkans, i.e. neglecting the stabilisation potential of Romania and Bulgaria for the region • No coordination of competing numerous initiatives • Main actors lacked political will and resolve to make a real difference • From today’s point of view, all Balkan initiatives prior to the Stability Pact are perceived as ill-conceived and unsufficient

12. On 10 June 1999, at the EU's initiative, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was adopted in Cologne. Its main aim is to strengthen the countries of South Eastern Europe "in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region". The Stability Pact is a political declaration of commitment and a framework agreement on international co-operation to develop a shared strategy among all partners for stability and growth in South Eastern Europe. It is not a new international organisation nor does it have any independent financial resources or implementing structures. It is a co-ordinating mechanism which matches requests from the region with offers from participating nations and organisations and co-ordinates political and economic reforms and reconstruction in the region. It seeks to provide a forum to stimulate change in the region.

13. The Stability Pact Partners are: • The European Union Member States and the European Commission; • The countries of the region and their neighbours: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, FYR Macedonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro), Turkey and Moldova; • Non EU-members of the G8: USA, Canada, Japan and Russia; • Other countries: Norway and Switzerland; • International organisations: UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, UNHCR, NATO and OECD; • International financial institutions: World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB) and Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB); • Regional initiatives: Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC), Central European Initiative (CEI), South East European Co-operative Initiative (SECI) and South East Europe Co-operation Process (SEECP).

14. Stability Pact for S.E.Europe:Characteristics SP an example for a general trend in international politics: regionalization replacing bipolarity SP based on lessons from international crisis management and conflict prevention, stressing the need for * a secure environment * promotion of sustainable democratic systems * economic and social well-being * reconstruction of intra- and intersocietal relations based on agreed rules, legitimacy and public authority as preconditions for successful conflict prevention and sustainable peace. SP also incorporates the CSCE process experiences – trust in the power of confidence-building measures, coherence of approach to problems in a number of baskets, insistence on peaceful change, compromise, and package deals as means of inter-national (re)conciliation, emphasis on local ownership of policies

15. Stability Pact for S.E.Europe: Working Mechanism Premiss: CSCE concept of conflict transformation through an open-ended process of increasing cooperation that will unfold over time Mechanism: S.E.Europe Regional Table meets on Foreign Steering Body acting as Clearing Minister level House for all matters of Principle Chair: Special Coordinator appointed by Coordinates all activities of and among the European the working tables, meets regularly with Union the chairs of the working tables, and re- ports periodically to the OSCE Working Table Working Table Working Table on democratisation on economic reconstruction, on security issues and human rights development, and cooperation Working Tables establish work plans in conformity with the objectives of the Stability Pact. Within the range of their competence, they can establish side tables or call meetings and conferences on matters of a specific or sub-regional nature. Sub-Table Sub-Table Sub-Table Sub-Table Meetings Conferences Meetings Conferences

16. Regional TableChair: Erhard Busek Working Table I: DEMOCRACYChair: Goran Svilanovic Working Table II: ECONOMYChair: Fabrizio Saccomanni Working Table III: SECURITYChair: Janez Premoze Sub TableSecurity & Defence Sub TableJustice & Home Affairs

17. The Stability Pact was launched in a manner which raised exaggerated expectations of what it might achieve. Since then, it has been viewed mostly with indifference if not scepticism. It could, and should, have been better explained at the start that it was not a new international funding organisation with financial resources of its own and an operational mandate. It is a forum bringing together 35 countries and 16 international organisations, financial institutions and regional initiatives committed to working within a common framework to promote stability and growth in the region. In that role it has sought with some modest success to promote regional co-operation and intra-Balkan trade; to focus non-EU donors on the needs of the region; and to achieve better co-ordination amongst the plethora of donors. We welcome the consensus which emerged at the Bucharest Regional Conference that the Stability Pact's role and activities should be given a focus more clearly in line with its status as a generator of international political commitment to the region and a catalyst for greater co-operation within it. • House of Lords, Select Cttee.on the EU, 20th report,para.154

18. Stability Pact:Achievements: • Through the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe the EU, for the first time in history, undertook to draw South Eastern Europe closer to the perspective of full integration into its structures. All Southeast European countries have been recognised as potential candidates for EU membership

19. Stability Pact: Achievements (2): The European perspective has proved to be the most powerful incentive for reconciliation, co-operation and internal reforms in the region. Countries in the region view the Pact as the primary instrument of political and institutional support for the EU integration of SEE countries. More important: The Stability Pact has succeeded in giving life to regional co-operation. For the first time in history, SEE countries perceive such co-operation as a building block, not a stumbling block for European integration.

20. How could the Stability Pact make a difference ? First, the Pact has made it clear that regional co-operation is an indispensable component and a precondition for Euro-Atlantic integration. It is the fast track to full EU membership. The EU, on its part, has recognised that it should not reward a race towards membership. “If countries want to join the European Union, they have to demonstrate that they can develop regional co-operation and can solve their problems in co-operation with their neighbours,” Commissioner Verheugen once stated. People in the region should have by now understood that such co-operation is one of the founding principles of the European Union itself.

21. How could the Stability Pact make a difference ? (2) Secondly, the Stability Pact has given evidence that co-operation serves the mutual interests of all participating countries. Against this background, the Pact has been engaged in facilitating the resolution of transnational issues, using the tool of regional co-operation as a catalyst for reconciliation, good-neighbourliness and improved political relations.

22. Stability Pact: Criticisms & Problems • As the prospect of full integration has proven to be a powerful incentive for reconciliation, cooperation and internal reforms in SEE, the EU needs to live up to its full commitment that SEE countries will be welcomed as full and equal members once the necessary conditions are fulfilled. Yet, the engagement of major donors in the Balkans has fallen dramatically. The Stability Pact community, including the EU, does not have appropriate instruments to promote social cohesion, private investment and sustainable growth in the region. Complicated bureaucratic procedures create difficulties to spend the money available efficiently and create disappointment among recipient countries. Thus, the credibility of donors is at stake. The SP has been given the difficult task to coordinate partners who sometimes resist to such coordination. For greater efficiency, SEE partners should be granted greater ownership in the design and management of external assistance. (Bodo Hombach, 2004)

23. Stability Pact: Criticisms & Problems (2) • The Stability Pact for SEE is not as efficient as it could be. The economic development in the region is still unsatisfactory, the population is unaware of the existence of the pact and its extensive programmes. The main problem is the lack of coordination. The single donor states even do not know which projects are funded by other countries. (Rainer Stinner, 2004) • The record of the international involvement and that of the Stability Pact in particular is mixed. This is partly due to the fact that the Stability Pact has mainly a coordinating function, while much more active involvement is necessary because the regional will is weak. (Vladimir Gligorov, 2004) • [Note: the Special Coordinator only has about 30 staff !!]

24. Stability Pact: Criticisms & Problems (3) • Main problem: • Inconsistencies – perhaps even competition – between Stability Pact and Stabilization and Association Process – • SP emphasizes regional cooperation and judges progress made by SEE states on this basis. • SAP establishes competition among the candidates for a Stabilization and Accession agreement, as their chances to enter the EU later on are judged on the basis of their individual progress towards the goals and qualifications agreed on. In this context, achievements in regional cooperation are regarded as marginal.

25. Future Prospects • The Stability Pact provides a superstructural framework between Romania & Bulgaria as accession countries, the SEE states as potential accession countries, and Moldowa. Thus, it will be needed at least until the SEE accession process is successfully resolved. • The Stability Pact also binds Kosovo into regional cooperation via UNMIK. Thus, it will be needed as long as the Kosovo status problem is not resolved. • The development of regional cooperation is an open-ended continuing process. This means that at last in the immediate and medium term future the Stability Pact will have enough work to do. Any obituaries therefore are decidedly premature.

26. Thank you for your attention !

27. TheStabilisation and Association Process for South-Eastern Europe Recipients: Albania, Bosnia & Hercegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Size: 4,5 bn Euro 1991 – 1999 on part of EU 17 bn Euro including humanitarian assistance + contributions of member states

28. The Stabilisation and Association Process for South-Eastern Europe Definition: • EU’s main contribution to the stability pact • Enhancement of the Regional Approach • Stronger incentives for the region, but also an element of conditionality regarding political and economic development and regional cooperation • Tailor-made approach taking into account the needs of each country Goal: bring peace, stability, and economic development to the region and open the long-term perspective of EU membership

29. 151. We heard from many of our witnesses that the Stability Pact, in particular the Quick Start Package, was announced with a great deal of fanfare which led to high expectations of it. Stephen Wordsworth from the FCO told us that these expectations were overblown (Q 34). Clare Short went one step further and indicated that the grandiose promises made at its inception were a cause for concern because they were seen by many as too ambitious (Q 252). Chris Patten believed that: "the expectations were less than coherently explained or analysed and that it is unfair to blame those who run the Pact for the gap between the initial rhetoric and what the Pact has usefully been able to do." (Q 65) 152. Gary Titley MEP made a similar point when he explained that the Pact had been established as a reaction to the problem of a perceived lack of co-ordination of aid efforts in the Balkan region. He thought that the Pact itself needed to be more streamlined and focused and given specific yearly tasks to achieve (Q 177).