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Explore the challenges and solutions for securing Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) using RSU-Aided Certificate Revocation with conditional privacy preservation techniques like group signatures. Learn about IEEE standards, threats faced, and simulation results.
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Security in vehicular Ad-hoc networks Presented By: NagadeeshNagaraja Authors: XiaodongLin RongxingLu ChenxiZhang Univ. of Waterloo, Waterloo
Introduction • What is a vehicular Ad-hoc network (VANET)? • What communication protocol is used in a VANET? • What are the security issues faced in a VANET? • How can we securely communicate and improve its performance? • How well do they perform?
VANET • Vehicular Ad-hoc Network • Sub category of MANET (Mobile Ad-hoc Network) • IEEE 802.11-based communication + DSRC • Inherits all the known and unknown security weaknesses associated with a MANET
Safety in VANET • Is VANET a safety critical communication? • Threat to Authenticity • Threat to Confidentiality • Malicious Threats • Comparable to MANET? • More severe and challenging. • Number of entities involved. • High speed and mobility. • Direct impact on the life of a person. • Real time impact in case of compromise. • Any standard /protocol established? • IEEE 1609.2
Copy rights: Fox Broadcasting Company Source: http://globecom2008.ieee-globecom.org/downloads/DD/DD03M2%20WAVE%20I/DD03M3_TWeil.pdf
IEEE 1609.2 • IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments--Security Services for Applications and Management Messages • How does it work? • Public-key encryption • certificate-based authentications
Any potential problems? Source: http://globecom2008.ieee-globecom.org/downloads/DD/DD03M2%20WAVE%20I/DD03M3_TWeil.pdf
Potential Solution? (1) • Revocation Using Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists (RC2 RL) • Data on the entity involved in malicious activity is lost, cannot track and identify the problem. Might repeat the behavior by requesting new certificate. • Vastness and the dynamics of the VANET makes centralized CRL almost impossible for real time.
Potential Solution? (2) • Distributed Revocation Protocol (DRP) • Infeasible to assume that each vehicle can check the revocation status of the certificates they are using. Furthermore, storing all CRL is impractical on an embedded system.
Better solution? • RSU-Aided Certificate Revocation!
Any utilizable property of VANET? • The movement of a vehicle can be predicted based on its broadcasted traffic-related messages. • IVC communications are performed locally, where a vehicle is more interested in the driving environment around it by listening to the broadcast messages from its neighboring vehicles.
RSU-Aided Certificate Revocation • The CA manages the RSUs, and both of them are assumed to be trustworthy • The RSUs are connected to the Internet using any networking technology. • Both CA ,RSU and Communication between them is considered trustworthy. • CA allocates the secret key to RSU. Corresponding Public key is used to identify the RSU physically.
RSU-Aided Certificate Revocation • When a new revocation is executed by CA, it will broadcast a certificate revocation notification to all the RSUs. • Each RSU then checks the status of the certificates contained in all the messages broadcast by the passing vehicles. • If a certificate has been confirmed as revoked, the RSU will broadcast a warning message.
RSU-Aided Certificate Revocation • Vehicles can update their CRLs and avoid communicating with the compromised vehicle. • Vehicles can communicate with one another to make the new CRL reach throughout the network, as soon as possible. • In case of silent attack (No broadcasting while passing an RSU). The certificate will expire, unless updated by the RSU. • Thus, the security and safety of the VANET in terms of resisting compromised vehicles can be achieved with the least amount of effort.
Conditional Privacy Preservation • Conditional privacy means providing the necessary privacy to the users, and also keep track of the information and use it when there is malicious activity.
Potential solution (1) • Security protocol based on anonymous key pairs • Maintain a large number of short term anonymous key pairs, example ( 40,000). • Randomly selecting one of them to sign each message. • Issue: huge over head, CA needs to keep track of all the list of key pairs for each vehicle to identify the malicious vehicle.
Better solution? • group signature and identity-based signature (GSIS)!
Evaluation • Using NS2 simulator (open source simulator). • 2 most common road scenarios considered. • City roads ( speed range 30-70 mph. +/-5) • Highways ( speed range 100 mph. +/-10) • Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER) to simulate traffic scenarios. • Transmission range of 300m.
Parameter for results • Average message delay • Average message loss ratio.
Avg. message delay varies by about 22ms, which is within acceptable range (100ms). • Avg. loss ratio reaches as high as 68 percent when the traffic load is up to 150. • Typical during severe traffic jam. Acceptable due to repetitive data. • Normal traffic conditions experience traffic load of 50, where 20 percent loss ratio is achieved. • Shows reasonable insensitivity towards road environment.
Experimented with constant traffic load of 60. • Shows insensitivity towards road environment. • Avg. delay increase linearly, and Avg. Loss ration increase exponentially.
Conclusion • Comprehensive review and state-of-the-art progress on industry standardization for security assurance and privacy preservation in VANETs have been presented • The solutions for achieving secure certificate revocation and conditional privacy preservation based on the PKI have been provided
Reference • http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.gate.lib.buffalo.edu/document/4481346/ • http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.gate.lib.buffalo.edu/document/7813797/ • http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.gate.lib.buffalo.edu/document/7426684/?part=2%7Csec8#sec8 • http://www.networkworld.com/article/2226498/infrastructure-management/simply-put-how-does-certificate-based-authentication-work.html • http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/ssr2016/documents/presentation-tue-whyte-invited.pdf • https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography#Examples • http://gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/sit/2010/its/GConoverFriday.pdf • http://globecom2008.ieee-globecom.org/downloads/DD/DD03M2%20WAVE%20I/DD03M3_TWeil.pdf • https://medium.com/@vrypan/explaining-public-key-cryptography-to-non-geeks-f0994b3c2d5 • https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_short-range_communications • http://www.ece.mtu.edu/ee/faculty/cchigan/EE5723-Security/lecture5-2-Key-Distribution.pdf