COL Daniel D. Imholte Chief of Staff US Army Transportation Center and Fort Eustis, Virginia

1. FUTURE SUPPORT TO THE ARMY WARFIGHTER NDIA National Logistics Conference and Exhibition Sparks, Nevada 1-4 March 2004 COL Daniel D. Imholte Chief of Staff US Army Transportation Center and Fort Eustis, Virginia

2. Incremental build of combat power • Time consuming • Risky • POD dependant • Efficiency focused • Deploy = Employ • Multiple entry points • Start line CONUS • Effectiveness focused

3. DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS… THEN AND NOW DS/DS OEF/OIF Paradigm Shift • Delivered Equipment • 20 CONUS Seaports Used • 6 Months to Move 33M Sq Ft Cargo • 33 Break-bulk AMMO Vessels • Limited Visibility—40% Containers • arriving theater had to be opened • Delivered Capability • 9 CONUS Seaports Used • 2 Months to Move 15M Sq Ft Cargo • Zero Break-bulk AMMO Vessels • 100% Visibility (ITV) for Containers Prior to Lift • TAV Built Warfighter Confidence

4. MOVEMENT TRACKING SYSTEM (MTS) • Map Engine: • Full color maps (NIMA and CADRG) • Active map layers • Supports computer generated vehicle icons with time/date • Two-way messaging: • Multi-Satellite Capable • Supports automated polling • 400 days unlimited usage • Built-in, Selectable Level of Encryption V2 Truck-Mounted ControlStation MT-2010 / 2011 Transceiver GPS PLGRwith All Units 10 year warranty Laptop Computer HP Color Portable Desk jet Printer • Desired Capabilities: • Interface with STAMIS • Enhanced Signal Security • Vehicle Diagnostics/prognostics • Interface with FBCB2 • 37% AAO Funded • AAO: 37,718 • Funded: 13,965 • Fielded: 2,482

5. Army Lead for Intratheater Lift FUTURE LIFT • Must possess these vital qualities: • Bypass predictable and traditional choke points • Deliver intact combat power at multiple entry points • Support uninterrupted deployment momentum • Provide for assured access, and decrease predictability and dwell time Joint Operational Pay-offs • More rapid introduction of forces • Increased capability to achieve assured access • Reduced vulnerability to enemy counters • Increased possibility of achieving operational surprise • Immediate employment of deployed forces • More rapid seizure of the initiative with preclusive effects • Significantly higher versatility and adaptability • More rapid transition to decisive operations • Expanded capability to maintain overwhelming tempo • More rapid achievement of conflict termination and/or transition to another JOA Shallow Draft High Speed Ship Theater Support Vessel SSTOL HLVTOL

6. FTTS ACTD OBJECTIVE 3 to 1 8 to 1 Load Handling System Med & Heavy Truck Variants Numerous Material Handling Equipment FTTS-MSV 4 to 2 5 to 1 Modular Platform FTTS-UV provides Command and Control and includes a Hybrid propulsion system for increased fuel efficiency and onboard power Numerous Interface Devices Numerous Delivery Platforms A SEAMLESS Distribution SYSTEM built for the Obj Force (Applied to the SBCT to evolve the TTPs, CONOPS, and doctrine)

7. SUMMARY OF CHANGE

8. BACKUP SLIDES

9. THEATER LIFT Theater Support Vessel • Rapidly self-deploy to the JOA (soldiers, equipment, and sustainment together) • Increase access • Conduct rapid shore to shore intra-theater sea lift of combat ready unit sets to support operational maneuver • Gain access through multiple points of entry through small, minor or degraded ports • Conduct enroute mission planning and rehearsal • Conduct follow-on sustainment and/or repositioning of units in forward areas • Length Overall - 318.11 ft, beam - 87.03 ft • Cargo Capacity: Up to 820 STs & 14,300 SqFt • Pax Capacity: 292 • Max draft – 11.03 ft. • Loaded Speed - 32 knots - light ship Speed - 40 knotsMax • Required Range - 2,400 nautical miles - load dependent TSV is the only Army unique intra-theater lift platform that meets Army Transformation Vision Goals

10. OEF/OIF OBSERVATIONS • ITV and electronic tracking • Lack integrating policy • Need DOTMLPF battlefield construct for manned and remote systems • Redesign movement control (structure and doctrine) • Modernize transportation C2 tools (TC AIMS II, MTS) • Logistics and contracting • Host Nation Support and LOGCAP • Failed to meet expectations and requirements • Weapon system fielding • Movement Tracking System • TCAIMS / IRRIS / RFID • KALMAR RTCH • TSV Acquisition

11. OIF/OEF OBSERVATIONS • Theater distribution • Established strategic linkage and operational Command and Control • Commodity distribution • Lacked In-transit Visibility and materiel / transportation integration • Army prepositioned stocks • Largest draw in history • Fighting systems were in excellent shape • Complex property transfer • Army watercraft and Joint Logistics Over the Shore • Largest since Vietnam (>5,000 containers) • Theater Support Vessel operational significance • Army support to 26 Marine Expeditionary Unit landing • Navy Special Operation Forces direct action and Umm Qasr opening

12. DEPLOYMENT OBSERVATIONS • Post ODS Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) • CONUS Force Projection • Rail capacity tripled at Hood, quadrupled at Campbell • Shipped over 380,000 tons in third less time than first Gulf War • Use of Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) and C-17 eliminated weeks in transit time Army Deployment Command and Control • Improved deployment process – TC-AIMS II/JFRG II in USAREUR • HQ MTMC Operations center – good start! • Deployment seams remain in process / command relationships • Continue Mobility Warrant Officer program • Continue Joint Deployment Employment Sustainment process improvement initiatives • Reengineered Army and Joint distribution processes