Dr. Kevin Lasher

1. POLI 314: U.S. Foreign Policy Dr. Kevin Lasher

2. Aspects/Outcome of Vietnam War • Continuation of containment (domino theory) • Vietnam as political war/guerrilla war • US domestic turmoil — questions about containment and much else

3. Reaction to Vietnam • First clear American military defeat • Creation of “Vietnam syndrome” • Questioning/partial rejection of cold war/containment policy

4. The Nixon Era and Beyond Containment in a “post-Vietnam” world

5. Factors Influencing Nixon’s Foreign Policy • US “rejection” of military containment • USSR had achieved nuclear parity • Multipolar world with China (WE and Japan) • Kissinger’s realism • Vietnam continues

6. US “rejection” of military containment • No more Vietnams -- no more foreign wars for the foreseeable future • The “Vietnam Syndrome” • US in a “weakened” position • Not pacifism or disarmament • NATO, troops in Japan, S. Korea, etc continue • How do you pursue containment with the military option diminished?

7. USSR achieves nuclear parity • USSR was catching up in strategic nuclear weapons • New doctrine of MAD • Soviets continued to expand nuclear arsenal, seeking nuclear parity (and beyond) • Both sides interested in arms control agreements

8. USSR achieves nuclear parity

9. USSR achieves nuclear parity

10. Arrival of Multi-polar world • China was emerging as potential great power (economic reforms still in future) • Western Europe and Japan were economic powers

11. Kissinger’s Realism • NSA Henry Kissinger • Great power realist • USSR should be treated as “normal great power” • Downplay/eliminate moral component • Accommodations of old European diplomacy • Summitry and hard bargaining

12. US in Vietnam until 1973 • US foreign policy cannot “move forward” until Vietnam War is ended • Soviet and Chinese “help” in an honorable end to the war • Nixon’s “Vietnamization” and troop withdrawals • Nixon had “credentials” to end war in 1969 (but didn’t)

13. Détente: 1969-1979 • From French “to relax or to slacken” • A relaxing or easing of tension between rivals for the foreseeable future

14. Components of Detente • 1) New containment • 2) Dualism • 3) Linkage • 4) Arms control • 5) China as balancer • 6) West European version

15. New Containment • Positive and negative containment • Faltering Soviet economy seeks Western technology • Reward “good behavior” and punish “bad behavior” • Trade, arms control, and “legitimacy” • “Bribe” USSR with Western trade

16. Dualism • Neither friend nor enemy, but both? • Dualism or schizophrenia? • Difficult to explain this new relationship to the American people

17. Linkage • Create a “web of constructive relationships” • Positive interactions would begin to feed on one another • Trade, arms control, space, exchanges, etc. • Over time Soviets would be bound to US and not want to risk continued “good relations” • Should be medium or long-term process

18. Arms control and summitry • Shared common interests beyond avoiding nuclear war • Arms control to limit threat of nuclear war • Could reach “accommodations” on certain issues • Not naivete or romanticism

19. Arms control and summitry • Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) Treaty • Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty • SALT II begun • Reduced nuclear threat slightly • SALT was more symbolic than substantive

20. China as “Balancer” • Nixon’s opening to China in 1972 (full relations 1979) • Exploit Soviet-Chinese split • Hint at US-China alliance • Opening to China puts pressure on USSR to pursue détente • US play both sides off each other

21. West European Version • Begins in 1960s • Trade between East and West • Improve intra-German relations • European version was less “quid-pro-quo”

22. Problems with Detente • What is the time frame for détente? • Linkage will take a long time to establish

23. Problems with Detente • Nixon’s fall from power in 1974

24. Problems with Detente • US-Soviet trade was limited (Trade Act blocked) • Soviets could trade with Western Europe with generous credits and less demands

25. Problems with Detente • Soviets could not/would not avoid meddling in Third World • Inevitable Soviet “misbehavior” sours spirit of detente

26. Problems with Detente • Soviets could separate “pieces” of détente whereas US viewed détente as total package • Soviet view: “We can both cooperate and compete”

27. Problems with Detente • Paradox of “carrots and sticks” • Required a subtlety of US policy which was probably impossible • Détente “oversold”

28. Problems with Detente • Vietnam continues until early 1973

29. Problems with Detente • Was détente as a serious policy even implemented?

30. Post-Nixon Detente • Détente continues under President Ford • Another Summit 1974 • Helsinki Accords on human rights 1975 • Preparations for SALT II

31. Post-Nixon Detente • Apollo-Soyuz mission in 1975 • Détente disappointment already building

32. Post-Nixon Detente • President Carter continues but tries to move beyond US-Soviet competition • Third World and human rights • SALT II Treaty never ratified (following Afghanistan)

33. Soviet “Misbehavior” • Arms to Syria and Egypt in 1973 war with Israel • Soviet arms and Cuban troops to Angola in 1975 • Soviet support for Marxist coups in Ethiopia and S. Yemen in mid-1970s • Aid to Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in 1979

34. Soviet “Misbehavior” • Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 • Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Soviets uninvolved) • Soviets support Polish crackdown on Solidarity movement in 1981

35. Soviet “Misbehavior” • Fading détente ends with Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 • President Carter boycotts 1980 Moscow Olympics and begins “Reagan military build-up”

36. Reagan and Cold War II “…They are the focus of evil in the modern world.” President Reagan on the USSR (1983)

37. Reagan and Cold War II Reagan and Gorbachev begin to end the Cold War in 1986 Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan

38. The End