Theories, evidence, and action

1. Theories, evidence, and action Laura Schulz

2. There is something fascinating about science. One gets such wholesale returns of conjecture out of such a trifling investment of fact. ~ Mark Twain, 1883 Mark Twain had something insightful to say about just about every aspect of human experience and so it�s not surprising that he was able to sum up one of the central problems we�re dealing with in this class in a single snide remark� So he meant it as a joke of course but there really is something fascinating about science. We go from a few bones to the existence of dinosaurs, from a few fruit flies to heredity, from spectral lines to the existence of galaxies. Mark Twain had something insightful to say about just about every aspect of human experience and so it�s not surprising that he was able to sum up one of the central problems we�re dealing with in this class in a single snide remark� So he meant it as a joke of course but there really is something fascinating about science. We go from a few bones to the existence of dinosaurs, from a few fruit flies to heredity, from spectral lines to the existence of galaxies.

3. �There is something fascinating about science. One gets such wholesale returns of conjecture out of such a trifling investment of fact.� ~ Mark Twain, 1883 Perhaps even more astonishingly � � there�s us � Rebecca uses a few massively reconstructed imagees of blood flowing through the brain, I look at the behavior of preschoolers and worst of all Josh and Tania look at what undergraduates do � and from this we expect to understand something about the fundamental nature of cognition. And as Josh noted, the fundamental question is why are we so good at this? Why do we make so many accurate predictions and interventions? Why do we get it right? And what I want to suggest as impressive as science is, getting wholesale returns out of minimal data is a commonplace feature of human cognition and particularly the type of learning that occurs in childhood. And that learning can be best explained in terms of theory formation and theory change. Perhaps even more astonishingly � � there�s us � Rebecca uses a few massively reconstructed imagees of blood flowing through the brain, I look at the behavior of preschoolers and worst of all Josh and Tania look at what undergraduates do � and from this we expect to understand something about the fundamental nature of cognition. And as Josh noted, the fundamental question is why are we so good at this? Why do we make so many accurate predictions and interventions? Why do we get it right? And what I want to suggest as impressive as science is, getting wholesale returns out of minimal data is a commonplace feature of human cognition and particularly the type of learning that occurs in childhood. And that learning can be best explained in terms of theory formation and theory change.

4. Little artist So you should be a little suspicious of this � Just because theories our an occupational hazard of our job we want to say that this is the fundamental way that thought is structured? Wouldn�t it at the least be a suspicious coincidence if the fundamental structure of thought was the way that the cognitive scientists who developed the idea happened to think? Why think of children as little scientists as opposed to little journalists, little artists, little therapists, little all-star baseball players the way they think of themselves? And of course theories don�t capture the whole of what it means to be a human being, all the dimensions of human experience, but neither it is a suspicious coincidence because the argument is not really that children think like scientists but that we can do science because we once were children. And the claim is that human children make massive inductions from minimal amounts of data, that their representation of knowledge in many areas is abstract and coherent, and that those representations allow children to explain the past, predict the future and intervene on the present, and that those representations change with evidence. � and that science is a particular historical and cultural canalization of those universal human abilities. So you should be a little suspicious of this � Just because theories our an occupational hazard of our job we want to say that this is the fundamental way that thought is structured? Wouldn�t it at the least be a suspicious coincidence if the fundamental structure of thought was the way that the cognitive scientists who developed the idea happened to think? Why think of children as little scientists as opposed to little journalists, little artists, little therapists, little all-star baseball players the way they think of themselves? And of course theories don�t capture the whole of what it means to be a human being, all the dimensions of human experience, but neither it is a suspicious coincidence because the argument is not really that children think like scientists but that we can do science because we once were children. And the claim is that human children make massive inductions from minimal amounts of data, that their representation of knowledge in many areas is abstract and coherent, and that those representations allow children to explain the past, predict the future and intervene on the present, and that those representations change with evidence. � and that science is a particular historical and cultural canalization of those universal human abilities.

5. Plan Part I: What do we really mean by theories and why should we think children have them? Part II: How theories might develop and change -- and some well-established claims about the relationship between theories and action. Part III: Some much more speculative claims about the relationship between theories and action. So in the first part of the talk I�m going to pick up that first thing you might be suspicious about and talk a little bit about what we really mean by theories and I�m really hoping this will be a discussion because we�ve all sat here for 3 days now and we should have some idea of what we�re really committing to here � what does it mean to say knowledge is structured like a theory � what sort of evidence would you need to show that children had theories as opposed to habits of association, or logical rules. Why think that conceptual development is analogous to theory change as opposed to maturational change, children might get new representations of knowledge the way they get new sets of teeth, it might just come online at a certain point in development �So the first part of the talk will be on what would we need to show that children really had theories and some empirical evidence from my lab that children actually do. Part I: What do we really mean by theories and why should we think children have them? Part II: How theories might develop and change -- and why we should care about the relationship between theories and action. In the second part of the talk, I�m going to talk about how you might build a theory. Rebecca posed this as a question in her last slide yesterday about and it�s a very deep question. And she�s quite right, we don�t know the learning mechanisms � we don�t know much about how theories develop and theories change. I�m going to talk about a very, venerable idea in developmental psychology which is to say it�s over fifty years old. It�s an idea by the great developmental psychologist Jean Piaget and I�m going to talk about why we should still take it seriously and how it connects to action. Part III: Some well-established claims about the relationship between theories and action. I�m going to actually have you take part in a mini-experiment, it will actually involve going out in the hallway and fun things like that and it�s sort of an example of how theories might constrain our actions in the world. Part IV: Some very speculative claims about the relationship between theories -- and theory-formation mechanisms -- and action. And in the last part of the talk I�m going to talk about some new data from my lab and some very baby thoughts about how theories might relate to action. So in the first part of the talk I�m going to pick up that first thing you might be suspicious about and talk a little bit about what we really mean by theories and I�m really hoping this will be a discussion because we�ve all sat here for 3 days now and we should have some idea of what we�re really committing to here � what does it mean to say knowledge is structured like a theory � what sort of evidence would you need to show that children had theories as opposed to habits of association, or logical rules. Why think that conceptual development is analogous to theory change as opposed to maturational change, children might get new representations of knowledge the way they get new sets of teeth, it might just come online at a certain point in development �So the first part of the talk will be on what would we need to show that children really had theories and some empirical evidence from my lab that children actually do. Part I: What do we really mean by theories and why should we think children have them? Part II: How theories might develop and change -- and why we should care about the relationship between theories and action. In the second part of the talk, I�m going to talk about how you might build a theory. Rebecca posed this as a question in her last slide yesterday about and it�s a very deep question. And she�s quite right, we don�t know the learning mechanisms � we don�t know much about how theories develop and theories change. I�m going to talk about a very, venerable idea in developmental psychology which is to say it�s over fifty years old. It�s an idea by the great developmental psychologist Jean Piaget and I�m going to talk about why we should still take it seriously and how it connects to action. Part III: Some well-established claims about the relationship between theories and action. I�m going to actually have you take part in a mini-experiment, it will actually involve going out in the hallway and fun things like that and it�s sort of an example of how theories might constrain our actions in the world. Part IV: Some very speculative claims about the relationship between theories -- and theory-formation mechanisms -- and action. And in the last part of the talk I�m going to talk about some new data from my lab and some very baby thoughts about how theories might relate to action.

6. Plan Part I: What do we really mean by theories and why should we think children have them? Part II: How theories might develop and change -- and some well-established claims about the relationship between theories and action. Part III: Some much more speculative claims about the relationship between theories and action. So in the first part of the talk I�m going to pick up that first thing you might be suspicious about and talk a little bit about what we really mean by theories and I�m really hoping this will be a discussion because we�ve all sat here for 3 days now and we should have some idea of what we�re really committing to here � what does it mean to say knowledge is structured like a theory � what sort of evidence would you need to show that children had theories as opposed to habits of association, or logical rules. Why think that conceptual development is analogous to theory change as opposed to maturational change, children might get new representations of knowledge the way they get new sets of teeth, it might just come online at a certain point in development �So the first part of the talk will be on what would we need to show that children really had theories and some empirical evidence from my lab that children actually do. Part I: What do we really mean by theories and why should we think children have them? Part II: How theories might develop and change -- and why we should care about the relationship between theories and action. In the second part of the talk, I�m going to talk about how you might build a theory. Rebecca posed this as a question in her last slide yesterday about and it�s a very deep question. And she�s quite right, we don�t know the learning mechanisms � we don�t know much about how theories develop and theories change. I�m going to talk about a very, venerable idea in developmental psychology which is to say it�s over fifty years old. It�s an idea by the great developmental psychologist Jean Piaget and I�m going to talk about why we should still take it seriously and how it connects to action. Part III: Some well-established claims about the relationship between theories and action. In the third part of the talk, I�m going to actually have you take part in a mini-experiment, it will actually involve going out in the hallway and fun things like that and it�s sort of an example of how theories might constrain our actions in the world. Part IV: Some very speculative claims about the relationship between theories -- and theory-formation mechanisms -- and action. And in the last part of the talk I�m going to talk about some new data from my lab and some very baby thoughts about how theories might relate to action. So in the first part of the talk I�m going to pick up that first thing you might be suspicious about and talk a little bit about what we really mean by theories and I�m really hoping this will be a discussion because we�ve all sat here for 3 days now and we should have some idea of what we�re really committing to here � what does it mean to say knowledge is structured like a theory � what sort of evidence would you need to show that children had theories as opposed to habits of association, or logical rules. Why think that conceptual development is analogous to theory change as opposed to maturational change, children might get new representations of knowledge the way they get new sets of teeth, it might just come online at a certain point in development �So the first part of the talk will be on what would we need to show that children really had theories and some empirical evidence from my lab that children actually do. Part I: What do we really mean by theories and why should we think children have them? Part II: How theories might develop and change -- and why we should care about the relationship between theories and action. In the second part of the talk, I�m going to talk about how you might build a theory. Rebecca posed this as a question in her last slide yesterday about and it�s a very deep question. And she�s quite right, we don�t know the learning mechanisms � we don�t know much about how theories develop and theories change. I�m going to talk about a very, venerable idea in developmental psychology which is to say it�s over fifty years old. It�s an idea by the great developmental psychologist Jean Piaget and I�m going to talk about why we should still take it seriously and how it connects to action. Part III: Some well-established claims about the relationship between theories and action. In the third part of the talk, I�m going to actually have you take part in a mini-experiment, it will actually involve going out in the hallway and fun things like that and it�s sort of an example of how theories might constrain our actions in the world. Part IV: Some very speculative claims about the relationship between theories -- and theory-formation mechanisms -- and action. And in the last part of the talk I�m going to talk about some new data from my lab and some very baby thoughts about how theories might relate to action.

7. So what�s a theory? Did Newton and Darwin have theories? Do adults have theories? Do three-year-olds have theories? Do babies have theories? Do chimps (dogs, crows �) have theories? Does the visual system have a theory? Okay so, part I. You�ve had 6 hours of lecture on theories now � what�s a theory? But do we really want to call it a theory? Is it sort of defalationary to the very idea of theories to lump all tehse together � Does Newton have a theory? Let�s hope so or we have no basic idea what the word theory means. Do you have theories? Josh and Tania might have convinced you you do. Do 4-year-olds have theories? Well, they certainly don�t know what the word theory means but maybe Rebecca convinced you that at least they might have a theory of mind. So then Rebecca posed another question; Do preverbal babies have theories? What justifies calling the mental representations of a 6-month-old and the mental representations of Sir Isaac Newton by the same name? And if 6-month-olds have theories what about chimpanzees? And if chimps have theories, what about things with no brain at all? Does the visual system have a theory? And the important thing isn�t where in ontogenetic or phylogenetic complexity you want to draw the line but why you want to draw the line there or why you want to draw no line at all � what about some particular way of representing information makes it theory like? And I want to jointly facilitate this discussion with my co-teachers here. I�m going to have to cut it Okay so, part I. You�ve had 6 hours of lecture on theories now � what�s a theory? But do we really want to call it a theory? Is it sort of defalationary to the very idea of theories to lump all tehse together � Does Newton have a theory? Let�s hope so or we have no basic idea what the word theory means. Do you have theories? Josh and Tania might have convinced you you do. Do 4-year-olds have theories? Well, they certainly don�t know what the word theory means but maybe Rebecca convinced you that at least they might have a theory of mind. So then Rebecca posed another question; Do preverbal babies have theories? What justifies calling the mental representations of a 6-month-old and the mental representations of Sir Isaac Newton by the same name? And if 6-month-olds have theories what about chimpanzees? And if chimps have theories, what about things with no brain at all? Does the visual system have a theory? And the important thing isn�t where in ontogenetic or phylogenetic complexity you want to draw the line but why you want to draw the line there or why you want to draw no line at all � what about some particular way of representing information makes it theory like? And I want to jointly facilitate this discussion with my co-teachers here. I�m going to have to cut it

8. What are characteristics of a theory? Structural features Abstract (goes beyond the evidence) Ontologically committed (categories are defined by the theory) Functional features Causal (supports prediction, intervention, explanation, and counterfactual claims). Dynamic features Defeasible/revisable with evidence Affect the interpretation of evidence. So by these standards does the visual system have a theory? I�d argue maybe not. Is theory of mind a theory? is theory of mind a theory? Why? Why not? What about if you think about something like theory of mind, we might want to call it a theory because it goes beyond the evidence, mostly we talk about unobservable entities like desires, beliefs, and intentions. It�s ontologically committed, we develop distinctions between agents and non-agents, we commit to the existence of mental states, and is abstract -- the evidence is all about surface behavior but we abstract away from the behavior and explain it in terms of unobservable entities. Behavior explained in terms of mental states, she wants the cookie, she thinks it�s over there. Ontologically committed: agents, non-agents, intentions, desires, beliefs; causal: use it to predict behavior, explain it, intervene, counterfactual (if I hadn�t been mean to my sister So by these standards does the visual system have a theory? I�d argue maybe not. Is theory of mind a theory? is theory of mind a theory? Why? Why not? What about if you think about something like theory of mind, we might want to call it a theory because it goes beyond the evidence, mostly we talk about unobservable entities like desires, beliefs, and intentions. It�s ontologically committed, we develop distinctions between agents and non-agents, we commit to the existence of mental states, and is abstract -- the evidence is all about surface behavior but we abstract away from the behavior and explain it in terms of unobservable entities. Behavior explained in terms of mental states, she wants the cookie, she thinks it�s over there. Ontologically committed: agents, non-agents, intentions, desires, beliefs; causal: use it to predict behavior, explain it, intervene, counterfactual (if I hadn�t been mean to my sister

9. What are characteristics of a theory? Structural features Abstract (goes beyond the evidence) Ontologically committed (categories are defined by the theory) Functional features Causal (supports prediction, intervention, explanation, and counterfactual claims). Dynamic features Defeasible/revisable with evidence Affect the interpretation of evidence. So by these standards does the visual system have a theory? I�d argue maybe not. Is theory of mind a theory? is theory of mind a theory? Why? Why not? What about if you think about something like theory of mind, we might want to call it a theory because it goes beyond the evidence, mostly we talk about unobservable entities like desires, beliefs, and intentions. It�s ontologically committed, we develop distinctions between agents and non-agents, we commit to the existence of mental states, and is abstract -- the evidence is all about surface behavior but we abstract away from the behavior and explain it in terms of unobservable entities. Behavior explained in terms of mental states, she wants the cookie, she thinks it�s over there. Ontologically committed: agents, non-agents, intentions, desires, beliefs; causal: use it to predict behavior, explain it, intervene, counterfactual (if I hadn�t been mean to my sister So by these standards does the visual system have a theory? I�d argue maybe not. Is theory of mind a theory? is theory of mind a theory? Why? Why not? What about if you think about something like theory of mind, we might want to call it a theory because it goes beyond the evidence, mostly we talk about unobservable entities like desires, beliefs, and intentions. It�s ontologically committed, we develop distinctions between agents and non-agents, we commit to the existence of mental states, and is abstract -- the evidence is all about surface behavior but we abstract away from the behavior and explain it in terms of unobservable entities. Behavior explained in terms of mental states, she wants the cookie, she thinks it�s over there. Ontologically committed: agents, non-agents, intentions, desires, beliefs; causal: use it to predict behavior, explain it, intervene, counterfactual (if I hadn�t been mean to my sister

10. Theory theory �Place some children in a universe that is radically different from our own . . If they come up with representations that are an accurate account of our universe, modularity is right. If they come up with representations that are an accurate account of their universe, the theory theory is right.� (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).

12. Theories affect the interpretation of evidenceTheories affect the interpretation of evidence

13. How might theories constrain the interpretation of evidence? Scientists came up with a technique for changing the gender of mice. They injected 100 mice with glucosin before impregnation. 70% of the newborns were male.

14. How might theories constrain the interpretation of evidence? On a scale of 1-7 where 7 is very convinced and 1 is not so convinced, how convinced are you that glucosin might affect mice gender?

15. How might theories constrain the interpretation of evidence? ESP experts came up with a technique for changing coin flips. They flipped a coin 100 times while chanting �heads�. 70% of the coin flips came up heads.

16. How might theories constrain the interpretation of evidence? On a scale of 1-7 where 7 is very convinced and 1 is not so convinced, how convinced are you that chanting �heads� might affect coin flips?

17. So we might think children had theories if � their beliefs about the world were abstract, causal, and coherent those beliefs changed with evidence � and their beliefs affected the interpretation of evidence. One way to measure coherence is to say that children reason in domain-appropriate ways, they don�t think everything can explain everything � that is, they organize knowledge in ways that seem to reflect real causal differences in the world � now you might be suspicious because many of these divisions reflect the divisions in undergraduate education � so what is a domain really?One way to measure coherence is to say that children reason in domain-appropriate ways, they don�t think everything can explain everything � that is, they organize knowledge in ways that seem to reflect real causal differences in the world � now you might be suspicious because many of these divisions reflect the divisions in undergraduate education � so what is a domain really?

18. What�s a domain? Good question � �A body of knowledge that identifies and interprets a class of phenomena assumed to share certain properties and to be of a distinct and general type. A domain functions as a stable response to a set of recurring and complex problems faced by the organism.� (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994)

19. Toddlers� domain-appropriate explanations It breaked because it was glass. She�s scared because she doesn�t want to be in the dark. My tummy hurts because I�m sick. ~It felled because it�s sick. ~ She�s scared because she was glass. ~ My finger hurts because it doesn�t want to be in the dark.

20. Domain-specific theories Theories tell you what types of events are might explain other events. Theories constrain what you think is possible and impossible � or at least what you think is more or less probable. True for children as well �

21. Domain-specific theories Max wants to throw a rock in the water and make a big splash. Can he?

22. Domain-specific theories Max wants to jump in the air and stay up forever. Can he?

23. Domain-specific theories Max wants to drink cider instead of milk. Can he?

24. Domain-specific theories Max wants to stop growing. He wants to stay small forever. Can he?

25. Domain-specific theories So children are very good at using domain knowledge to reason about possible and impossible events. And are very resistant to believing that causal relations can cross domain boundaries (Notaro, Gelman & Zimmerman)

26. Domain-specific theories Max is very worried about the first day of school. Can Max get a tummyache from worrying so much?

27. Does evidence affect children�s theories? Can children use statistical evidence to learn things they don�t believe at baseline?

28. Do theories affect children�s evaluation of evidence? Do children interpret identical evidence differently depending on whether the evidence is theory-neutral or theory-violating?

29. Evidence A&B-->E (G&J-->~E) C&A-->E A&D-->E F&A-->E A&H-->E What causes the effect, A or H?

30. Bayesian inference Bayes� rule: An example Data: E Some hypotheses: H A Prior is agnostic between 1 and 2 Likelihood P(d|h) favors 2 over 1 Posterior P(d|h) favors 2

31. Theory-neutral (within domain)

32. Theory-violating (Cross Domain)

33. Baseline Condition

34. Bayesian inference - within domains Bayes� rule: An example Data: Bambi has itchy spots Some hypotheses: Bambi ran through a garden Bambi ran through the cattails Prior is agnostic between 1 and 2 Likelihood P(d|h) favors 2 over 1 Posterior P(d|h) favors 2

35. Bayesian inference - cross-domains Bayes� rule: An example Data: Bunny has a tummyache Some hypotheses: Bunny ate a sandwich Bunny is scared of show and tell Prior favors 1 over 2 Likelihood P(d|h) favors 2 over 1 Posterior P(d|h) favors?

36. Results Four Year Olds

37. 3�6-4�0 Results Because theories are too strong or ability to interpret evidence is too weak?Because theories are too strong or ability to interpret evidence is too weak?

38. Recap Children reason like scientists insofar as: Children learn from evidence Children evaluate the evidence in light of their theories.

39. Plan Part I: What do we really mean by theories and why should we think children have them? Part II: How theories might develop and change -- and some well-established claims about the relationship between theories and action. Part III: Some much more speculative claims about the relationship between theories and action.

40. Picture so far � Evidence Theories So you could be hiding in a room all day, people could come in and out handing you data, you could interpret the data in the light of your theories and you could develop theories in light of the data and that would be all there would be to intelligence. And I think many people think the life of a professor is exactlythat � But I believe that misses something fundamental about the nature of theories. And I�m going to show you why �So you could be hiding in a room all day, people could come in and out handing you data, you could interpret the data in the light of your theories and you could develop theories in light of the data and that would be all there would be to intelligence. And I think many people think the life of a professor is exactlythat � But I believe that misses something fundamental about the nature of theories. And I�m going to show you why �

41. Na�ve theory of bubbles? Write down everything you think you know about soap bubbles � what�s core? What�s not so core? And if that�s your theory of bubbles, I can just about guarantee that there are some things you are not going to do � For instance, you probably won�t try this � And in this case, you�d be wrong.Write down everything you think you know about soap bubbles � what�s core? What�s not so core? And if that�s your theory of bubbles, I can just about guarantee that there are some things you are not going to do � For instance, you probably won�t try this � And in this case, you�d be wrong.

42. A favorite quote �The greatest obstacle to discovery is not ignorance but the illusion of knowledge� (Daniel Boorstin)

43. Constructivism Evidence Theories Action So what�s really critical is that theories constrian our actions on the world � sometimes in helpful ways, but sometimes in not so helpful ways. Because it�s not just the case that we have theories so we can act. But our actions affect the evidence we get. And this idea was central to Piaget�s account of children�s elarning � Children�s active explorationof the world mattered � in fact it was a driving force in cognitive development. When we act on the world we get different evidence then when we just sit and back and watch. Our actions change the evidence we get, which changes our theories, which in turn supports new action. Okay, so is there any evidence that children�s theories affect their actions? Tania actually pointed me to one of the most elegant studies and it it wasdone in the �70�s by �stimuli are bad but you can use your imaginationSo what�s really critical is that theories constrian our actions on the world � sometimes in helpful ways, but sometimes in not so helpful ways. Because it�s not just the case that we have theories so we can act. But our actions affect the evidence we get. And this idea was central to Piaget�s account of children�s elarning � Children�s active explorationof the world mattered � in fact it was a driving force in cognitive development. When we act on the world we get different evidence then when we just sit and back and watch. Our actions change the evidence we get, which changes our theories, which in turn supports new action. Okay, so is there any evidence that children�s theories affect their actions? Tania actually pointed me to one of the most elegant studies and it it wasdone in the �70�s by �stimuli are bad but you can use your imagination

44. Theories and evidence

45. Theories and evidence

46. Theories and evidence

47. Theories and evidence So that�s an adult na�ve theory of balancing. But what aobut children? Well it turns out that young children, 3-year-olds, don�t have much of a theory about balancing, at least not as evident in the behavior. T hey seem to balance all blocks � deceptive or not � by trial and error. Four-year-old childrne do have a theory and it�s not a bad theory but it happens to be wrong. They have a Centering theory that you balance opbjects by putting the middle of the object in the middle of the support. And this theory constrains their actions. So that while chlidrne a year younger will successfully balance deceptive blocks just by trying it out. Four-year-olds won�t. They fail and they fail and they fail because they insist that blocks balance by being put in the middle. Five-year-old childrne have an adult-like theory that you have to put the weight in the imddle. The y succeed. U-shaped curve Made-up data but something liket his �So that�s an adult na�ve theory of balancing. But what aobut children? Well it turns out that young children, 3-year-olds, don�t have much of a theory about balancing, at least not as evident in the behavior. T hey seem to balance all blocks � deceptive or not � by trial and error. Four-year-old childrne do have a theory and it�s not a bad theory but it happens to be wrong. They have a Centering theory that you balance opbjects by putting the middle of the object in the middle of the support. And this theory constrains their actions. So that while chlidrne a year younger will successfully balance deceptive blocks just by trying it out. Four-year-olds won�t. They fail and they fail and they fail because they insist that blocks balance by being put in the middle. Five-year-old childrne have an adult-like theory that you have to put the weight in the imddle. The y succeed. U-shaped curve Made-up data but something liket his �

48. Theories and actions The really amazing thing is that if you can liberate 4-year-olds form their theories, they can balance the blocks just fine. How do you liberate a 4-year-old from the theory that the block should look like it�s in the middle. You turn out the lights. And when you do � childrne look just fine. So theories are sometimes problematic. And not just for children �The really amazing thing is that if you can liberate 4-year-olds form their theories, they can balance the blocks just fine. How do you liberate a 4-year-old from the theory that the block should look like it�s in the middle. You turn out the lights. And when you do � childrne look just fine. So theories are sometimes problematic. And not just for children �

49. Experiment Find a partner. Your task is to affix the candle to the bulletin board outside. Come back when you�re done.

50. Functional fixedness Once you know the purpose of something (boxes are for containment) it�s much harder to see other uses (boxes are for support). Adults are much faster at solving the problem when the tacks are outside the box than inside the box.

51. What does this have to do with theories? Adults have a �design� theory of artifacts. We think artifacts were built for a purpose. The designer�s intention is central to our understanding of an artifact. So even if you use a pillow for a projectile, the purpose of the pillow is still as a cushion.

52. What does this have to do with theories? 7-year-olds v. 5-year-olds �What�s a brick for?� Suppose children don�t have a design stance about artifacts. Maybe they wouldn�t be subject to functional fixedness � Maybe they wouldn�t be subject to functional fixedness �

53. Moe the troll lost his ball in the tube. Manipulated the pencil in both cases bu eiither did or did not demonstrate that the pencil was for writing. Moe the troll lost his ball in the tube. Manipulated the pencil in both cases bu eiither did or did not demonstrate that the pencil was for writing.

55. Really about theories? Pencils are more familiar to older children than younger children. Maybe older children just have to inhibit their knowledge of pencils and it interferes with their action. However, it�s an abstract theory about artifacts, should apply even to novel artifacts.

56. Novel artifacts � lighting wand. Novel artifacts � lighting wand.

58. Implications Our theories constrain our actions. For better and for worse � Let�s take a break �

59. Plan Part I: What do we really mean by theories and why should we think children have them? Part II: How theories might develop and change -- and some well-established claims about the relationship between theories and action. Part III: Some much more speculative claims about the relationship between theories and action.

60. What are characteristics of a theory? Structural features Abstract (goes beyond the evidence) Ontologically committed (categories are defined by the theory) Functional features Causal (supports prediction, intervention, explanation, and counterfactual claims). Supports curiosity and exploration. Dynamic features Defeasible/revisable with evidence Affect the interpretation of evidence. And the really essential claim here is that there is another functional role of theories which is that they support curiosity and exploration. Another way of saying this is that theories affect the way children play. And that although children�s free play is incredibly noisy and random-looking, it�s not completely noisy and random-looking. The clich� that we learn by doing, that play is children�s work, those may not just platitudes for preschool newsletters � those may be deep truths about what motivates learning. And the really essential claim here is that there is another functional role of theories which is that they support curiosity and exploration. Another way of saying this is that theories affect the way children play. And that although children�s free play is incredibly noisy and random-looking, it�s not completely noisy and random-looking. The clich� that we learn by doing, that play is children�s work, those may not just platitudes for preschool newsletters � those may be deep truths about what motivates learning.

61. Speculations about theories and action Young children will generate more varied actions when evidence violates their theories than when it is consistent with their theories.

62. Acting when evidence violates your na�ve theories Previous research suggests that young children expect physical causes to act deterministically. If children think the true causal structure of the world is deterministic � they might engage in more exploratory behavior when causes appear to produce effects stochastically then when causes act deterministically.

63. Acting when evidence violates your na�ve theoriesSchulz & Hooppell Theory: Causes always produce effects. Evidence 1: C-->E, C-->E, C-->E, C-->E Action: Produce C Evidence 2: C-->E, C-->X, C-->E, C-->X Action: Varied Evidence 3: C-->E, C-->X, C-->E, C-->X Action: Produce C

66. Scoring

67. Differential actions

68. Differential actions

69. Conclusion Children believe physical causes should act deterministically. Children produce more varied actions when they observe stochastic evidence than deterministic evidence. Since stochastic evidence is often due to unobserved causes, such exploration might support learning.

70. Speculations about theories and action Schulz & Baraff-Bonawitz Young children will generate more varied actions when evidence is ambiguous (e.g., confounded) than when it is unconfounded. Volunteers?

71. Speculations about theories and actions Unconfounded condition: Each lever moved both together and separately. Confounded condition: Levers only moved together. We then give children a choice of the toy they�ve already played with or a brand new toy. Prediction: children will choose the new toy in the unconfounded condition and keep playing with the old toy in the unconfounded condition.

74. Results: (n = 16 per group)

75. Results

76. Results:

77. Acting when evidence is confounded Children are sensitive to instances of confounding. Children seem to explore more when the causal structure is ambiguous. When children explore, they disambiguate the causal structure.

78. Theories and action speculations So it look as if both substantive and formal assumptions about causal structure affect children�s actions � And affect it in exactly the sorts of ways that might promote learning.

79. Summary Children�s theories are affected by evidence. Children�s theories affect the interpretation of evidence. Children�s theories both constrain and enable actions Actions provide new evidence � And so children learn �

80. They�re scientists after all!

81. Exploration What we know for sure about children: They are immature. They are impulsive They are perseverative

82. Exploration What we know for sure about children: They are excellent causal learners. They produce a wide range of interventions on the world. They replicate their interventions.

83. Exploration Is this really true? Given novel objects, do young children produce both A) more unique actions and B) more total actions, than older children or adults?

84. Exploration

85. Coding sheet

86. Results: (four 3�s; six 4�s; four adults)

87. Results: (four 3�s; six 4�s; four adults)